Romantic Frames of Mind: Vision and Sympathy in British Novels of the Nineteenth Century by Massie, Catherine
 
 
 
 
 
ROMANTIC FRAMES OF MIND: 
VISION AND SYMPATHY IN  
BRITISH NOVELS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
 
 
 
 
Catherine (Kate) Jane Massie 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of English and Comparative Literature  
in the School of Arts and Sciences. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Joseph Viscomi 
 
Laurie Langbauer 
 
Gordon Pitz 
 
Mary Sheriff 
 
Jane Thrailkill 
! ii!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 
Catherine (Kate) Jane Massie 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
! iii!
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Catherine Jane (Kate) Massie: Romantic Frames of Mind:  
Vision and Sympathy in British Novels of the Nineteenth Century 
(Under the direction of Joseph Viscomi) 
 
 
 
Victorians in Britain believed, following the Romantics, that vision facilitated sympathy, 
or knowledge of others’ inner lives. Yet humanities scholars have often associated 
Victorian art or literature that presents vision as a mode of knowledge or avenue for 
curiosity with spectacle or discipline: the disruption of sympathy. This dissertation 
challenges this narrative to argue that many Victorian artists and writers experimented 
with the visual to aid sympathy (empathy, in modern parlance). It focuses on Jane 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, Charlotte Brontë’s Villette, George Eliot’s Middlemarch, 
and Rudyard Kipling’s Kim, paired with visual art (paintings or photographs) or visual 
experiences (seeing through microscopes, visiting a museum, looking through an album), 
to suggest that these novels variously exemplify fiction’s power to help audiences see 
from other points of view. The novels function as cognitive artifacts that practice 
audiences in perspective change. This analysis clarifies the depth of the Romantic 
aesthetic revolution and suggests the return of its ideas in modern cognitive science. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Dorothy Wordsworth’s journal entry for the 20th of January in 1798 begins with 
simple yet poetic observations: 
 The green paths down the hill-sides are channels for streams. The young wheat is  
streaked by silver lines of water running between the ridges, the sheep are 
gathered together on the slopes. After the wet dark days, the country seems more 
populous. It peoples itself in the sunbeams. (1) 
 
She kept the journal presumably for reasons similar to those that have motivated 
countless others to write in journals or diaries: to remember events, to register thoughts, 
to explore and understand personal daily experience, and as was increasingly true across 
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Britain, to record direct perception and 
subjective experience of the natural world. These short lines show Dorothy translating 
into words her keen visual observations of that world – the hill-sides, the wheat, the 
water, the sheep – and transforming them subtly into aesthetic perception via delightful 
metaphor: “the country peoples itself in the sunbeams.” 
Soon after she wrote, Dorothy’s brother William transcribed these four sentences 
into his own journal, and decades later he also seems to have transformed them into lines 
of poetry.1 When Dorothy wrote, she used her journal as a memory device to record her 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1In the 1971 edition of the Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth, editor Mary Moorman writes in a footnote to 
the excerpt quoted above that Dorothy composed these lines and William copied them into the Alfoxden 
Notebook; he later used similar phrases in a fragment of poetry that can be found on page 341 of volume V 
in Ernest de Sélincourt’s The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth. In a footnote to the same excerpt in a 
2002 edition of the journals (The Grasmere and Alfoxden Journals), Pamela Woof admits the possibility 
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observations and as a tool to aid her thoughts about what she had noticed. The journal’s 
efficacy as a help not merely to memory but also perhaps to continued thought appears 
most strikingly in that verb metaphor turning vision into aesthetics. When William copied 
her lines and returned to them years later, he likewise used his journal as an auxiliary to 
memory and finally, after a greater delay, as an aid to continued thought.  
But this was still not the endpoint in the usefulness of Dorothy’s words, or the 
service of her journal to thought. Though the original handwritten version has been lost, 
copies beginning with her brother’s ensured the journal’s persistence through the 
intervening centuries, during which her words have been read and analyzed for countless 
reasons by countless individuals. As primary text and as supporting evidence in 
multitudes of secondary texts, the journal has become part of the accumulated stock of 
knowledge about the era now called Romantic. In one measure of modern influence, a 
Google search for “Alfoxden Journal” in late 2012 turns up more than 8,000 results, 
including links to full-text digital copies, scholarly print editions, critical reviews of those 
editions, reference works, and crib notes for students. The same search in Google Scholar 
produces nearly 500 entries, many of which represent scholarly arguments that reference 
the journal. Dorothy’s text did not aid only her memory and assist only her thought, just 
as it did not prompt only her brother’s: it has aided and inspired the thought of nearly 
numberless readers since she wrote it. Read for its own interest, for the history it records, 
and for its insight into William Wordsworth’s process of composition, Dorothy’s journal 
has been incorporated into the larger historical and cultural story, or stories, of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
that William was merely the scribe of these lines, but prefers the hypothesis that brother and sister 
composed them together, or that William was the original author (see page 274 in the 2002 edition). Here I 
preserve Moorman’s notion that Dorothy wrote the lines and William copied them – but fully admit I do so 
for sentimental reasons. Whatever theory of composition is correct, the lines William wrote into the 
Alfoxden Notebook are now the only part of the Alfoxden Journal that exist in manuscript. 
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Romantic period. Her interpretation of her own visual impressions on January 20, 1798 
has become part of shared cultural memory in the process. 
This dissertation will be concerned with much this sort of cultural knowledge 
work via texts: it will focus particularly on novels as they inspire and enable thought, 
especially where such thought processes both involve visual information and also are 
characteristic of nineteenth-century Britain. In particular, it will propose that novels 
offered – and offer – one important space for communities of readers to define shared 
values, work through the local implications of wider cultural trends, and practice sharing 
points of view. By its nature, fiction asks readers to inhabit different perspectives, flesh 
out characters from limited descriptive cues, and turn curiosity into information about 
others. Readers take pleasure in this play with shifting perspective, but modern 
psychological research suggests that reading also performs useful work: readers of fiction 
are absorbed in and transformed by their reading, and lastingly affected afterward. Novels 
thus share with other written texts their usefulness to memory and thought both 
individual and cultural; to this utility they add the command of story and the magic of art. 
As a major genre that came into its own in the nineteenth century, famously an 
age of widespread social and cultural change in Britain, novels provided readers with an 
important new way to exercise sympathy. The nineteenth-century word for empathy, 
“sympathy” was an abiding concern for many nineteenth-century Britons, who believed 
that visual observation facilitated this knowledge about other people’s emotions, 
perspectives, and experiences. While scholars of visual culture have often associated 
Victorian art and literature that foregrounds vision with spectacle, alienation, and 
fragmentation – the interruption of sympathetic understanding – examination of texts 
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that, like Dorothy’s, turn vision into aesthetics suggests that this scholarly interpretation 
may not be the whole story. Indeed, newer work in cognitive science and the psychology 
of empathy reveals that sight provides one important avenue for understanding others’ 
inner lives, and that art offers powerful shared experiences of seeing and knowing from 
other points of view when it activates audiences’ imaginations to complete meaning.  
This dissertation examines novels paired with visual art (paintings or 
photographs) or visual experiences (such as looking through a microscope, or visiting a 
museum) familiar to nineteenth-century Britons. In particular, I will focus on a subset of 
British novels that wielded popular influence in the nineteenth century and remain part of 
the canon today. Including Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, Charlotte Brontë’s 
Villette, George Eliot’s Middlemarch, and Rudyard Kipling’s Kim, this group affected 
and responded to British culture, and continues to exercise influence over modern ideas 
about fiction’s purpose and power. These novels, in particular, adapt the nineteenth-
century British preoccupation with vision as mode of knowledge and an avenue for 
curiosity in order to elicit empathy. Thus the dissertation will also attend to nineteenth-
century visual phenomenology as this helps elucidate readers’ responses. Through this 
interdisciplinary project, drawing on literature, art history, history, psychology, and 
cognitive science, I challenge earlier scholarship to argue that many Victorian artists and 
writers, like their Romantic predecessors, experimented with records of visual 
impressions in order to facilitate sympathy. The project’s subordinate but related claim is 
that nineteenth-century British ideas about sympathy persist and return in today’s 
cognitive psychology; these repetitions substantiate the insight of the Romantic aesthetic 
revolution and also clarify fiction’s ability to transport audiences into other lives. 
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Cognitive Artifacts 
One way to describe the usefulness of Dorothy’s journal, both for Dorothy and for 
everyone who has found something inspiring, edifying, or interesting in any edition of 
her pages since she wrote them, is to define her journal as a “cognitive artifact.” A 
cognitive artifact is a human-created device that assists cognition – knowledge, memory, 
problem solving, pattern recognition, classification, perception, attention, insight, and a 
host of other potential tasks related to thought. Cognitive scientist Donald Norman 
describes cognitive artifacts as “mental tools” and “external aids that enhance cognitive 
abilities” (Things 4, 43). As he writes, 
The human mind is limited in capability. There is only so much we can 
remember, only so much we can learn. But among our abilities is that of devising 
artificial devices – artifacts – that expand our capabilities. We invent things that 
make us smart. (Things 3) 
 
Norman argues that cognitive artifacts do not amplify cognition the way a megaphone 
amplifies the voice; instead, they “change the nature of the task being done [to] enhance 
the overall performance” (“Cognitive” 19). A slide rule, for example, turns a complicated 
mathematical calculation from an onerous memory task into one that requires precise 
physical manipulation (to move the rule), and sharp observation (to read results 
accurately).2 The slide rule changes the task to one that consumes less time and mental 
resources because some knowledge has been “stored” in the instrument (Card et al 2-3). 
As Norman points out, cognitive artifacts are not all manipulable objects like the 
slide rule. They include records like notes and books, which aid extended thinking 
because they serve as external memory; like Dorothy’s journal, they allow the user to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2A digital calculator is no less a cognitive artifact because its workings are invisible, however. It just 
changes the task differently. All three scenarios – mental calculation, use of the slide rule, use of the 
calculator – require basic understanding of the mathematical problem (Card et al 2-3). 
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return to and deepen previous thought, or benefit from the thought and knowledge of 
others. Not all cognitive artifacts are physical, either – they include procedures, such as 
the routine checks a pilot performs before take-off, and systems, like mathematics 
(Norman Things 4-5). Such mental cognitive artifacts aid cognition because they provide 
“information structures” that guide thought and assist communication (Norman Things 
4). In David Herman’s apt phrase, cognitive artifacts are “material as well as mental 
objects that enable or enhance cognition” (163, my emphasis). Thus for example 
cartography is a cognitive artifact because it is an invented system of conventions for 
representing space, whose users understand its symbolism; within the system an 
individual map “stores” information and allows a user to make calculations about such 
concerns as distance or elevation; a book of maps collects these records for easy 
preservation and reference. Cartography, map, and book are all cognitive artifacts. 
Similarly, writing itself is an invented conventional system whose individual users 
(whether hand writers or typists) produce texts that store information for communication, 
reference, and knowledge sharing and serve as cognitive artifacts in their own right.  
Amid this apparent diversity, three key components constitute all cognitive 
artifacts: their artificial, “invented” ontology, their ability to “enhance” cognitive 
performance, and their function to represent information (Norman Things 4-5, 
“Cognitive” 17). Cognitive artifacts do their performance-enhancing work via 
representation, or the use of symbols or signs to stand in for the concept, object, or event 
represented. A representation is an abstraction that focuses on the essential and disregards 
the inessential elements of what it represents, allowing easier communication, 
description, memory, and analysis. Yet as Norman notes, “The critical trick is to get the 
! 7!
abstractions right” (Things 49). If a representation highlights or disregards the wrong 
elements, then it disrupts communication, derails description, and disorders thought. 
Done well, however, a representation usefully translates thought into “whatever form and 
structure best” suits the problem at hand (Norman Things 51). It should be noted that both 
the representation itself and the cognitive artifact that supports it are cognitive artifacts: a 
record and its book, a display and its computer screen.3 
 As such a text, Dorothy’s journal can be considered a cognitive artifact in 
multiple senses: as individual record and as participant within several systems, as 
physical and as mental object. The original journal was a physical object that Dorothy 
wrote in, with pages she turned, read, and scanned, and covers she closed. It recorded her 
observations, changing what would have been a memory task into a writing and reference 
task; in turn Dorothy’s use of it presumably organized her thoughts and prompted new 
ones. She participated in systems common to her culture, the use of journals and the 
practice of close observation being (often related, under empiricism) conventions of her 
day. As a record, however, the journal’s singular physical existence ultimately proved 
less important than the stories it could tell about Dorothy and her brother – their daily 
lives, their thoughts, their sensibilities, their habits of perception. These made the journal 
important enough to be copied, saved, and circulated among readers (and writers) who 
believed it provided useful knowledge. The journal is thus one original cognitive artifact, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3Proponents of extended cognition often argue that such external aids become such an integral part of 
cognition that some “thinking” actually happens outside the body. Without going quite so far, this 
dissertation will maintain that the use of an external aid can enhance cognitive performance – even 
enabling kinds of thinking that would not be possible without it. Similarly, the nature of the aid can affect 
cognitive performance perhaps as much as the fact of its existence. Full comprehension of a text’s function 
thus requires attention not simply to either text or reader but to as much as possible of the system in which 
both are embedded. 
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now lost, and multitudes published and shared since, which also represent its abstract 
existence as culturally useful item. Its stories live, and continue to aid thought. 
Stories as Cognitive Artifacts 
 To call a story a cognitive artifact is to reference both the possibly physical 
existence of a story, circulated in print and communicated in writing, and its abstract 
nature as an object of memory, which may be shared verbally, may be discussed without 
reference to a physical text, and may serve as a kind of repository or marker of shared 
culture. What marks “story” as cognitive artifact under all these circumstances is, again, 
that it is made by humans, that it represents, and that it can assist and enhance (or at least, 
change) thinking, regardless of whether it is a “material” or a “mental” object, or both.  
 A growing, interdisciplinary contingency of researchers has begun to see story, or 
narrative, in just this way. Ubiquitous in human cultures, story is not only fun; like many 
other forms of play, it also performs useful work. Influential psychologist Jerome Bruner 
suggests that narrative is a cognitive mode that helps us understand and “construct the 
social world and the things that transpire therein,” “the rich and messy domain of human 
interaction” (5, 4). As “familiar and ubiquitous” to humans as water is to fish, Bruner 
asserts, narrative helps us “organize our experience and our memory of human 
happenings” in the form of “stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and 
so on” (4).4 In short, narrative helps humans understand personal and social experience 
and solve problems related to social knowledge, or “what we think people are like and 
how they must get on with each other” (Bruner 20-21). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4Though Bruner suggests both a “narrative mode of thought” and a “narrative discourse,” he argues that 
this is a distinction without a difference, because “our experience of human affairs comes to take the form 
of the narratives we use in telling about them” (5, emphasis in original). 
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This dissertation will be concerned with four related ways, among the myriad, in 
which story helps humans navigate experience, particularly experience within a 
community. Story allows us to impose patterns on personal experience to understand it, 
to comprehend that others’ inner lives are different from our own, to practice empathy in 
inconsequential (fictional) scenarios, and to see meaningful patterns in the life of the 
larger environment, culture or society.  
First, story allows us to organize our own life experience, which means 
“chunking” it into workable pieces, providing it with a sequence, invoking cause and 
effect relations, and otherwise imposing pattern (Herman 172-185). In short, we can 
make sense of what would otherwise be chaotic via narrative. As Jonathan Gottschall 
puts it, “We spend our lives crafting stories that make us the noble – if flawed – 
protagonists of first-person dramas. A life story is a ‘personal myth’ about who we are 
deep down – where we come from, how we got this way, and what it all means” (161). 
Stories, like dreams or other forms of play, may also offer us the chance to experiment 
with alternative identities safely (Humphrey 106-125). Several features of narrative 
thinking help us perform this psychological work. “Chunking” allows us to break up 
experience into manageable segments. Just as stories have beginnings and endings, with 
multiple incidents in between, so we organize our life experiences into episodes that 
belong to a longer narrative (Herman 172-5). Causal relations allow us to discover the 
immutable beneath mutability: our basic identity remains the same even as time and 
experience produce changes in appearance and behavior. Sequencing implies causal 
relations, as things that happened earlier are assumed to help cause things that happened 
! 10!
later (Herman 175-178). Patterns allow us to answer those questions about “where we 
come from, how we got this way, and what it all means.”5  
An important component of this process of self-awareness is the ongoing 
relationship between the individual perspective and the environment or community – 
what Herman calls “the inextricable interconnection between trying to make sense of and 
being within an environment that extends beyond the self” (183, emphasis in original). In 
other words, understanding one’s own experience is intimately bound with understanding 
one’s place in the larger social group. We learn to see ourselves partly by considering 
how others see us.6 Individuals build personal histories from the accrual of narratives 
about origins and experiences; cultures gradually build traditions from the accrual of 
similar narratives as explanations. Individual narrative histories are always in dialogue 
with these larger cultural versions. As Bruner writes, “our individual autobiographies… 
depend on being placed within a continuity provided by a constructed and shared social 
history in which we locate our Selves and our individual continuities” (20). If cultural 
histories are constructed by many individual repetitions of the same narratives, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5Perhaps most importantly, personal memory is like the experience of story in that both are simulated. Any 
narrative provides only the basic sketch of story as the audience experiences it; those who read it, or listen 
to it, or watch it on stage or screen construct out of personal experience the full world it merely suggests. 
As psychologist Keith Oatley writes, “We create our own version” of the narrative; “We run a simulation 
on our own minds” (18). Similarly, memories are not captured and filed for later access, when they appear 
again like perfect photographic copies. Instead, it seems, they are reconstructed with every act of 
remembering. We re-experience a memory as a kind of simulation based on the basic sketch of the original 
experience, but re-created, with much the same possibilities for imaginative construction as in the 
experience of story. Countless studies suggest memory’s flawed (and wonderful) fabulations (Gottschall 
156-176). The human drive to impose narrative on personal experience is so great that we will even invent 
false – but entirely plausible-sounding – explanations for our own behavior under test conditions that 
ensure our narratives come from thin air. (See for example Michael Gazzaniga’s work with split-brain 
patients, as recorded in “Forty-Five Years of Split-Brain Research and Still Going Strong” and The Mind’s 
Past and discussed in Gottschall’s chapter 5). In the cases of memory and of fiction, “Narrative ‘truth’ is 
judged by its verisimilitude rather than its verifiability” (Bruner 13).  !
6See Philippe Rochat, Others in Mind: Social Origins of Self-Consciousness. 
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development of any individual history is also intimately bound with the larger narrative 
traditions of that community cultural history. 
Second, story offers practice in the awareness that others have inner lives that 
differ from our own. In most of daily life, this happens effortlessly: “We have only so 
much as to glance at another human being and we at once begin to read beneath the 
surface. We see there another conscious person, like ourselves,” an individual with 
personal emotions, desires, hopes, memories, a past and a future (Humphrey 30, 66). The 
human tendency to attribute mind appears in our proclivity to bestow mental states even 
on non-conscious entities – the car that will not start, the rain that will not stop 
(Humphrey 85-87). Yet we seem to like to exercise these skills in fiction, where we use 
them to turn the limited cues a story provides about a character into mental conceptions 
of more or less fully realized people. “Theory of Mind,” or “mindreading” is the 
cognitive science term for this faculty by which we read others’ perspectives, thoughts, 
and emotions from behavior and appearance. Lisa Zunshine argues that the purpose of 
fiction is precisely to exercise this function, because that exercise is pleasurable, and 
because it provides playful practice in mindreading skills we use in daily social 
interaction (4-6). Stories may help us navigate social interaction by simulating complex 
situations that, if they do not mimic those we see in daily life, at least “run parallel” to 
them in requiring awareness that others have different perspectives (Gottschall 58).  
  Third, stories may help us become better not only at recognizing that others have 
unique inner lives, but also at reading and sharing those perspectives. Some cognitive 
scientists suggest that “mirror neurons” in the brain are active when we feel or act, and 
also when we perceive someone else feeling or acting. In other words, our brain states are 
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partly the same whether we perform or perceive an emotion or an action (Iacoboni 4-8). 
Marco Iacoboni, a neuroscientist who studies mirror neurons, asserts that these neurons 
underlie audiences’ responses even to fictional characters’ predicaments, rather than to 
those we directly perceive: “We have empathy for… fictional characters – we know how 
they’re feeling – because we literally experience the same feelings ourselves” (4).  
Though other scientists caution that mirror neuron enthusiasts attribute too much 
to these neurons, it does seem clear that stories change our brains and bodies. One study 
led by Mbemba Jabbi discovered that some of the same brain regions activated when 
subjects tasted disgusting liquid, watched people taste liquid and make disgusted faces, 
and read about people experiencing disgust (Jabbi et al 1, 4-5). Jabbi and colleagues 
concluded “that imagination and social perception of emotions may share 
neuroanatomical underpinnings” and that “the neural basis of the captivating experience 
of reading a book” may involve the partial simulation or replication of brain states 
associated with emotion. Nicole Speer and colleagues’ 2009 study asked participants to 
read short narratives while their brain activity was monitored. Speer’s group found that 
when their subjects read about characters’ bodily movements and interaction with their 
environment, including the manipulation of objects, their brain activation looked much 
like the brain activation of people moving about and grasping objects themselves (996-
998).7 Accumulating evidence does begin to suggest that people share one another’s inner 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7See also the Stanford experiment described in Corrie Goldman’s “This is Your Brain on Jane Austen, and 
Researchers at Stanford are Taking Notes.” In this study, ongoing as of publication of the news article, 
subjects read a chapter of Mansfield Park and alternated between reading for pleasure and reading closely 
for scholarly interest as an fMRI scanner tracked blood flow in their brains. Results at the time of 
publication suggested that close reading involves more brain activity, which may point to focused reading 
“as a kind of cognitive training” (qtd in Goldman).  
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states by mirroring them on a neural level. Reading about a character’s emotion can 
provoke us to feel that emotion with a similar brain state.8 
 Over time, some researchers suggest, accumulated experience with fiction may 
rewire readers in more lasting ways. Stories may help us to become better empathizers in 
daily life.9 This is not because readers store and retrieve specific lessons from stories they 
have read and retained in explicit memory, and then apply them to a social dilemma at 
hand, but because accumulated practice in simulated social interaction hones skills. Any 
practice via “realistic rehearsal… leads to enhanced performance regardless of whether 
the training episodes are explicitly remembered” (Valli and Revonsuo 11, qtd in 
Gottschall 65). Perhaps stories, the mind’s simulations of social life, practice readers in 
the same way (Gottschall 64-67, Mar et al “Bookworms” 696).  
The research of Oatley and his colleague Raymond Mar suggests this may be true. 
In one study that controlled for age and language fluency, Mar, Oatley, and colleagues 
found that frequent fiction readers both scored higher than frequent readers of non-fiction 
in self-reported tests of empathy, perspective-taking, and story absorption tendencies, and 
also performed better than non-fiction readers in tasks requiring social inference skills 
(Mar et al “Bookworms” 703). Exposure to narrative, with its “depictions of the actual 
world replete with intentional agents pursuing goals,” seemed to make a positive 
difference in social ability, despite negative stereotypes of the isolated bookworm (Mar, 
Oatley, et al “Bookworms” 695). The possibility remained, however, that fiction readers 
are drawn to fiction’s interpersonal nuances precisely because they already possess 
greater social ability. Mar, Oatley, and Peterson conducted a second study designed to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8Gottschall discusses the Jabbi and Speer studies in several chapters, including “Hell is Story-Friendly.” 
 
9This is not the same thing, of course, as becoming either a more compassionate or a more moral person. 
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control (at least partly) for the effect of personality traits, and found that fiction readers 
still outperformed nonfiction readers on tasks requiring empathetic inference. Though 
their studies cannot be fully definitive, Mar and colleagues suggest that fiction may 
indeed practice social skills. An inclination towards imaginative engagement may also 
help start an individual on a life of reading fiction: “a ready capacity to project oneself 
into a story may assist in projecting oneself into another’s mind in order to infer their 
mental states… [T]his capacity to really empathize with fiction appears to explain, in 
part, why fiction-reading habits relate to social skills” (Mar et al “Exploring the link” 
421-2).10  
 Finally – as the immediately preceding paragraphs should suggest – just as we 
understand ourselves through the stories we tell ourselves, so we understand others 
through the stories we tell about them. This dissertation will argue that cultures use 
stories to seek meaning in shared cultural life, or to borrow Martha Nussbaum’s words, as 
escorts “bringing us into contact with the complexity of our own lives and the lives of 
others” and “as guides to what is mysterious and messy and dark in our experience” 
individually and together (“Exactly” 348). Stories, among all the tools humans use to 
understand experience, usefully allow room for the qualitative and the subjective, for the 
emotions and the imagination.  
The generic and the particular are always in tension in any given story.  As 
cognitive artifacts, of course, stories abstract: interesting stories typically exclude the 
inessential minutia of daily life in favor of essential events and dialogue that advance the 
plot, which is to say, those that relate to the characters’ problems and to the larger social 
issues at stake. Stories also necessarily present the particular, the local, and the specific: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10I am indebted to Gottschall’s The Storytelling Animal for sending me to Mar’s and Oatley’s work. 
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the points of view of individual characters or groups within a particular, even personal 
context. Even a story that seems to capture universal truths must do so with particular 
characters from particular places within particular circumstances. Yet narrative research 
suggests that most stories belong not just to genres but also to “general types” that often 
intersect cultures and traditions (Bruner 7, Hogan 133-138).11 As Bruner writes,  
Particularity achieves its emblematic status by its embeddedness in a story that is 
in some sense generic…. The ‘suggestiveness’ of a story lies, then, in the 
emblematic nature of its particulars, its relevance to a more inclusive narrative 
type. But for all that, a narrative cannot be realized save through particular 
embodiment. (7) 
 
Stories are thus eminently useful for exploring the effects of the universal on the 
particular, and vice versa – of context and perspective on others’ inner lives and 
characters, in the messy affective richness of lived experience – to “enable us to 
understand how similar hopes and fears are differently realized in different social 
circumstances” (Nussbaum “Exactly” 350). Stories offer a complement to the general and 
the universal in the sense that they show how general rules affect individual lives, and 
may in turn teach general precepts through specific examples that form repeated patterns. 
Similarly, stories that offer multiple possible subjective interpretations complement the 
complexity of social life, where general rules would seem to oversimplify, and they 
practice readers in careful “lucidity” and “the intense scrutiny of particulars” (Nussbaum 
“Finely” 516). Stories create and shape communities and individuals; stories may make 
us better readers of ourselves, of one another, and of all the nuanced intricacies of 
subjectivity and emotion that characterize our shared communities. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11Romantic narratives of separation and reunion, heroic narratives of deposition and triumph, and sacrificial 
narratives of violation and propitiation all cross genetic and geographic divides to appear, with creative 
variation, in cultures nearly everywhere (Hogan 133-138). 
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 But this work requires good readers as much as good stories. If humans can 
remember tremendous amounts of information when it is organized into patterns, 
nevertheless the pattern must be perceived for to be meaningful (Norman Things 77). 
Written stories afford reflection in the same sense that a book’s pages afford turning: the 
reader “can review it, compare this section with that, analyze the structure and the 
content” (Norman Things 246). Readers determine their own pace and can stop to 
consider and reflect on the form and content of their reading wherever desired. But the 
transition from what Norman calls the experiential mode, where the reader is absorbed 
fully in the experience of the text, into reflective reasoning depends on the impulse of the 
reader (Things 47). Without the impulse, the reader will not necessarily make the 
transition, or the connections between storyworld and her own society. Suzanne Keen 
notes that group discussion of literature, during or after reading, can be crucial 
encouragement of such reflection. A teacher who encourages readers to find patterns in 
their reading, and links between the experience of reading and readers’ own subsequent 
actions, can encourage meaningful contemplation and even empathy. But, she cautions, 
individual responses to stories vary as much as stories do, and the production of empathy 
might best be considered a neutral tool that can be used for ends we might deem 
destructive as well as constructive (25, 28-38). 
In each of the above uses, stories serve as “intuition pumps,” to borrow Daniel 
Dennett’s term for “thought experiments” that “pump an intuition” (182). “[J]ungle gyms 
for the imagination,” stories as intuition pumps “structure the way you think about a 
problem” and therefore how that problem is solved (Dennett 182). Like other cognitive 
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artifacts, in other words, stories change the problem-solving task and the way the 
problem solver approaches it. Mar and Oatley’s argument is worth quoting at length: 
 The product of an author’s investigation into human nature is a story, which is a 
 simulation in two separate senses. First, stories simulate or model the social world 
 through abstraction. This abstraction condenses complex information regarding 
interactions between multiple autonomous and intentional agents without 
substantial discarding of key elements, while simultaneously revealing the 
principle underlying chords of the social world. Second, the abstraction of 
experience found in stories evokes, through various mechanisms that depend on 
imagery and literary language, a simulative experience that allows for the 
compelling and efficient transmission of social knowledge. Just as the idea of 
simulations that run on computers has extended conceptual understandings of the 
cognitive psychology of vision and reasoning, we propose that the idea of fiction 
as a kind of simulation that runs on minds will extend our understanding of selves 
in the social world. (Mar and Oatley “The Function of Fiction” 187-188) 
 
That they do so by engaging the imagination is one key source of their power.  
The stories on which I focus, in their instantiation as novels, are for the willing 
and receptive reader devices of transportation as well as of continued thought. Richard 
Gerrig compares the experience of narrative to the experience of travel “some distance 
from [one’s] world of origin,” through fiction’s magic (10). Story’s art can weave a spell 
so complete that readers forget to attend to their own surroundings and feel “immersed in 
the world of the narrative,” transported into other lives, other times, other places (Green 
247). “A transported reader,” writes psychologist Melanie Green, “suspends normal 
assumptions and treats the narrative as the frame of reference” (248). Story’s pleasurable 
claim on the imagination offers a window into other worlds and a vehicle to carry the 
willing reader there. Narrative absorption relies on readers’ intuitive emotional responses 
to others and to situations, which in turn depend on imaginative engagement and aesthetic 
response. The work of Green and others indicates that degree of transportation is 
associated with changes in attitude and even in personality. The more a reader is 
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transported into a story, the more he or she is likely not only to view characters 
sympathetically, but also to agree with the story’s general import and the social beliefs it 
expresses.12  
Aesthetic response is therefore an absolutely necessary component for the work 
that fiction performs, even if it may not be fully sufficient without an intentionally 
thoughtful reader. The “moral of the story,” said in plain words, may be less effective at 
providing such insights than the story itself; readers may need a story’s art – its particular 
language – to experience a full aesthetic and imaginative response. Nussbaum even 
suggests that different aesthetic styles may afford different kinds of insight. Austen 
makes available a certain kind of social awareness, Eliot another. Just as the kind of 
stories I will discuss draw on generic types and universal themes, but make these 
particular in character and context, so they make notions of empathy and social 
responsibility particular through specific language that in different words would lose 
some of its power and impact. If no author can count on reflective evaluation in her 
readers, so no story-analyst should lose sight of the aesthetic of transportation into other 
lives that does the work of perspective sharing. The artfulness of the stories I have chosen 
lead the reader to wonder – to be curious, and to marvel – and this play with words on 
readerly curiosity is inextricable from the work the stories perform. 
Vision, Curiosity, and Wonder 
 One way to understand nineteenth-century Britain is as an age in which older 
cultural stories began to make less sense, and newer ones accrued explanatory power. An 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12For more on this process, see Green and Brock, “The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of 
Public Narratives” and Green, Brock, and Kaufman, “Understanding Media Enjoyment: The Role of 
Transportation into Narrative Worlds” and finally, Green and Carpenter, “Transporting into Narrative 
Worlds: New Directions for the Scientific Study of Literature.”  
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obvious example for today’s critics would undoubtedly be the contest between the 
Darwinian story of evolution, which crystallized scattered and long-generating materials 
into a unified theory, and older natural-theological explanations for diversity in living 
creatures. But the nineteenth century is famously an era of immense change in Britain, 
the first country in the world to industrialize and the foremost in burgeoning empire at the 
time.13 Not surprisingly, then, across the century Britons were engaged in navigating new 
and changing relationships with each other, with their larger culture, and with the natural 
world. I submit that such changes required other new explanatory cultural stories as well. 
This exploration, both literal and metaphorical, consistently demonstrates a 
growing attitude of curiosity, or the intellectual impulse to know more.14 It is as if new 
information about England’s own flora and fauna, about human life, and about the globe 
and its far-flung inhabitants provoked both new awareness among the average nineteenth-
century Briton that learning it might be desirable.15 Public lectures, advances in printing, 
and better and more widespread education made such information popularly accessible, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13In 1800, the population of England was still predominantly rural. One century later, nearly 80 percent of 
Britons lived in cities. The middle decades of the century saw technological innovations that brought 
England new wealth, as well as a steady erosion of the upper class’ long financial and political domination. 
As the Reform Bills transferred political power to lower classes, and the Industrial Revolution lined the 
pockets of the middle class and brought the lower classes streaming into the cities for work, the old landed 
estate system began to crumble (Strong 30-37). Over the course of the century, Acts of Enclosure tamed 
most of whatever wild land was left. Empire brought the British into contact with new peoples, new flora 
and fauna, and new kinds of objects – all of which streamed back home and had to be studied, organized, 
and assimilated (Fulford et al 6, 8, 12-13. See also N Armstrong, Fiction in the Age of Photography). More 
British citizens lived inside less space than ever before, even as the horizons of the British Empire 
expanded around the globe until finally, famously, they met again. England was the first country to 
experience industrial pollution, and the first to have an international capital on a truly modern scale. 
 
14Reio et al establish that “information seeking, or cognitive curiosity, which stimulates information-
seeking, exploratory behavior” is indeed an independent form of curiosity, “distinct” from “sensory 
curiosity,” which provokes the curious to seek new forms of sensation rather than new information (118). 
 
15Indeed, in a seminal 1994, article George Loewenstein defined intellectual curiosity (which he called 
epistemic curiosity) as the result of awareness that a “gap in one’s knowledge” exists (76). Awareness, or 
knowing what one does not know, typically precedes interest. See Loewenstein, “The Psychology of 
Curiosity: A Review and Reinterpretation.” !
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where it had once been the domain of a privileged few. If, as researchers of curiosity 
suggest, humans play on the edges of the unknown, then no wonder nineteenth-century 
British art and science responded with stories that sought to explain these changes, 
assimilate them, or respond to them.16 
Strikingly often, nineteenth-century curiosity took a visual turn.17 Anna Letitia 
Barbauld and John Aiken’s Evenings at Home; or, The Juvenile Budget Opened, first 
published between 1792 and 1796 and eventually “a classic of the Victorian nursery,” 
links education explicitly with curiosity about the visual appearances of things (Fyfe).18 
A chapter titled “Eyes and No Eyes; or, The Art of Seeing” compares the accounts of two 
schoolboys, William the budding naturalist and Robert the dullard, who have each taken 
the same afternoon walk. Robert was bored with no one to see or converse with, but 
William tells his teacher that he “hardly took a step that did not delight” him and has 
“brought [his] handkerchief full of curiosities home” (Barbauld and Aiken 97). This 
bundle of “curiosities” offer the material for the imaginative recreation of his walk, an 
extended narrative that lets the teacher interpose nuggets of fact and lessons on the utility 
and pleasure of curiosity as it leads to keen visual observation. The teacher concludes the 
chapter with a summary of its import: “the observing eye and inquiring mind find matter !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16As Paul J. Silvia puts it, “New and comprehensible [things] are interesting; new and incomprehensible 
things are confusing” (58). Wojciech Pisula similarly argues that “novelty” and “complexity” both “evoke 
curiosity” but “[t]he prerequisite, however, is comprehensibility”: if people believe they can understand 
something strange and new, they will feel curious; if the novel seems too difficult even to begin to grasp, 
then “what follows is withdrawal and stress” rather than exploration and learning (131). 
 
17Curiosity may have long-standing associations with vision, as George Loewenstein points out. He notes 
that St. Augustine called it “ocular lust” and Sigmund Freud used the roughly equivalent term “Schaulust” 
(Loewenstein 76-77). I am indebted to Ashley K. Reed for a translation of “Schaulust” as “a strong desire 
to look at things;” this is, as Ashley says, “curiosity with a specifically visual component.” !
18The book had gone to sixteen editions by 1850. The copyright of the second version expired in 1851, and 
“by the 1860s, Evenings at Home was being published by six other publishers” in addition to George 
Routledge, who published the first cheap reprint (Fyfe). The final full reprint was published in 1905 (Fyfe). 
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of improvement and delight in every ramble in town or country” (Barbauld and Aiken 
97). Wonder inspires investigation, which provides the pleasure of further wonders: work 
and play unite in visually-stoked curiosity, which is its own reward. 
 I suggest that this general curiosity and the interest in vision it provoked began in 
the Romantic period, where it surfaced in both aesthetics and science, and increased in 
intensity and influence across the Victorian age. Though we are, as Richard Holmes 
notes, accustomed to thinking of Romantic literature as “intensely hostile” to science, “its 
ideal of subjectivity eternally opposed to that of scientific objectivity,” the two were more 
intertwined under the banner of curiosity and vision than this culturally inherited story of 
difference suggests (xvi). Disciplines separating intellectual activity into two cultures had 
yet to evolve, and as Fulford et al argue, “it was not customary formally to divide 
fictional from factual writing” until well into mid-century (4). Romantic aesthetics and 
what Holmes, Noah Heringman, and others have termed “Romantic science” shared a 
sense of wonder at the visible natural world in its various appearances, and an impulse to 
understand more about it for the pleasure of knowledge, even if their modes of discovery 
and definitions of “knowledge” sometimes differed. 
The braided nature of science and aesthetics as modes of curiosity’s relationship 
with vision in the Romantic period is clear when one puts Wordsworth’s evolving 
“Preface to Lyrical Ballads” back into conversation, as it seems originally to have been, 
with Humphry Davy’s 1802 Introductory Discourse. As fundamental texts for 
Romanticism, these two documents represent the focused thought of men who would 
eventually be recognized as the intellectual pillars of the period.19 In his introductory !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19Davy, who would become “the Romantic Age’s most prominent and passionate Man of Science,” knew 
Wordsworth through Coleridge, and had corresponded directly with Wordsworth to correct the proofs of 
! 22!
lecture, which Coleridge heard, Davy asserted the importance of chemistry for 
intellectual and social progress and, as if defending the man of science against the 
implications of Wordsworth’s 1800 “Preface,” borrowed Wordsworthian language to 
“sketc[h] out a bold forecast of a coming age of technology in which the chemist would 
be the architect of great benefits for mankind” (Sharrock 65). A few months later, 
Wordsworth published the 1802 version of Lyrical Ballads, with a revised “Preface” in 
which he seems to respond to Davy’s discourse with a section discussing the poet and the 
man of science (Sharrock 65-69).20 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads, including the “Preface” in which Wordsworth argued for the value of 
the poetic mind (Ross 24, Sharrock 57, 66). In London in January 1802, Davy delivered his Introductory 
Discourse, the first of what would be many well-attended public lectures on chemistry. 
 
20In his January lecture, Davy defends science against beliefs like those Wordsworth and Coleridge held at 
the turn of the century, that “the kind of analysis of nature performed by the experimental scientist was 
useful but superficial… the work of an inferior faculty” (Sharrock 61). In the 1800 and following versions 
of the “Preface,” Wordsworth claimed that poetry (by contrast) is concerned with “the primary laws of 
[human] nature” and “the essential passions of the heart,” one source of its restorative powers (Wordsworth 
“Preface” 392). Davy asserts therefore that the purpose of his lecture is to explore the “effects” of 
chemistry “upon the progress of the human mind” (316).  By this he means both technological progress, 
which moves general knowledge forward, and also “the effects of the study of this science [chemistry] 
upon particular minds,” which he examines in order to “ascertain its powers of increasing… happiness” and 
health (324). Davy even asserts that the study of science “may destroy diseases of the imagination, owing 
to too deep a sensibility,” returning the man of science to a balanced appreciation of “tranquillity and 
order” (326). Science as Davy describes it is not superficial, but actually addresses the profoundest needs of 
the individual and the community, even as it interests the public; he hopes that scientific progress will 
gradually bring about an improved society, “in which the different orders and classes of men will contribute 
more effectively to the support of each other than they have hitherto done” (322).  
 Wordsworth then adds a long section to the 1802 “Preface,” a part of which discusses the 
distinction between “the Poet” and “the Man of Science.” He admits that both poet and man of science take 
pleasure in the pursuit of knowledge, and seems to imply that both sorts of pursuit can be useful. Yet he 
also claims that while the “solitary” “Man of Science seeks truth as a remote and unknown benefactor,” the 
Poet’s pursuit is of a different and more important kind of knowledge: “the first and last,” “a necessary part 
of our existence” (Wordsworth “Preface” 401). The Poet, unlike the Man of Science, “sing[s] a song in 
which all human beings join” (Wordsworth “Preface” 402). Poetry’s expression of human experience is for 
Wordsworth still the more crucial sort of knowledge than the merely factual information science provides. 
Nevertheless, should science bring about a “material revolution… in our condition” of the very sort that 
Davy prophesized, and therefore also “in the impressions which we habitually receive,” then the poet too 
will adapt, voicing the human sensations contingent on the changes (Wordsworth “Preface” 403). He 
writes, 
 The remotest discoveries of the Chemist, the Botanist, or Mineralogist, will be as 
proper objects of the Poet’s art as any upon which it can be employed, if the time should ever 
come when these things shall be familiar to us, and the relations under which they are 
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Although Wordsworth holds Davy’s claims for science’s benefits at arms’ length, 
and Davy implies that a Wordsworthian “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” 
might best serve those who also remember the importance of “order” (a word with 
Enlightenment overtones), the two men each claim for their respective discipline a 
restorative power based in renewed wonder over the apparently quotidian. This 
pleasurable sense of wonder begins in curiosity about visual appearances and leads to 
profounder understanding and appreciation. As in the earlier version, Wordsworth of the 
1802 “Preface” posits poetry as the antidote to the “craving” for “outrageous stimulation” 
that plagues those (mostly city-dwellers) grown accustomed to increasingly wild cultural 
display in the form of theatrical spectacle, “frantic novels,” “extravagant” verse, and 
titillating newspaper stories (Wordsworth “Preface” 395). Where such spectacles “blunt 
the discriminating powers of the mind” and “reduce it to a state of almost savage torpor,” 
his poetry adopts the simple language of truthful observation to demonstrate how restored 
perception can find the “unusual” and the “interesting” in even the most “ordinary 
things” (Wordsworth “Preface” 392). Though Wordsworth writes that poetry’s first 
concern is with the mind “when agitated by the great and simple affections of [human] 
nature,” the ordinary things that excite such emotion include both everyday social 
situations and also the natural world, to which “the mind of man” forms a “mirror” 
(“Preface” 394, 402).  
Davy, perhaps influenced by the language of Wordsworth’s 1800 text, claims 
similar restorative benefits for the mind in science. Like Wordsworth, Davy’s text 
(published soon after the lecture) finds cities sources of perceptual desensitization, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
contemplated by the followers of these respective Sciences shall be manifestly and palpably 
material to us as enjoying and suffering beings. (Wordsworth “Preface” 403) 
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asserts that “cultivation” of interest in the sciences will “attach feelings of importance 
even to inanimate objects; and… furnish to the mind means of obtaining enjoyment 
unconnected with the labour or misery of others” (325-6). Such an interest will not only 
exercise the mind’s powers of observation and imagination, but also improve 
relationships with other people and the natural world, for “the physical sciences… 
demonstrate that every being is intended for some definite end or purpose” and therefore 
worthy of respect and regard (Davy 325-6). Like Wordsworth’s poetry, Davy’s science 
teaches its practitioner newly to see the common and the ordinary, which gain in 
significance as the observer gains in knowledge: “The appearances of the greater number 
of natural objects are originally delightful to us, and they become still more so, when the 
laws by which they are governed are known” (325).  
Despite their differences, then, together Wordsworth and Davy help to usher in 
the era of Romanticism in both art and science: an “Age of Wonder” at even the ordinary 
and quotidian, wonder that inspired a “reverent contemplation of nature” observed 
“simply and precisely” (Holmes 249).!Davy compares chemistry properly pursued to 
“slowly endeavouring to lift up the veil concealing the wonderful phaenomena of living 
nature” (314), and describes science’s recent progress as attaining newly accurate seeing: 
“The dim and uncertain twilight of discovery, which gave to objects false or indefinite 
appearances, has been succeeded by the steady light of truth, which has shown the 
external world in its distinct forms, and in its true relations to human powers” (321).  
Wordsworth likewise claims that the language of truthful, attentive observation will 
usefully display the real importance of his ordinary subjects: “I do not know how…” he 
writes, “I can give my Reader a more exact notion of the style in which I wished these 
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poems to be written than by informing him that I have at all times endeavoured to look 
steadily at my subject; consequently, I hope that there is in these Poems little falsehood of 
description, and that my ideas are expressed in language fitted to their respective 
importance” (“Preface” 396, my emphasis).  Similarly, he calls the poet’s “task light and 
easy to him who looks at the world in the spirit of love” (“Preface” 401). 
One might object here. As with Romantic aesthetics more generally, Wordsworth 
clearly privileges imagination and memory over the sort of objective appearances that are 
important to Davy’s science. Wordsworth also objects to scientific thought where it seeks 
to parse the world, rather than to perceive holistically (to see “similitude in dissimilitude” 
“Preface” 407). Wordsworth makes this argument when he rejects the picturesque’s 
emphasis on external forms and visual interest in favor of a profounder sense of “A 
presence that disturbs me with the joy / Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime / Of 
something far more deeply interfused” (“Tintern” 95-97).21 Where the picturesque 
enthusiast craves excitement, variety, and novelty, Wordsworth says he now seeks a 
deeper imaginative interaction that fosters not mere visual aesthetic appreciation, but a 
sense of intimate and responsive relationship with the natural world. This profounder 
engagement celebrates the transformational powers of the imagination over the 
perceptual powers of the eye: a healthful relationship with nature, suggests the 
Wordsworth of “Lines Written a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey,” is one that will “half 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21The craze for picturesque, wildly fashionable by the end of the eighteenth century, sent countless Britons 
tramping through the English countryside in search of picturesque views – or in other words, those that 
would be suitable as the subject for a painting, because they were intricate, rough, rugged, dappled with 
light, or otherwise interesting to the eye. Armed with a Claude glass, a sketchpad, and a guidebook to tell 
him or her where to stand and how to see, the picturesque traveler took pleasure in “collecting” these 
scenes and in finishing, reviewing, and sharing them with others after returning home. Though the 
picturesque once seemed useful to Wordsworth because it directed attention to the natural world, by the 
time he was writing the poems for Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth had come to see it as a superficial and 
shallow response to mere appearances. 
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create” and half perceive, dispensing with pre-imposed conceptions (like picturesque 
rules for aesthetics) (“Tintern” 106-7). Wordsworth’s form of wonder at the ordinary 
would then seems largely opposed to Davy’s clearly visual attention to the interesting 
“appearances of… natural objects,” just as Romantic aesthetics more generally can seem 
opposed to visuality as well as the spectacular and the overly rational. 
And yet, Wordsworth’s habits of mind as expressed in his poetry demonstrate 
continued attention to the visual, which remains necessary as fodder for the imagination 
and its communicative power. For instance, though Wordsworth provides comparatively 
little “mimetic [visual] detail” in the landscape he sketches with the opening lines of 
“Tintern Abbey,” it is precisely the fact that he does “again / … behold” the scene – with 
all the implications for comprehensive visual embrace that verb implies – that sparks the 
poem (Hess 286, Wordsworth “Tintern” 4-5). Similarly, in a deceptively simpler poem, it 
is Wordsworth’s explicitly visual experience of daffodils “Fluttering and dancing in the 
breeze” that allows his later mental re-viewing of them, and facilitates the reader’s shared 
visualized experience of the final stanza (Scarry 162). Even a poem like “The Solitary 
Reaper,” in which sound seems more important than vision, “calls out to the reader in the 
opening lines to halt and ‘Behold…’” the scene (Hess 296). Each of these poems, like 
many others (e.g. “Composed Upon Westminster Bridge,” “Lines Written Near 
Richmond,” “The Thorn,” “The Ruined Cottage,” parts of the Prelude) involve “a 
protracted experience of gazing” resulting from a “moment of arrested vision, in which a 
halted narrator records an image of a momentarily fixed landscape that he can then carry 
away with him in memory for future imaginative acts” (Hess 296). 
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In short, if Wordsworth’s poems, as exemplars of Romanticism more generally, 
do half create their meaning, they also half perceive it – a fact overlooked by critics who 
focus solely on the poet’s avowed hostility to vision as it is warped by aesthetic 
convention. Furthermore, this perception is often explicitly, and at times even exclusively 
visual. Wordsworth without his powers of visual observation would not be Wordsworth, 
or perhaps even a Romantic. His sister Dorothy’s more mimetic, detailed records of their 
shared visual experiences in her journal may have been more crucial to Wordsworth than 
fully acknowledged, as a kind of external memory for the physical visions that in 
Wordsworth’s poetic treatment become insight. 
Davy’s and Wordsworth’s reliance on vision is borne out in the words of other 
figures, literary and scientific, from their age. For both sorts of endeavor, vision was key 
but also required exercise. As William Herschel, the famed astronomer, wrote,  
Seeing is in some respects an art, which must be learnt. To make a person see 
with such a [telescopic] power is nearly the same as if I were asked to make him 
play one of Handel’s fugues upon the organ. Many a night have I been practising 
to see, and it would be strange if one did not acquire a certain dexterity by such 
constant practice. (qtd in Holmes 108) 
 
Good observation, according to Herschel, requires practice just as does skillful 
performance in any other artistic endeavor, among which he classifies observation. While 
for Herschel “seeing is… an art,” for John Constable, “Painting is a science, and should 
be pursued as an inquiry into the laws of nature” (qtd. in Leslie 355). Like the man of 
science, Constable asserts, the painter must make long, patient study to train the eye and 
hand to reproduce even the most apparently spontaneous landscape. The writings of both 
men clarify that they saw vision as interpretive and subjective, but capable of providing 
epistemological insight if used with skill and dogged pertinacity. Both would agree with 
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their older contemporary, naturalist Gilbert White, that the best-informed observer is 
“one that takes his observations from the subject itself, and not from the writings of 
others” (110). 
Despite the occasional hostility that many critics have noted between Romantic 
art and science, then, I follow Holmes, Heringman, Fulford and collaborators, and others 
in asserting a shared Romantic attitude towards the natural world and its inhabitants, 
human and non-human, that emphasized visual wonder. Romantics noticed the ordinary 
and the often overlooked; relied on objective attention to detail and the subjective 
qualities of the visual observer, who trained him- or herself accordingly; and believed 
such rapt, even reverent visual attention offered the promise of sympathetic insight into 
the natural world and into humans’ place within it. To learn to see, like William, instead 
of merely look, like Robert, is to discover “a world in a grain of sand, / And heaven in a 
wild flower” (Blake “Auguries” 1-2). 
Vision, Curiosity, Sympathy: An Epistemology and An Aesthetics of Wonder, Cont. 
Sympathy’s close, though not exclusive, association with vision has roots in the 
same mid-seventeenth-century empirical philosophy that produced the notion that one 
person might understand another’s inner life via sensory information. Sounding more 
scientifically prescient than he could have known, Hume famously wrote “that the minds 
of men are mirrors to one another” (365). For Hume, sympathy depended on the work of 
the imagination, but it was an imagination often fired by sight, such as he described in 
himself: “When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my 
mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea 
of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself” (576). Likewise the sight 
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of objects that should cause emotion, such as the instruments of surgery, could “excite the 
strongest sentiments of pity and terror” in Hume, who logically attributes typical feelings 
to the average patient (or victim) of eighteenth-century medicine (576).   
Philosophers argue over whether Hume would have agreed with Adam Smith’s 
views on sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, but in Smith’s version, sympathy 
also often depends on some form of vision. He noted the habit of an audience to move 
involuntarily with the movements of a performer on a tightrope, and added, “When we 
see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we 
naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we 
feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer” (2). This bodily 
mirroring extends to emotion: “The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be 
transfused from one man to another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of 
what excited them in the person principally concerned. Grief and joy, for example, 
strongly expressed in the look and gestures of any one, at once affect the spectator with 
some degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion” (A. Smith 3). Although neither 
philosopher claims physical sight as an absolute requirement for sympathetic responses, 
both clearly mark it as a powerful aid.  
Ann Bermingham notes that in the late eighteenth-century, sensibility, or an acute 
capacity for feeling a sympathetic response, was as much a “way of seeing” as a “mode 
of feeling”, and one that “found in ordinary scenes and events occasions for deep 
reflection” (“Cottage Door” 1). Scientific and philosophical theories that supported its 
effects were tied closely not just to Hume and Smith, but also to John Locke, whose 
empirical philosophy helped push vision to the forefront of the British conception of how 
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humans know and understand the world.22 Also influential were the optics of Isaac 
Newton, who revised earlier notions that the eye emitted beams that touched objects and 
sent back information about surfaces and distances. Touch was still important for 
Newtonian optics and Lockean empiricism; it just operated in reverse: Newton’s idea was 
that rays touched the eye; Locke’s that ideas “impressed themselves on the mind” 
(Bermingham “Cottage Door” 13). In short, despite empiricism's emphasis on reason, its 
adherents theorized perception as “a way of being touched by the world” via sight, 
literally and through its effect on the emotions (Bermingham “Cottage Door” 13). By the 
time the French Revolution had devolved into bloody horrors, this mode of perception 
seemed too dangerously emotive to many in England, and English rationality and 
common sense were elevated over sensibility (Bermingham “Cottage Door” 9). 
Curiosity and the visual as it aided and encouraged interest in human relationships 
within society and within the natural environment appears as a significant factor in 
multiple large-scale popular movements that begin in the Romantic period and continue 
through the end of the century. The picturesque craze itself, anathema to the mature 
Wordsworth, can be seen as partly the result of a new curiosity about nature. Here such 
curiosity does become rather superficial, concerned as the picturesque is with mere 
appearances only: William Gilpin, its major proponent and popularizer, famously 
recommends taking a “mallet judiciously used” to historical Tintern Abbey to improve its 
outward interest for the eye (“Observations on the River Wye” 62). But Gilpin’s 
guidebooks to picturesque beauty did spark a craze that encouraged Britons to explore the 
natural world, learning to see it for themselves with the discriminating eye of a painter. 
Gilpin himself suggests that an appreciation of picturesque landscape can afford healthy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22For Locke, vision seemed the most rational and objective sense. See Edney and Crary. 
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entertainment to “engage some vacant minds” who might otherwise travel without 
purpose, and a “rational, and agreeable amusement” in “an age teeming with licentious 
pleasure” for all who pursue it (Gilpin “Three Essays” 41, 47).23 Even as England 
industrialized, increasing numbers of its citizens learned to see and visually appreciate 
their changing countryside as landscape. Though often mocked, the picturesque craze 
may have helped to inspire a more lasting, profounder taste for painting en plein air that 
brought British watercolorists into direct contact with nature and helped “produc[e] the 
expansive atmosphere for which [these painters] have become famous” (Klonk 101). 
Ultimately, Gilpin’s emphasis on quick sketching (to be revised later) may have even 
begun to condition the British eye to appreciate the sketch as a more direct access to the 
artist’s visual impressions. 
But the craze for the picturesque was hardly the only turn of the century 
manifestation of curiosity about the visual in the context of burgeoning interest in nature 
and its relationship to humankind. As Heringman points out, this period has been termed 
the “second scientific revolution” for its startling gains in knowledge about the natural 
world (2). Those who use this term typically refer to the more spectacular Romantic-era 
achievements, including Herschel’s discovery that the universe extended beyond the 
Milky Way, William Parry’s attempt on the North Pole, Michael Faraday’s work with 
electricity, and Davy’s isolation of new elements. It is indubitably true that such 
achievements and the frequent public demonstrations such as those Davy gave – wherein 
the public could see exactly what most published texts still had merely to describe – fired 
the public imagination (Ross 24).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23Interestingly, while Gilpin makes mildly ethical claims, Alexander Cozens argues in “A New Method of 
Assisting the Invention in Drawing Original Compositions of Landscape” for the psychologically (although 
he does not use this word) healthy and liberating effect of sketching original (not from nature) landscapes. 
! 32!
Perhaps somewhat less noticed by modern critics, however, but even more widely 
disseminated at the time, was the persistent nineteenth-century interest in natural history. 
Before disciplinary boundaries separated aesthetic from scientific work, and split 
scientific culture into separately defined fields, investigations of the natural world were 
largely subsumed under the banner of natural history. At once a set of practices and a 
genre of literature, natural history as the amateur practiced it beginning in the Romantic 
period involved close observation of natural forms, collection of botanical and zoological 
“specimens” simultaneously individually interesting and representative of a larger group, 
and an “unprecedented” torrent of printed reading material (Heringman 6). The hunger 
for information not only fueled reading, but also increasingly sent amateur naturalists into 
the outdoors to hunt specimens, take notes, and see for themselves. Gilbert White, a 
country parson who dedicated years to observing the natural environment in Selborne, 
and whose Natural History and Antiquities of Selborne was first published in 1789, 
pioneered such outdoors study. Over the first decades of the nineteenth century this field-
based model partly replaced in the public mind an older model of indoors investigations 
via books (Merrill 7-9, Barber 39-40). The point, as White and so many other writers 
emphasized, was not simply to read about the natural world, but also to go and see it. 
As the century continued and the “hard” sciences began to professionalize and 
specialize, natural history retained its hold on the popular imagination as an amateur 
enthusiasm, attesting to the continued pull of vision and curiosity. Lynn Barber argues 
that the “heyday of natural history” began during the Romantic period and extended into 
the height of the Victorian, from 1820 to 1870 (Barber 13, Merrill 150). Partly because 
there were never any specialized degrees in natural history at the universities, outdoors 
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naturalist study remained open to amateurs, children, women, and the lower as well as 
middle classes. One measure of natural history’s broad and continuing popularity is the 
continuing demand for naturalist guidebooks and pleasure reading. For example, J. G. 
Wood’s otherwise unremarkable Common Objects of the Country (1858) went to two 
editions in the first two months of publication; after about three decades Routledge had 
published 86,000 copies (Lightman 174-5). 
Natural history straddled the new scientific-artistic divide, investigating the 
natural world from a standpoint simultaneously alert to objective (usually visual) fact and 
infused with human interest. Where Romantic poets could sometimes castigate science 
for destroying mystery and awe (“we murder to dissect,” science “unweaves the 
rainbow”), and by just a few decades later scientific prose could assert that literature was 
too unsystematic to be good epistemology, natural history “in general refused to accept 
this dichotomy, seeing no reason why the best qualities of both pursuits might not 
overlap. Natural history texts could be both objective and subjective, concrete and 
human” (Merrill 99-100). A tension between taxonomy and morphology, or the 
representative and the particular, persisted in natural history writing and practice. But 
both writing and practice simultaneously emphasized the importance of objective facts 
and wondrous astonishment, precise observation and the appeal to the imagination. 
Typical in this regard is Charles Kingsley’s Glaucus; or, The Wonders of the Shore 
(1855), which extols the curiosity of the good naturalist because “he” is 
able to see grandeur in the minutest objects, beauty in the most ungainly… 
holding every phenomenon worth the noting down; believing that every pebble 
holds a treasure, every bud a revelation; making it a point of conscience to pass 
over nothing through laziness or hastiness, lest the vision once offered and 
despised should be withdrawn; and looking at every object as if he were never to 
behold it again. (45) 
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Kingsley then leads the reader on an imaginative ramble by the sea, consistently 
addressing his audience as if they stand together on the sand. “Follow,” “look,” “see,” 
Kingsley commands, and then he describes the sight of a landscape, a strange object, or a 
tiny creature in vivid visual detail, so that the reader’s imagination can present what he or 
she must visualize instead of perceive (e.g. Kingsley 61-64). The object to which 
Kingsley points is nearly always both individually remarkable and also a good 
representative of its species, the habits and habitats of which Kingsley is careful to 
explain. Always the excitement of curiosity provokes further investigation, which leads 
to knowledge, which is its own playful reward. Kingsley quotes Phillip Henry Gosse, 
another major Victorian naturalist writer, sounding much like Davy or Wordsworth: 
“When once we have begun to look with curiosity on the strange things that ordinary 
people pass over without notice, our wonder is continually excited” (77). As Merrill 
writes, “Natural history was aesthetic science, science pursued out of a personal sense of 
awe and beauty” (79). It retained its hold on the popular imagination alongside the more 
spectacular achievements of specialized practitioners, and it both responded to and 
shaped nineteenth-century Britons’ curiosity about the natural world. 
 The rage for outdoors exploration and for collection extended beyond the study of 
the indigenous into curiosity about Great Britain’s imperial possessions. As Mary Ellen 
Bellanca notes, “[f]rom the early nineteenth century on, an increasingly literate British 
public was steeped in discourse that glorified acquisition of new territory along with new 
knowledge,” until “[b]y the 1850s, natural science encompassed knowledge from all over 
the world, a world of which the British Empire at its height controlled 25 percent” (9). 
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Britons were invested in conquering new territory through (often visual) information as 
well as military might.  
Though wealthy Europeans had long collected odd, exotic, and even bizarre items 
for their eclectic “curiosity cabinets,” Joseph Banks’ burgeoning collection at his house 
in Soho Square marks a watershed in imperial museums in Britain (K. Arnold 16-22, 
Fulford et al 11-12). Banks accompanied Cook on his circumnavigation of the globe, and 
came home in 1772 with “a massive haul of things” he had gathered (Fulford et al 11). 
His botanical discoveries from that voyage and several earlier trips helped make Kew 
Gardens one of the foremost botanical gardens in the world, and fueled nearly three 
decades of engraving work, as Banks funded an attempt at a comprehensive, illustrated 
guide to exotic flora in fourteen volumes (Fulford et al 38). Much of the rest of his 
“massive haul” was organized and classified into a museum of Pacific culture and natural 
history that became so famously influential that Britons headed to the Pacific would often 
visit Banks’ collection first, so that they would know what to expect. Natural history, 
which was itself partly a science of classification, provided the framework for a newly 
organized sort of collection, in which objects were described and catalogued rather than 
merely jumbled together (Merrill 76). As Banks rose through the ranks of British society, 
he also made himself the central node in a growing network of exploration and 
information: for more than four decades he sent explorers across the globe from his 
position as the president of the Royal Society in London (Fulford et al 35-43. Following 
the model that Banks had set, “[v]ery often the point of a voyage was not simply to ship 
materials to and retrieve commodities from a new world, but to make representations of 
the world so that others could visit it and know what to do when they got there” (Fulford 
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et al 27). No Romantic himself, nevertheless Banks set the tone for Romantic-era (and 
later) imperial investigations, which were increasingly predicated on “viewing from a 
distance” via collections of visually interesting and apparently informative objects 
(Fulford et al 20). 
Objects were hardly the only interesting items that marked British curiosity about 
empire, however. Travel narratives, scientific studies of animal and vegetable life, 
ethnographic reports about native peoples, and wild stories about European experiences 
within native culture were not new genres even in 1800. But innovations in publication 
across the century, combined with the eventual advent of photographic illustration, meant 
that this sort of information became increasingly accessible – and demanded – by the 
reading public (Stetz 25; D. Arnold 26). Maintaining military and political control of 
territory around the globe meant that engineers, surveyors, cartographers, medical 
personnel, botanists, naturalists, ethnographers, and other scientific researchers, 
frequently affiliated with the military, were constantly on the move. Still other British 
citizens worked as ambassadors and administrators.  
All of the above produced narratives of various kinds, including official and semi-
official reports and travel accounts that combined ethnographic and zoological 
information with entertaining stories and “useful facts” – that most Victorian of 
obsessions. The sheer volume and breadth of published travel narratives from journeys 
through Great Britain’s empire and elsewhere attests to their popularity and to the British 
presence around the globe: accounts from the period in question range from Elizabeth 
Craven’s 1789 A Journey through the Crimea to Constantinople and Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s Letters Written in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark (1796) through 
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Alexander Burnes’ Travels into Bokhara; Being the Account of a Journey from India to 
Cabool, Tartary, and Persia (1834), Charles Lyell’s A Second Visit to the United States 
of North America (1849), Henry Bates’ The Naturalist on the River Amazons (1863), and 
Henry M. Stanley’s How I found Livingstone: Travels, Adventures, and Discoveries in 
Central Africa (1872) to Lewis Wingfield’s Wanderings of a Globe-trotter in the Far 
East (1889) and Robert Peary’s Northward over the “Great Ice” (1898) – just to name a 
smattering. These took a visual turn, even when they were not illustrated. Heavily 
descriptive, these accounts frequently emphasize the visual in “views,” “scenes,” or 
“prospects” (D. Arnold 24).  The British gave a great deal of “ocular authority” to the 
European traveler, in official or non-official capacity, who presumably “brought a 
discerning eye, a sharp intelligence, and the benefits of education, sensibility, and 
experience to the spectacle exposed to his or her view” (D. Arnold 24). Curiosity inspired 
the writing and the reading, both of which were extensive. 
Meanwhile, visual images of the literal sort proliferated. Though mapmaking and 
topography were traditional arts in England, a newly concentrated effort began in the 
mid-eighteenth century with a map of Scotland intended to aid military control, 
completed by 1755. The British government then founded the Ordnance Survey in 1791, 
and promptly began what became a decades-long survey of England and Wales 
(Bermingham Learning 78-81). Meanwhile, drawing for mapmaking purposes became 
part of the standard curriculum at England’s military academies, and even at some private 
schools whose pupils were destined for maritime or commercial careers. As Matthew 
Edney points out, mapmaking was crucial for management of a military and commercial 
empire: “knowledge of …territory is determined by geographic representations and most 
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especially by the map…. To govern territories, one must know them” (1). If this sort of 
visual knowledge could respond to intense curiosity, it was also deadly earnest. 
But topographical and other maps, as well as images of foreign people, 
landscapes, and architecture, could be commercially lucrative as well as militarily useful 
in an atmosphere of curiosity. Turn-of-the-century draftsmen such as Thomas and 
William Daniell in India produced surveys, sketches, paintings, and engravings of exotic 
scenery that served as military documentation and were also sent back to England to be 
snapped up by citizens eager for knowledge of strange places and people under British 
control, and excited to own a visual bit of empire. The advent of photography meant that 
those who wished to capture foreign “views” for military and/or commercial purposes 
could do so much more efficiently and (after the invention of the calotype) reproduce 
them much more easily (Worswick 2). For example, the East India Company hired 
photographers in the place of draftsmen in 1855, as did local British-run governments 
during the Raj after the Rebellion in 1857. Documentary-style photography evolved 
under the aegis of the Company, which desired records of military exploits as well as 
topographical and archaeological surveys and other projects that were more scientific in 
nature (Worswick 4). Stereoscopic views and images of exotic landscapes and 
architecture were popular among English readers in England and abroad, who were eager 
for “expert” knowledge about the empire, as illustrated by success of such works as the 
monthly publication Indian Amateur’s Photographic Album, published in Bombay, and 
the London-published One Hundred Stereoscopic Illustrations of Architecture and 
Natural History in Western India.  London journals frequently brought the efforts of 
English photographers abroad to an eager British public eye (Desmond 3).   
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Curiosity and the desire to turn visual information into useful knowledge marked 
British social engagement at home in growing cities, too, where it could mark discomfort 
as well as pleasure. In an era when more Britons were less likely to know their neighbors 
than ever before, the popular pseudo-scientific practice of phrenology and physiognomy 
promised an almost magical power to know others by their appearances.24  While 
phrenology’s diagnostic methodology primarily involved touch, to read the physical form 
of a sitter’s head, it also depended heavily on visual illustrations. These included the 
actual heads of real individuals, reproduced from “portraits and busts (and later 
photographs),” and also, crucially, diagrams that visually “mapped the various faculties 
to their cranial regions” (Jonathan Smith 201). Physiognomy, meanwhile, suggested that 
viewers could know others purely by sight, through such visual markers as dress, facial 
structure, habitual movements, and expression. These elements could reveal information 
about the other that ranged from occupation to class to personality and even, potentially, 
morality. Though not a new idea, physiognomy increased in popularity during the latter 
decades of the nineteenth century (Pearl 11-12). John Lavater, whose eighteenth-century 
book became a best-selling nineteenth-century authority on the subject, asserted that 
physiognomy was “the science of discovering the relation between the exterior and the 
interior – between the visible surface and the invisible spirit which it covers – between 
the animated, perceptible matter, and the imperceptible principle which impresses this 
character of life upon it,” as if looking into a person’s features could allow one to 
perceive his or her soul (qtd in Shaw 819). This obsession with the visual as vital clue to 
inner life took a more sinister turn in the work of Cesare Lombroso, whose criminology !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24See Roger Cooter, “Phrenology and British Alienists, ca. 1825-1845,” in Madhouses, Mad-Doctors, and 
Madmen: The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era. 
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promised to identify criminal “types” by their appearance, based on the study of 
prisoners’ photographs.  The Victorian middle class took uneasy solace in the idea that 
anyone with criminal tendencies walking their cities might be identified by their facial 
features (Pearl 26). As Sharrona Pearl remarks,  
Physiognomy helped urbanites deal with the simultaneous overload and lack of 
human information by allowing people to make judgments on the basis of sight. 
The most important information physiognomy could provide was precisely what 
was lacking in the urban environment, namely, a system of establishing reasons to 
trust and, equally important. (Pearl 10) 
 
The Victorians thus gave additional emphasis to an old question predicated on a new 
awareness of potentially incongruent “interior space” and exterior appearances: how can 
we know others via the information that sight provides? (Pearl 9).  
Though the unknown could provoke fear, it just as clearly elicited wonder and 
curiosity in the nineteenth century. Beginning with the Romantics, this curiosity was tied 
closely with vision. As a sensory channel, vision helped Britons notice and appreciate the 
ordinary and the quotidian as well as the surprising and exotic; as a mode of investigation 
it provoked further study and led to increased knowledge as well as persistent interest. It 
provided the means to study, catalogue, and otherwise integrate the foreign with the 
familiar, itself no less interesting for those with eyes to see. Wonder formed a link 
between Romantic art and science and increased in influence over the Victorian period. 
Wonder itself, suggests Fisher, is always both aesthetic and scientific; it provokes the 
wonderer “[t]o notice a phenomenon, to pause in thought before it, and to link it by 
explanation into the fabric of the ordinary,” finding the pleasures of knowledge and 
aesthetic appreciation in the process (55). For Fisher, as for nineteenth-century Britons (I 
have argued), wonder is always visual – “the outcome of the fact that we see the world” 
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(Fisher 17). The novels I discuss in this dissertation similarly employ vision and curiosity 
to work out the human implications of the changing relationships, within society and 
between humans and the environment, that I have here described. 
Vision, Curiosity, and Empiricism 
 The link between curiosity and vision was inextricable from empiricism. 
Beginning with the ideas of John Locke, vision seemed to depend most completely on the 
“pregiven world of independent truth” (Edney 48). It seemed the most reliable avenue for 
knowledge in an epistemology that held that all knowledge comes through the senses. In 
the simplest version of this inherited cultural story, the nineteenth-century British 
knowledge-seeker, especially in science, sought objectivity above all else. This meant 
that the negation of the influence of the self and of individual perspective, desire, and 
emotion became “a moral as well as an epistemological virtue” (Levine Dying 5). 
  Modern critics have pointed out that vision did not maintain a monolithic status 
over the course of the century. As Jonathan Crary notes, changes in the scientific 
understanding of vision itself inspired new metaphors for knowledge. The older Lockean 
model compared visual perception to the function of a camera obscura; Crary notes how 
this “optical device” and “technical apparatus” had a wider life as a “philosophical 
metaphor [and] a model in the science of physical optics” for “how observation leads to 
truthful inferences about the world” (27). One effect of the comparison between the 
camera obscura and the physical eye was to “sunder the act of seeing from the physical 
body of the observer, to decorporealize vision” (Crary 29), ensuring vision’s status as 
universally objective provider of accurate information.25 But vision itself was the subject !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25As a metaphor for understanding, the comparison figured the mind as a room in which the observer, an 
autonomous subject, inspected ideas passing before an inner eye (Crary 43, 46). In both the physiological 
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of study increasingly often in the nineteenth century, and its own observers noticed that 
sight could not be severed from individual physiology. When the act of seeing was 
returned to the body, and such bodily functions were understood to vary by individual 
and to be subject to defect and illusion, it became clear that vision was not a passive 
vehicle for communication of truth but was rather quite subjective and creative. This 
attention to idiosyncrasies of the human eye represented a dramatic break with the “stable 
and fixed relations incarnated in the camera obscura” (Crary 14), revealing vision to be a 
variable and creative interaction between the observer’s body and the perceived objects.26  
Dramatic changes in the situations with which observers had to contend also 
brought growing visual sophistication. As the decades progressed, “an observer 
increasingly had to function within disjunct and defamiliarized urban spaces, the 
perceptual and temporal dislocations of railroad travel, telegraphy, industrial production, 
and flows of typographic and visual information” (Crary 11). Technological change 
created new visual sensations, for instance as passengers reacted with surprise to the sight 
of their image, reflected in the windows of a train, colliding and merging with the bodies 
of passengers in a train passing in the other direction (Hartley 74). Playful instruments 
like the thaumatrope, the phenakistiscope, and the stereoscope all began as scientific tools 
for studying optics and migrated eventually into the public sphere as toys for 
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and philosophical versions of the model, even the privileged sense of vision is subject to the rule of reason, 
which ensures that the visible world is known without possible modifications by an individual’s “sensory 
and physiological apparatus” (Crary 55). Crary notes that the camera obscura could even be seen as an 
improvement on human binocular vision, representing the advantages of reason’s unchallenged rule: “The 
camera obscura with monocular aperture was a more perfect incarnation of a single point than the awkward 
binocular body of the human subject. The camera was in a sense a metaphor for the most rational 
possibilities of a perceiver within the increasingly dynamic disorder of the world” (53). 
 
26Perhaps it is this change that allowed J. M. W. Turner to make the very “retinal processes of vision” the 
focus of his paintings by the end of his career, capturing what it feels like to make sense out of sight 
information (Crary 138).!
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manipulating one’s own vision, indicating their society’s fascination with optical effects 
produced by the disparity between “reality” as reason comprehended it and actual visual 
experience. Given this increasing awareness of vision’s fallibility and variability, how did 
it maintain influence within the framework of empiricism? 
Often asking some version of this question, modern critics have decried and 
discredited the nineteenth century’s reliance on objectivity and on vision. These critics 
argue that true objectivity is impossible, and rightly point out countless incidents in 
which nineteenth-century claims for objectivity have actually served as shields for 
oppression, deceit, and self-delusion (Levine Dying 5-7). From this point of view, vision 
often comes to take on a rather sinister cast, as the means for maintaining control over a 
mindlessly entertained, docile society, or as the sense leading most inevitably to cultural 
fragmentation and artistic alienation. Michel Foucault points out the disciplinary effect of 
internalized norms of observation on society, while Martin Meisel and Gillen D’Arcy 
Wood trace the evolution of visual “spectacle” across nineteenth-century British culture, 
from stage effects to panoramas to illustrated books and other newly sensational media.27 
Vision’s, and empiricism’s, very claim to objectivity then becomes a willful “blindness to 
the way knowledge is shaped by determinative contexts” predicated on a will to power 
that seems naturalized by its apparent objectivity – its claim to represent truth (Garratt 
28). The potentials for vision, as objectivity’s instrument, to serve as entertainment and as 
disciplinary force inhere in my discussion above. Yet Chris Otter and others have begun 
to suggest that ideas about the panopticon, the flaneur, and the spectacle have influenced 
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27See Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison; Realizations: Narrative, Pictorial, and Theatrical Art 
in Nineteenth-Century England; and The Shock of the Real: Romanticism and Visual Culture, 1760-1860, 
respectively. 
 
! 44!
modern critical understanding of the nineteenth century to a degree far outstripping any 
actual hegemony at the time.28 
Instead, it may be more useful to nuance our ideas about nineteenth-century 
empiricism in a more accurate direction. Peter Garratt suggests in a recent work that 
empiricism as many nineteenth-century Britons espoused it depends on a view of the 
subject as ceaselessly evolving. From this point of view, the self is always in progress, as 
new sensory information changes it and new experiences accrete to it. By the mid-
Victorian period, Garratt argues, the very identity of the “knowing subject” seemed 
dynamic and unstable – a “condition of life” and experience (32, 37). All knowledge is 
therefore subjective: there is no way around subjectivity, and no way to discipline it into 
objectivity. The knowing subject can know something only by taking a particular 
perspective on it or, in other words, “occupying a relative position” to it (Garratt 17). 
Knowledge for the mutable self is always “necessarily circumscribed, conditioned by 
context, and conceived in terms of relationship” (Garratt 16). Similarly, instruments can 
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28In The Victorian Eye: A Political History of Light and Vision in Britain, 1800-1910, Otter notes that the 
panopticon and the flaneur (both representing alienated/ing influences) dominate critical understandings of 
vision in this period to a degree much exaggerating their actual influence. He argues that each is a 
twentieth-century retrospective “fantasy,” obscuring the reality that “Perfect, transparent vision of society 
remained, and remains, elusive, undesirable, impossible, and probably meaningless: Western governments 
have usually been quite happy to tolerate broad areas of darkness” and that “Flanerie was an exclusive, 
metropolitan, elitist, narcissistic practice, limited to a select group of writers who seldom used the term 
flaneur to describe themselves” (5, 7). By projecting exaggerated ideas of these limited trends onto the 
nineteenth-century British, critics thus obfuscate rather than further understanding of a culture that Otter 
argues valued visual freedom as much as control. 
 Following Martin Meisel and Gillen D’Arcy Wood, I would add the more useful idea of "visual 
spectacle" to the list of lenses through which critics often perceive nineteenth-century British culture. In his 
The Shock of the Real: Romanticism and Visual Culture, 1760-1860, Wood demonstrates convincingly that 
much Romantic literature was inspired by negative reactions to such entertainments, which trick the eye 
and stifle the imagination. From increasingly realistic stage effects in the theatre, to panoramas bringing 
foreign city-scapes to London, to illustrated books that narrated trips abroad through pictures, sensational 
visual experience does seem to have been on the rise across the century. While this line of argument seems 
more useful than those Otter skewers, I argue that it is not all that critics should attend in visual culture, 
either. Instead, beginning with the Romantics but continuing through the century, the British seem to have 
had an increasingly sophisticated understanding of visual perception that gradually filtered down to popular 
culture, inspiring imaginative responses in writers and artists along the way.   
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aid vision and practice can hone observational skill, but what instrument and practice 
produce is not a more objective vision but rather a more comprehensive subjective 
awareness. Furthermore, not only is observation not “correctible,” but the attempt to 
discipline and correct it would actually distort awareness of reality, which is always 
relational (Garratt 16). The moral and epistemological obligation of the observer, 
therefore, is to remain aware of relationship, point of view, and context. Indeed, this is a 
positive good, as reality itself depends on the self in relationship with others and with the 
natural world. What matters to empiricism – surprisingly, perhaps, from the standpoint of 
many modern impressions – is precisely the “determinative contexts” of relationship. 
Against the critical sense that new visual sensations almost always interrupted 
sympathy, I argue that the ideas they inspired could facilitate it, and that the texts and 
images I study reveal the yen for visual information to provide new explanatory stories 
for a culture experiencing rapid change. As Levine puts it, "Novels are not science," but 
"fictions expose [their] culture's deepest assumptions (or desires)" (Darwin 13). 
The Story of This Dissertation: Chapter Summaries 
Growing Victorian curiosity about Romantic-era daily life, amid nostalgia for an 
earlier and perhaps pleasanter England, meant that the work of John Constable and Jane 
Austen held unprecedented public attention in the final decade of the century. As my 
second chapter explains, Constable and Austen had largely been considered uninteresting 
in their own time due in part to their ordinary subject matter. Later hagiographers 
presented both as authoritative visual observers of their past world. Austen’s and 
Constable’s quotidian subject matter became not a liability but a virtue for Victorians 
who sought a story of continuity with an older England, which nostalgia idealized as it 
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vanished. This chapter analyzes Pride and Prejudice (1813) and The Hay Wain (1821) to 
argue that Austen’s and Constable’s illusory qualities were not fully felt until the 
Victorian period, when the stories author and artist could tell were increasingly valued for 
their potential contributions to a larger cultural narrative about England’s rural past. 
The third chapter treats stories that challenged comforting Victorian narratives of 
correspondence between inner character and outer appearance amid a rapidly urbanizing 
society. It analyzes the peculiar affect that Victorian and modern audiences have noted in 
response to Charlotte Brontë’s Villette (1853) and Lady Clementina Hawarden’s 
photographs of domestic scenes (1857-1864). Novel and photographs transfix and 
unsettle audiences in similar ways, this chapter argues, because they present 
counterfactual mental states but frustrate interpretation of factual alternatives. These 
counterfactuals without actual counterparts cloud clear narration in both photographs and 
novel. They highlight instead the egocentric error potential in any interpretation of 
another person via appearances. Hawarden’s and Brontë’s art can thus be seen as 
cognitive tools that convey the affect of discomforted (stereotypically Victorian) desire to 
know the other through visual information. Though this analysis would seem to confirm 
modern narratives of visual disruption, I argue that the very strangeness of the evasive 
stories Hawarden and Brontë tell suggests that interpretation via visual information is 
(and was) so familiar as to seem unremarkable elsewhere. 
The fourth chapter explores the implications of the subtitle to George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch (1871-1872): “A Study of Provincial Life.” As a “study” at the time could 
be a scientific examination or an artistic sketch, the novel can be seen as an extended 
naturalist’s observation – and narration – of life in a small town. Eliot’s visual metaphors, 
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which invite the reader to experiment and observe and also involve the microscope, the 
naturalist’s indispensable tool, bear out this context. Earlier critics have concluded from 
the novel’s attention to varying perspective that Eliot was pessimistic about the 
possibility of true sympathy. I suggest that the naturalists whose language and techniques 
Eliot borrows are not dismayed by the variable effects of condition and perspective: they 
insist, to the contrary, that the skillful observer takes advantage of variable conditions to 
learn more. As Eliot adapts their techniques, her novel does not merely inform the reader 
that different perspectives can provide strikingly different knowledge about others; it 
enacts this idea. Eliot not only asks the reader to take a naturalist’s attitude, her novel 
itself becomes a kind of variable lens through which the reader sees. In narrating the 
intertwined stories of the residents in one provincial English town, Eliot practices her 
readers in finding the best frame through which to view and interpret, or narrate, others. 
Her story is meant to assist wider narratives of social justice as this leads to harmony. 
The final chapter turns to Rudyard Kipling’s Kim (1900-1901), a narrative of 
empire. I argue that Kipling, the son of the British curator at the Lahore Museum in India, 
reproduces the effect of the museum as visual technology – in other words, as a collection 
of material items that allows both individual scrutiny and panoramic pattern-finding. 
Such collections facilitate the sense of comprehensive knowledge, but in the context of 
aesthetic pleasure; like novels, they perform their work as if it is play. In novel form, the 
museum’s visuality – one can look, but not touch – becomes descriptive, using concrete 
language that brings arcane knowledge about a foreign place and time to life. Just as a 
museum can serve as a tool for “seeing at a distance,” this novel seemingly magically 
transports an audience through a pragmatic, material, visual collection. Kipling’s story 
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performs the playful work of fictional transportation par excellence. As cognitive tool, it 
offers to its wider British culture the condensed visual fantasy of an age obsessed with 
exploration and the exotic, with curiosity and wonder. And yet, Kim reflects Kipling’s 
imperialism as thoroughly as it does his love for India (in fact, the two may be 
inextricable). Kipling’s failure of empathy in this regard, right in the middle of his great 
love, points to the dangers inherent in the perspective-sharing work that the play of 
fiction can enact. If story makes audiences better empathizers, nothing guarantees either 
that they also become more compassionate people, or that resulting empathy will be 
directed to ends everyone would agree are moral.  
The dissertation proper thus begins, in the Austen-Constable chapter, with an 
examination of fictional stories’ illusory powers in the context of cultural narratives, and 
moves in the third chapter, on Brontë and Hawarden, to consider the disruptive power of 
stories that contradict expectations conditioned by such narratives. The fourth and fifth 
chapters present stories that should have similarly helped original audiences to assimilate 
wider cultural trends, but now stand in contrast to one another in terms of ends modern 
critics find palatable. 
Methodology 
I argue that Romantic ideas persisted into the Victorian period and return in 
today’s ideas about how humans perceive and respond to others. This project is thus most 
concerned with those aspects of Victorian culture that continue the Romantic interest in 
vision and sympathy. But it also maintains a concern with how today’s audiences respond 
to this persistently enchanting art. A growing number of critics incorporate insights from 
cognitive science into this sort of analysis, once squarely within the humanities. Art as 
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human activity, produced and shared by human brains, can through both humanist and 
scientific study tell us more about what it means to be human. Patrick Colm Hogan states 
this well: “It is crucial for humanists and scientists to recognize that the arts should not be 
some marginal area to which cognitive discoveries are imported after they are made 
elsewhere. Arts are central to our lives…. [I]f you have a theory of the human mind that 
does not explain the arts, you have a very poor theory of the human mind” (2). As 
scientists learn to see cognition and emotion as inextricable, so humanists rediscover that 
shared affective responses offer rich rewards to rigorous study (Thrailkill 15). 
Awareness of history, genre, and contemporary response can usefully constrain 
and propel such criticism. While so far most humanist study utilizing cognitive science 
has taken a generalist approach to human aesthetics, Alan Richardson called recently for 
work that analyzes specific art objects or texts within their historical contexts.29 It is 
impossible to know precisely how minds respond while processing a work of art or a text. 
Historical context and reception history can suggest possibilities, as can close reading. I 
borrow an “if-then” formula from Jane F. Thrailkill’s work on the affect of nineteenth-
century literature. In Thrailkill’s formula, the critic does not “posit or require that the 
‘ideal reader’ or even the ‘historical reader’ will feel” a certain way. Rather, if the reader 
responds in such a way, which formal analysis and response history suggests, then certain 
cognitive processes seem at work (Thrailkill 47). In addition to Thrailkill’s formula, 
cultural context guides my focus on response that would have been likely for a 
nineteenth-century audience, as well as today’s critic. The argument is by its nature 
speculative, but so must new inquiries even in science often be.  
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29See The Neural Sublime: Cognitive Theories and Romantic Texts, published in 2010. 
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To these ends, I have found Dual Coding Theory (DCT) a useful paradigm for 
speculating on individual differences within patterns of response to texts and visual art. 
Developed by Allan Paivio, DCT poses that human cognition utilizes “two functionally 
independent but interconnected systems, a nonverbal system specialized for dealing with 
nonlinguistic objects and events, and a verbal system specialized for dealing directly with 
language” (Paivio 33). In other words, the verbal system handles the comprehension and 
production of language, and the nonverbal system processes what an event or object 
looks, feels, sounds, smells, and/or tastes like, as well as its affect.  
DCT holds that each of these systems uses basic units organized and combined in 
potentially infinite ways. At the biological level of explanation, these units refer to neural 
nodes and connections that process or respond to perceived information. At the cognitive 
psychological level of explanation, it is these units that “generate” language and images 
in the verbal and nonverbal systems, respectively (Sadoski and Paivio 45). In the verbal 
system, the basic unit is the “logogen,” which refers to any “chunk” of recognized 
language; logogens can be as small as a letter or a syllable, or as large as a memorized 
expression that the user repeats as a unit rather than produces creatively at each use. The 
“imagen” is the basic unit of the nonverbal system. Rather than language, it produces 
imagery – which in psychological terms refers not just to visual but also to comparable 
auditory, tactile, and motor simulations experienced in the absence of direct perception.  
As “representational units,” imagens and logogens must be “activated” by internal 
processing and/or perception (Paivio 36-37).  At the biological level of explanation, 
activation means that energy movement excites neurons physically connected in a 
network.  At the psychological level, activation occurs in terms of three levels of 
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meaning. A logogen or imagen has representational meaning when it can be activated in 
response to a stimulus: a person recognizes a word or image because he or she has an 
available corresponding mental representational unit. Learning new words means 
learning new logogens, which are then among those available for future processes. The 
second, referential meaning, indicates associations between imagens and logogens – the 
mental connection between a word and an image. If a person visualizes in response to a 
word, or names an image with language, then these logogens and imagens activate each 
other across systems. Finally, associative meaning indicates connections, or associations, 
between logogens and other logogens, or imagens and other imagens. For example, when 
a word brings to mind another word, these logogens have associative meaning. This brief 
explanation should make clear that activation can occur within a system, as with 
associative meaning, or across systems, as in referential meaning. 
Perception of words or images is thus most direct when it is representational: a 
word activates a logogen; an image activates an imagen. Referential activation is indirect, 
because (for instance) a word must first activate a logogen before it can activate an 
imagen. Associative activation is similarly indirect. Concrete nouns produce the most 
direct activations, but DCT holds that such connections exist for other classes of words. 
An abstract word like “success,” for instance, may not have a “direct referent” imagen, 
but will still evoke associated images from experience (Paivio 46). The connections are 
simply even less direct: the abstract word activates associated concrete words and then 
those concrete words activate linked images. Verbs, adjectives, and adverbs follow 
similar less-direct patterns to activate imagens, since imaging them incorporates a noun 
(for example, to think of “running” requires one to think of someone or something 
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performing the action). Connections can also travel in the reverse direction, from imagen 
to logogen, as when a visual memory evokes spoken words. As this suggests, referential 
and associative meaning (or connections across systems and within systems, respectively) 
can span sense modalities as well as systems (Paivio 46-47, 50-51).30 
It follows naturally from this that experience affects meaning at all levels. Direct 
perception that involves mental recognition (as opposed to merely registration on the 
senses) requires that incoming sensory information more or less matches an available 
imagen or logogen from a range of possibilities.  The match marks the best fit. These 
connections are not pre-determined but probabilistic: they can potentially activate a 
number of possible routes dependent on idiosyncratic experience and context. Both units 
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30It is important to note Paivio’s caution that the systems, the units within them, and the activation patterns 
seem to differ slightly between direct perception, when the object or event is present, and mental 
representation in the absence of that object or event.  Perhaps separate but related units exist for processing 
in perception versus memory. Perhaps the units are “tagged” or “labeled” differently, so that the distinction 
between activation in the presence or absence of direct perception remains clear throughout processing.  
Paivio’s example of the difference is instructive: 
…a ship seen in the distance “homes in on” a relatively small set of similar ship imagens and a 
particular imagen is activated when the ship gets close enough to be identified.  When asked to 
picture a ship in our minds, we have a larger imagen pool to draw from and it takes more time 
before a particular imagen is activated and we can report a conscious image…. The size of the 
representational pool and the availability of particular representations depend on the breadth, 
depth, and recency of one’s experience with the perceptual domain—in this case, our knowledge 
of ships. (49-50) 
This reference to the activation of concrete imagens in the cases of identification and visualization indicates 
one way in which dual coding differs from other modern psychological theories about how knowledge is 
organized within the mind.  Unlike many other such theories, DCT proposes no abstract psychological 
entities.  Schema theories, by contrast, organize knowledge according to abstract categories (schemas). 
Though they derive from experience, schemas represent general knowledge. A schema for an object or a 
situation is not any particular object or event, imagined or perceived, but rather a group of typical features 
of that object or event abstracted and compiled.  According to these theories, a person thinks about 
individual objects or situations as instances of this general category.  Paivio and colleagues mistrust such 
abstract concepts on the grounds that they are rather vague, difficult to test for directly, and require the 
cognizer to perform extra work to create and then “unpack” the abstract schema whenever a cognitive task 
calls for specifics (Paivio 11-12).  By contrast, DCT proposes no such abstract entities; even the most 
abstract cognitive acts operate with concrete units.  These representational units, as I have mentioned, 
retain their sensorimotor origins in memory and processing. Thus, for instance, a memory of an event is 
inextricable from what it felt like to perceive it.  An imagined object or event retains its concrete, particular 
identity.  Processes as abstract as language comprehension rely on concrete associations, with their specific 
sensorimotor identities.  This is true of both conscious and unconscious activity, direct perception and 
internal imagery, and sensory and response processes (or input and output).  
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and their connections are flexible and evolving, changing as we change. Experience 
builds new units and new connections; recent activation can prime or inhibit future 
activation. Context guides which among possible candidates are activated as well: for 
instance, context allows perceivers to understand language with missing or inaudible 
words when it provides enough probability to complete percept-logogen matches 
(Sadoski and Paivio 57). An associative framework within which unlimited connections 
are possible, DCT accommodates error and creativity (Sadoski and Paivio 53-4).31 
Even the most abstract text, if its language is familiar, produces mental models by 
activating verbal contexts.32 But imagen activation does aid comprehension. Much 
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31An example may make this discussion clearer. If I have seen a bird before, then even a fragmented outline 
of a bird will activate a bird imagen. If the shape of a bird is new, exposure (especially repeated exposure) 
will create an imagen and teach recognition. If I have seen a bird, but not one of this particular species, then 
I can recognize it as being like my existing bird imagens.  Exposure will create a bird imagen for the new 
bird.  Since even individuals within a species vary, even each individual within a familiar species that I see 
will probably have its own imagen, associated more tightly with one another than would be the imagens for 
two individuals of different species, who show a wider physical and behavioral variation. Usually, how 
well I (and each of us) can generalize from an unfamiliar percept to a similar available imagen or logogen 
in order to recognize that a new stimulus represents a variation on something already known depends partly 
on individual capability and experience. As Sadoski and Paivio explain it, “we operate for efficiency 
around… exemplars.  A ‘good’ exemplar… serves as the central tendency in a multidimensional 
distribution.  The other members of that distribution are variants that have been experienced or are 
interpolated” (47). The exemplar is a particular one, however – not an abstraction inducted from multiple 
specific examples. The same principle and process holds for recognizing or learning new logogens.  
Repeated exposure increases recognition and familiarity; the match happens with an increasingly detailed 
and available representational unit, whether this is imagen or logogen (Paivio 42-43). 
 
32Paivio argues that the two distinct systems often work together “to mediate nonverbal and verbal 
behavior” (13).  He writes, 
both systems are generally involved even in language phenomena.  The verbal system is a 
necessary player in all “language games” but it is sufficient in only a few.  In the most interesting 
and meaningful ones, it draws on the rich knowledge base and gamesmanship of the nonverbal 
imagery system.  Conversely, the nonverbal system cannot play language games on its own, but it 
can play complex nonverbal solitaire.  The verbal system dominates in some tasks and the imagery 
system in others.  Thinking is this variable pattern of the interplay of the two systems.  (Paivio 13) 
As this implies, the significance of DCT for a study of literature and visual images is its ability to capture 
and predict the richness of associations within and between language and mental imagery.  It suggests that 
one distinguishing feature of literary or aesthetic language is its especial capacity to balance audience 
attention between stylistic verbal features and rich mental imagery, and as a theory it offers tools for 
analysis of this balance.   
 DCT analyzes how meaning can be potential within, rather than fully predetermined by a text: the 
richness and thoroughness of comprehension depend on the individual and the situation. Readers are active 
creators of meaning, rather than passive receivers of it. Nonverbal imagery accompanies textual processing 
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to a degree dependent partially on the text, and partially on the reader and the context of the reading 
situation. Readers who activate more associative and referential connections will find a given text richer in 
meaning, which increases by degrees from basic recognition and “mere” familiarity to thorough 
understanding and extratextual elaboration. Partly because context and situation influence reading, a 
community can share meaningful experiences, facilitating communication between members of that 
community (Sadoski and Paivio 65-67). If, as Sadoski and Paivio point out, this is why dictionaries are 
possible – because users in the language community agree on roughly stable meanings associated with 
listed words – it is also why a text can function as a cognitive tool that unites readers through shared 
affective and imagined experiences. Communities help to create and shape texts, which in turn help to 
create and shape communities. 
 Readers create meaning from text through a complex ongoing process of focus and expansion, 
which continually broadens in association from basic perception and contracts to narrower possibilities 
from context and environment (Sadoski and Paivio 65). Reading (and meaning) begins when the reader 
perceives text, either by seeing language or feeling it, in the case of Braille.  This is the representational 
level of meaning: the reader recognizes the text.  This is a “bottom-up” process in which the reader 
responds perceptually to a stimulus; “top-down” processes are those in which context, ongoing 
interpretation, reader expectations, and the like influence experienced meaning. In the case of a sighted 
reader, visual text activates visual logogens (a reader reading Braille will activate motor logogens).  These 
logogens are likely chunked at the level of words, but the reader’s attention may vary between graphemes, 
words, punctuation, and phrases or segments.  Context or prior reading can “prime” certain related 
logogens, which means they are more easily activated.  A word that is entirely new to the reader will 
activate letter and letter combination logogens until it is familiar enough to have its own logogen. 
Activation may spread to auditory-motor logogens for speaking the text or to motor logogens for writing. 
But at this level, comprehension is basic and rather rudimentary (Sadoski and Paivio 69-71). 
 At the referential level of meaning, these logogens can activate imagens.  These imagens may in 
turn help prepare the reader for later logogens, or alternatively, raise expectations that later logogens 
contradict. Such connections become part of the context for the rest of the text, and add to or even create 
the experience of meaning and richness of comprehension.  As Sadoski and Paivio say, “Imagery can form 
a strong internal context that comes not just a companion to verbal context, but integral with it” (71). The 
original logogens also activate other related logogens at the associative level of meaning. These new 
logogens may activate imagens. Imagens associated with the original logogens and the new logogens may 
activate other imagens, which in turn may activate still more logogens. The modality-specific qualities of 
the units in both systems mean that activation respects sensorimotor-based organization: logogen 
associations are hierarchical and sequential, while imagen associations are sets nested within larger sets. 
These structural tendencies can themselves influence meaning – as Sadoski and Paivio point out, given 
grammar’s reflection of perspective, a tiny change in preposition from “on” to “by” can change a 
sentence’s mental model considerably (79). 
This entire process of activation occurs nearly instantaneously, and can be unconscious even as it 
assists conscious comprehension. For instance, a reader may not consciously experience thoroughly 
elaborated imagery – or even any imagery – in response to a text even as activated imagens help that reader 
to understand it more richly. As I have said, the connections are probabilistic, which means they are not 
pre-determined; they largely depend on an individual’s prior experience (which helps to determine possible 
connections) but may activate in any number of possible ways consistent with that individual’s make-up.  
As Sadoski and Paivio describe it, the activation process is not linear, but parallel: “spreading activation 
fans out in parallel in the verbal and nonverbal systems and through connections between the two systems” 
(Sadoski and Paivio 110).  The reader forms “tentative interpretations or mental models” that evolve as 
reading continues and “[f]amiliarity, grammar, verbal-associative contexts, and nonverbal contexts… shape 
and elaborate the emerging interpretations” (Sadoski and Paivio 110).  These models are not abstract; they 
are integrated conglomerations of the logogens and imagens that the text activates: simulations a reader 
“runs” in response to the text. Like a reading hypothesis, the mental model both helps to shape the reader’s 
ongoing experience of the text, and also itself evolves as additional experience influences it in turn. 
 These mental models often incorporate affective response. The strict DCT view of this aspect of 
reading is that first a text activates a particular logogen that activates associated imagens, which are in turn 
connected with the somatic experience of emotion. Emotions are not themselves imagens, but are rather 
associated with imagens in the same way a taste (“sour”) is associated with an imagen (“lemon”). However, 
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research demonstrates that verbal concreteness increases the probability of activation and 
the strength of memories. Paivio and colleagues’ research shows that concrete language 
is second only to pictures for its ability to activate images, followed at a distant third by 
abstract language. This makes sense given that referential connections between concrete 
language logogens and imagens offer a more direct route for activation than abstract 
language, which usually must first activate still other, associated logogens that in turn 
referentially activate imagens. When concrete language activates imagens, the content of 
that language is encoded dually, in both language and image. All other factors being 
equal, concrete language is thus better remembered because it is accessible in two forms. 
Recall is not just slightly better, but usually twice as strong for concrete language. These 
results hold even when the subjects reported no conscious visual imagery in response to 
the concrete text (Sadoski and Paivio 61).  
The dependence on past experience for activation does not mean that the reader is 
limited to re-experiencing personal episodic memories only.  It means, instead, that to 
read about an event, an object, or a situation completely unlike anything one has known 
is to imagine it with concreteness derived from one’s own past sensorimotor experience.  
This means that although I have never been to India, when I read a novel set in India that 
conveys the heat, the smell of cooking food, and the noise of a bazaar, I can experience 
not just the beauty of the text but also the world it suggests to my imagination with 
concrete sensorimotor details drawn from my own experience of hot summer days, of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Sadoski and Paivio also note that logogens can activate emotions directly in a process “similar to referential 
processing” but without intermediary images, “although the effect could be mediated by images” (86). As 
with imagens, emotions can be activated without direct perception. Consistent with the rest of DCT, these 
logogen-affect connections derive from experience. This may be the exception I noted earlier to the DCT 
rule that we do not think with emotion. The affect a text evokes becomes part of the contextual mental 
model that in turn influences a reader’s experience of the rest of the text. Like a logogen-imagen 
connection, a logogen-affect connection involves both systems, which may account in part for its impact. 
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Indian food, of crowded and noisy spaces. Because these images are not subject to 
sequential logic, grammar, or textual convention, they can index personal meaning that 
would be hard to convey in words except reductively. Should I visit India, my 
imaginative response to a novel set there would afterwards be more particular and easier 
to access, because I would have logogens and imagens (and associated gustatory and 
olfactory memories) from my experience in India. But the process of activation itself 
would be much the same, according to DCT. So far from limits to the imagination, then, 
DCT suggests a more rigorous method for analyzing imagination’s rich vividness, its 
combinatory creativity, and its power to produce holistic experiences in response to text 
that seem more than the sum of their parts, and that can transport readers into other lives. 
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CHAPTER 2: VIRTUALLY WITNESSING 
JANE AUSTEN AND JOHN CONSTABLE 
 
 
 
In 2003 the British Broadcasting Company unveiled the results of “The Big 
Read,” a yearlong survey to determine the “Nation’s Best-loved Book.” In the summer of 
2005 the BBC Radio 4’s Today program followed with another survey cataloguing public 
taste at the millennium, this time to identify the best-loved painting in a British museum. 
The results of both surveys drew disdain from critics,33 but the works placing first and 
second in each are hard to denigrate as representatives of the stereotypically English. The 
first place winner in “The Big Read” was J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, a tale 
the author imagined after the First World War “as ‘a myth for England’, to honour the 
courage and obstinacy of a small people against evil,” while Jane Austen’s classic 
“comedy of love and manners,” Pride and Prejudice, ranked second (Ezard). In “The 
Greatest Painting in Britain Vote,” English artists took the top spots despite the shortlist’s 
inclusion of foreign artists, with J.M.W. Turner’s The Fighting Temeraire Tugged to Her 
Last Berth placing first, and John Constable’s The Hay Wain second (Belam). 
Critics bemoaned the dull predictability of these choices, but if the top four 
winners seem now like painfully obvious picks, “as English to Englishmen, in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33One critic called The Big Read “a silly and vulgar spectacle” because the BBC featured celebrities 
championing their favorites; others cast aspersions on whether the survey more accurately reflected reading 
tastes or audience enthrallment with the high-budget film productions benefitting many books on the final 
list (Tonkin; Ezard). As with the book rankings, critics suggested that “The Greatest Painting” vote just 
revealed familiarity. The art critic from The Independent asserted the list’s predictability: “I’m sure the 
chosen 10 do reflect public taste pretty accurately: sometimes absolutely right, sometimes bafflingly 
wrong…. I would like to see The Fighting Temeraire loaded on to The Hay Wain, and them both quietly 
wheeled off to some nice art dump” (qtd in Belam).! 
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national mythology, as Roast Beef” as Robert Miles says of Austen (132), neither Austen 
nor Constable would have been so during their own lifetimes. Tolkien’s sprawling epic 
and Turner’s spectacular painting would have been contenders almost from the moments 
of creation, so quickly did they seize public attention. But the quieter second place 
winners have more interesting, because less obvious, trajectories. Pride and Prejudice 
sold a respectable but unremarkable number of copies in its first, anonymous release. 
Constable could not find a buyer for The Hay Wain when he exhibited it in England in 
1821 and 1822, and the artist himself was little enough appreciated that he died with the 
majority of his paintings still in his own possession.34 If now both novel and painting 
seem quintessentially English in style, and their appeal derives in part from their 
inextricability from English national mythology, their eventual canonization was by no 
means inevitable. One might assert, with the critics, that each owes their cultural status to 
sheer familiarity, but this becomes a circular argument. Neither Austen’s novel nor 
Constable’s painting achieved real fame among their contemporaries, yet now they share 
totemic cachet as representatives for their time and place. But if Constable and Austen 
did not speak to their contemporaries, why are they now considered to speak for them? 
To ask this question is to ask a version of this dissertation’s central question: what 
factors contribute to audience engagement, especially via the visual? Austen’s and 
Constable’s paths to canonization are remarkably similar. Early audiences seem to have 
found each lacking according to aesthetic conventions that privileged the elevating and 
the interesting. But the success of the Romantic revolution in the arts meant that 
subsequent generations appreciated art, like Austen’s and Constable’s, that engaged !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34As Wessel Krul says, “In terms of commercial success, the artistic career of John Constable… must be 
considered a failure” (138). 
! 59!
audiences with ordinary subject matter via active imagination. Furthermore, as many 
academic critics have noted, Victorian nostalgia for life among the minor gentry in the 
pre-industrial period motivated new historical interest. Where earlier generations found 
Austen and Constable dull, Victorians sought both the authoritative information each 
seemed to offer about past life within a genteel social class, and also a story of continuity 
with that past. Scholars suggest that Constable and Austen offer the illusion of access to 
and continuity with a past that Victorians could narrate as specifically English.35 
I add that Victorians may have been likely to find Austen’s and Constable’s work 
powerfully illusory because the average Victorian encountered each figure first as a 
visual authority partly created by his or her respective hagiographer. These personas 
emphasized powers of keen observation in an age that valued vision as a privileged 
means to knowledge: Constable and Austen thus appeared expert witnesses to ordinary 
turn-of-the-century landscapes and domesticity. Cultural narratives and expectations for 
art doubly predisposed Victorians to appreciate Austen and Constable where earlier 
audiences had felt indifferent or repelled.36  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35As Miles puts it, then, Austen’s “pastoral” vision of her social class becomes “England’s totem of 
primitive Englishness” when England requires assurance that traditional English life continues – or at least 
continues to be valued – despite changing landscapes, economic systems, social strata, and/or domestic 
mores (134). Lionel Trilling notes that part of Austen’s appeal may be the sense readers have that “the 
novels represent a world which is distinctly, even though implicitly, gratifying to eye and to the whole 
sensory and cognitive system,” much unlike the “modern” world (522). Roger Gard attributes her 
Englishness to her lack of politics, a quality he also ascribes to “Anglo-Saxon culture” (15). Miles notices 
the paradox of Austen’s path to status as “England’s totem” and explains it via economics: England did not 
need Austen’s “pastoral” vision until the late nineteenth-century, when the nation’s South East financial 
centers required assurance that they upheld daily English traditional life despite massive change (134). 
Similarly, John Barrell and Michael Rosenthal situate Constable’s calm scenes of rural work as an upper 
class vision of successful husbandry, where rural workers are satisfied and industrious. See The Dark Side 
of the Landscape: The Rural Poor in English Painting 1730-1840 and Constable: The Painter and His 
Landscape, respectively. Ann Bermingham agrees that Constable’s paintings “naturaliz[e]” landowners’ 
power over landscape, and its poorer inhabitants (“Redesigning” 238). Such analyses implicitly locate 
Constable’s lasting appeal in his paintings’ pastoralism. 
 
36Cognitive psychology, which indicates that perception depends on expectations as well as senses, clarifies 
that internalized convention could indeed disrupt or facilitate reception in this way. 
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 Even early audiences who commented disparagingly on Austen’s novels or 
Constable’s paintings tended to note the remarkable illusory powers of each. Constable’s 
paintings seemed fresh and true to life; Austen’s story world enveloped readers in 
conversations that felt real. In later decades, when cultural narratives encouraged 
audiences to participate in the illusion, commenters expressed enthusiasm for this 
imaginative involvement. It is true that differences in medium and style separate author 
and artist: Austen’s virtuoso writing provides only the sparest, most essential details of 
character development and interaction, while Constable’s mature technique is coarse and 
indistinct by comparison. Though his effect of spontaneous composition is as much an 
illusion, based in long study and hard work, as Austen’s apparently effortless prose, 
Constable’s paintings call attention to their creator’s brushwork where Austen’s writing 
hides its art. Yet audiences of each must complete meaning in a way that depends on a 
sense of personal involvement and connection with the living presence of the artist.  
Cognitive analysis of Pride and Prejudice and The Hay Wain, as examples of 
Austen’s and Constable’s work respectively, suggests that each involves the reader or 
viewer in an imaginative process that mimics the inductive process. The viewer 
experiences The Hay Wain like Constable experienced the scene; the reader experiences a 
conversation between Austen’s characters in Pride and Prejudice as humans experience 
social interactions. Constable the expert observer appears in his brushwork; similarly, 
Austen seems present in her narrative voice. Victorians who engaged the works would 
have found themselves involved in an epistemological process implicitly calling upon 
shared values of empiricism. That is to say, the magic this art possesses for those who 
embrace it draws upon the same processes as everyday human functioning, in which we 
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act on uncertain conclusions drawn from experience. This should have been an especially 
convincing way to produce an illusion for Victorian audiences within a culture that 
privileged empiricism and the expert observer. 
Austen’s Early Reception: Cultural Aesthetic Expectations 
A brief review of perception can elucidate why Austen’s original readers, like 
Constable’s original viewers, were not as receptive as later audiences. Perception is 
creative, combining sensory information with personal input conditioned by expectations, 
memories, experience, and wishes.37 Visual art differs only in that artists have arranged 
pigments in such a way that the viewer can interpret them using the same unconscious 
brain processes (Hoffman 6, 12). Reading appears a similar process: the reader responds 
to the prompts of the text by filling it in, co-producing the work in his or her own 
imagination. Phenomenological experience is always constructed from a combination of 
sensory input and individual mental content (Hogan 18, 30, Bruner 219-222). 
Thus, cultural expectations for art as individuals within that culture internalize 
them can affect those individuals’ engagement with art works, even at the level of 
perception. It appears that this sort of expectation helped prevent early audiences from 
fully appreciating Constable’s paintings and Austen’s novels, while it encouraged later 
popular reception. The tone of many early comments suggests that early viewers and 
readers reacted with perspectives grounded in late eighteenth-century aesthetics, even 
though Austen and Constable worked during what is now called Romanticism. 
Broadly, the eighteenth-century Neoclassical aesthetic privileged art in all genres 
that elevated the passive audience through the ideal. Art should abstract features from its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37For instance, we construct what we see: human eyes have evolved to capture certain kinds of information 
(such as color along a limited spectrum, depth, edges of objects) that the brain can use, and that we 
experience as sight. 
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subject to present the idealized essential rather than the particular. It should appear highly 
“finished”: poetry should be a virtuoso performance; painting should offer a detailed, 
smooth surface. The best art hid its art, presenting the ideal as convincingly as if it were 
real (Rothstein 309; Abrams 42). Eighteenth-century critic Lord Kames called the 
Neoclassical mimetic illusion “ideal presence,” or the ability to cast the audience into a 
reverie wherein imagination seems to perceive the subject directly. Kames’ notion of 
ideal presence implicitly depends on imagination to expand the cues from the text or 
image (Rothstein 309-12).38 The essential, abstracted and idealized, called upon the 
audience to  
[T]he full realization in the mind… of the possibilities latent in the finite [art 
work]. In avoiding the nonessential particular, the artist not only avoided the 
slavish imitation of sublunary nature, but offered his audience a general 
proposition which had the power to evoke their artistic complicity. Viewers 
susceptible to the creation of ideal presence would, when confronting a picture 
containing a striking essential image, supply from imagination and memory those 
particulars which made it most meaningful and evocative to them. (Bertelsen 360) 
 
Lesser art attained value through “interest.” Readers of novels, not yet considered high 
art, expected pure entertainment via the salacious and the sentimental (Southam 5). 
 Austen’s style seems largely consistent with Neoclassical aesthetics – a point to 
which I will return – but her subject matter seems to have been deemed too ordinary 
either to entertain like the sentimental novel, or to elevate like fine literature (Southam 4-
9). 39 Her spare prose provides only the essential particulars, and early Austen readers 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38In 1757, proto-Romantic Edmund Burke wrote that spring, baby animals, and “unfinished sketches” 
“afford a more agreeable sensation… because the imagination is entertained with the promise of something 
more,” suggesting that reproductions gain “power” from the “ability to force the reader or viewer to create 
the world, in full, to which the signs proper to the art direct him” (Burke 70, Rothstein 319). 
 
39“For some nineteenth-century readers, Jane Austen damned herself by the very fact of writing about 
ordinary people in ordinary circumstances; beyond this point, however well or badly she wrote was 
irrelevant; she had denied herself the possibility of great writing….  Implicitly or explicitly, [this attitude] 
accounts for a continuing refusal to consider Jane Austen’s novels as serious works of art” (Southam 13). 
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noted the power of her works to produce Kames’ “ideal presence.” But expectations for 
subject matter kept early readers from fully appreciating the illusion. As one female letter 
writer commented on Pride and Prejudice in 1813: “’P & P’ I do not very much like. 
Want of interest is the fault I can least excuse in works of mere amusement, and however 
natural the picture of vulgar minds and manners is there given, it is unrelieved by the 
agreeable contrast of more dignified and refined characters occasionally captivating 
attention. Some power of new character is, however, ably displayed…” (qtd in Southam 
8). Another such reader commented of Mansfield Park, “It has not… that elevation of 
virtue, something beyond nature, that gives the greatest charm to a novel, but still it is 
real natural everyday life” (qtd in Southam 11). For the first reader, Austen fails to evoke 
interest; for the second, she fails to elevate the reader through the ideal.  
 Both readers recognize that Austen achieves something unusual: she immerses the 
reader in the world she creates, and makes the characters that appear there seem 
unusually real. An early review of Pride and Prejudice in 1813 ends, “We cannot 
conclude, without repeating our approbation of this performance, which rises very 
superior to any novel we have lately met with in the delineation of domestic scenes.  Nor 
is there one character which appears flat….” (324, qtd in Southam 57). Yet, as this and 
other reviews suggest, readers of all sorts at this time seem to have felt that while in 
Austen’s novels “the commonplace is perfectly rendered… the commonplace is not what 
we look for in [high] literature” (Southam 9). 
Austen’s Later Reception: Victorian Nostalgia 
For later generations, as critics have noted, Austen’s novels presented the British 
nation with a story about itself that answered a widespread longing for a past that felt like 
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home, even if it was half-invented. At the beginning of the nineteenth-century, most of 
the nation’s population was rural. The local landowner was the center of the community, 
responsible for providing (or not providing) satisfactory housing, law, education, and 
employment. With political and economic power residing almost entirely with 
landowners, “the country house was the symbol and expression of power which with 
people were most familiar” – the symbol, really, of an entire feudal way of life (Lambert 
vii).  The middle decades of the century saw immense technological innovations that 
brought England new wealth, as well as a steady erosion of the upper class’ long 
domination. The old estate system began to crumble under the weight of the Reform Bills 
and the Industrial Revolution, and with it an older way of life (Strong 30-37).   
But by the second half of the century a backlash had begun: if these changes 
meant enlarged horizons and new freedom from old feudal abuses, they also meant 
factory exploitation, heavy pollution, widespread disease, and bitter poverty for many 
(Strong 30-37). By the 1880’s more than eighty percent of the English population was 
living in the cities (Strong 29), and aristocratic landowners no longer had the money or 
political clout to maintain their ancient holdings, many of which went to ruin or were put 
up for sale, or both (Strong 53). Meanwhile, Victorians were inventing an idealized 
English tradition of country life, just in time to elegize it. Prominent writers and 
reformers bemoaned the loss of traditional country life to “the contaminating forces of 
commerce and urban bustle” (Outka 338). C. F. G. Masterman’s popular 1909 book The 
Conditions of England articulated the growing unease of the previous decades this way: 
A few generations ago… England was the population of the English countryside: 
the “rich man in his castle,” the “poor man at his gate”; the feudal society of 
country house, country village, and little country town, in a land whose immense 
wealth still slept undisturbed.  But no one to-day would seek in the ruined villages 
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and dwindling population of the countryside the spirit of an ‘England’ four-fifths 
of whose people have now crowded into the cities.  The little red-roofed towns 
and hamlets, the labourer in the fields at noontide or evening, the old English 
service in the old English village church, now stand but as the historical survival 
of a once great and splendid past.  Is ‘England’ then to be discovered in the 
feverish industrial energy of the manufacturing cities? (11-12)  
 
The possibly unsurprising result of new city money and country decay amidst widespread 
romanticizing of a half-fabulated country tradition was compelling commercialized 
nostalgia. A minor rage for renovation celebrated new construction that looked “as if it 
had always been there” (Kelsall 6). The architectural ideal, in that specifically middle 
class space, the suburbs, was “a kind of country estate in miniature” with gardens and 
picturesque architectural details that “offer[ed] artfully constructed suggestions of rural 
villages and an earlier, non-urban way of life” (Whelan 17, 59, emphasis in original). 
Meanwhile getting out of the city altogether, if just for a visit, became more important. 
Newly affluent urban dwellers desired nothing more than to escape the dirty and immoral 
city, where they had earned their money, into the country, which was newly represented 
as the locus of tranquility, independence, and simplicity (Strong 30).40   
A new national identity with immense “spiritual authority” – one that 
romanticized an idyllic, rural, domestic, conservative life – was born in the collective 
nostalgia for a rural past that was being invented in the pages of popular magazines and 
books even as the real, flawed one convulsed (Strong 33). Magazines like Country Life, 
which began publication in the final decade of the century, targeted the professional 
urban classes with articles about architecture and gardening, traditional country crafts, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40And they could escape: the railway meant the countryside was increasingly accessible for weekends and 
sporting trips where city-dwellers could role-play at being landed gentlemen; new money meant the middle 
classes could purchase the estates of impoverished landowners, or for less money, cottages to renovate with 
modern conveniences (Strong 40). At the very least, a tourist’s visit offered vicarious participation, as the 
“tradition” of country house visiting continued and intensified. 
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sporting pursuits, interior decorating, farming and estate maintenance.  Pages upon pages 
of advertisements – for manor houses, cottages, village homes for rent, weekend 
getaways – hinted that one could buy a lifestyle along with a landscape (Outka 339). At 
the turn of the century, “the very idea of an authentic country life was for sale in a way 
not previously seen in England” during these years (Outka 337-8).   
In this atmosphere of rural nostalgia, Austen’s novels offered appealing access to 
“a landscape, not of objects, of physical features arranged picturesquely, but of social 
relation. It is… a Burkean, or Tory, pastoral” (Miles 131-2). “Constructed” and 
“marketed” in the 1870s and 1880s as the “songbird” of a gentrified rural way of life and 
as “England’s totem,” Austen’s appeal only increased as the century closed (Miles 134). 
For these readers, the very ordinariness of her subject matter was now a positive factor. 
As a writer for Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine put it in 1866, in Austen’s novels 
“we are transferred at once to an old world which we can scarcely believe was England 
only half-a-century ago. If it were only for the completeness with which she holds the 
mirror up to the society in which she lived, they would be of great interest” (qtd in 
Southam 211). In an 1871 review, reprinted in 1871, 1874, and 1883, Anne Thackeray 
calls the world of Austen’s novels, 
… a country landscape, where the cattle are grazing, the boughs of the great elm-
tree rocking in the wind…. The rafters cross the whitewashed ceilings, the beams 
project into the room below. We can see it all: the parlour with the horsehair sofa, 
the scant, quaint furniture, the old-fashioned garden outside, with its flowers and 
vegetables combined, and along the south side of the garden the green terrace 
sloping away… 
All this time, while her fame is slowly growing, life passes in the same way in the 
old cottage at Chawton. (168, 173, qtd in Southam 168) 
 
Austen’s timelessness, as the Victorians narrated her influence and their connection to 
her world, derives from her very rural ordinariness. Her status as the authentic recorder of 
! 67!
that landscape of rural life and social relations depended on two things: her reception as 
authoritative observer and her finally fully appreciated powers of illusion. 
Austen as Visual Authority in an Age of Visual Epistemology 
Keen visual observation was paramount to nineteenth-century British 
epistemology, which privileged vision as the most objective, and therefore most reliable 
sense. This importance derived from “the rhetoric of empiricism,” which Jules David 
Law has called a “foundational optical metaphorics” analogizing comprehension and 
clear vision (2). Of all the human senses, sight seemed to depend most on “the world of 
pregiven truth” and least on subjective human processing, especially since consciousness 
uniquely hides most visual processing from awareness (Edney 48).41 It was therefore the 
most trustworthy and reliable among the unreliable human senses for gaining knowledge 
through experience, even if vision itself had begun to seem increasingly fallible. 
 Unlike Constable’s, Austen’s “landscapes” are of social relationships in an implied 
pastoral environment: the famed naturalness of her works rests not on their visual 
likeness to green nature but on the truth of their representation of human nature.  
Nevertheless, the rhetoric surrounding her reception in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century involves frequent elevation of her authoritative, often specifically visual, 
observation.42 Her Victorian biography significantly helped to create this visual authority 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41From mapping the night sky, to surveying Great Britain in its entirety, to cataloguing exotic flora and 
fauna in the colonies, to sketching or photographing cells from microscope slides, to imposing longitude 
lines on the globe for ocean navigation, nineteenth-century Britons accomplished enormous research tasks 
using sight. This reliance on sight extended from study of the natural world to the study of others: for 
instance, physiognomy promised to make even strangers legible to those who could read signs of character 
in facial structure or clothing. Images seemed to reveal human nature, whether in the abnormal 
psychologies Hugh Diamond thought he could capture in photographs of mental patients, or the drawings 
of common facial expressions Darwin included in his tome on human emotions. 
 
42Although novels are a non-visual medium, critics often referred to Austen like a visual artist, as when G. 
H. Lewes calls her “one of the greatest painters of human character” in The Book of Authors (402). 
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for an age that valued its epistemological possibilities. 
 Austen was born less than a year before Constable, in December 1775, but died 
well before him, in July 1817.  She enjoyed more popular success than he during her 
lifetime, short as it was, but she was not a bestseller, and she was “not immediately 
acclaimed as… a writer of peculiar Englishness” (Miles 132).43 Except for a small 
“highbrow” audience, “after her death… her popularity seems to have declined almost 
immediately” (Southam 18). Her nephew James Edward Austen-Leigh published a 
Memoir of Jane Austen in 1870 that changed this, giving life to an Austen persona that 
captured public imagination. Like Constable’s, Austen’s persona became more famous 
than her works, and her powers of visual observation were key to her reputation. 
 Austen-Leigh famously presented Austen as “dear Aunt Jane,” a spinster of 
unimpeachable morals who tossed off classic novels in odd moments snatched from 
domestic duties.44 The biography constructs Austen as a sharp-eyed observer peculiarly 
suited by a kind of homespun expertise for her novels of village gentry. Austen-Leigh 
presents her writing activity as continuous with her home life “in the general sitting-
room, subject to all kinds of casual interruptions,” but these interruptions are everywhere 
reinforced as the fodder for that writing (81). It is Austen’s engagement with her 
intelligent family, her immersion in domesticity, and her intimacy with a small circle that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43The first edition of Pride and Prejudice, a run of about 1,500 copies, sold out between January and July 
1813, and went to two more editions by 1817. These numbers do not include readers using circulating 
libraries. Even so, this was a respectable performance, but it could not compare with a true blockbuster like 
Scott’s 1817 Rob Roy, which sold 10,000 copies in two weeks (Southam 4-5). 
 
44The second edition of the biography, published in 1871, for the first time also included Austen’s drafts of 
“Lady Susan,” “The Watsons,” and the chapter she deleted from Persuasion; Kathryn Sutherland notes that 
these writings “challenge” Austen-Leigh’s characterization of his aunt by their inclusion, contradicting his 
presentation of her “novels as the effortless extensions of a wholesome and blameless life lived in simple 
surroundings…. [to] reveal that the artlessness of the finished works is the result of laboured revision… 
rather than unconscious perfection” (xv). 
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make her so perceptive an observer of village life, and “Every village could furnish 
matter for a novel to Miss Austen” (qtd in Austen-Leigh 117).45 
 In fact, like Constable, the artist sequestered in England, Austen as “Aunt Jane” is 
free of influence from the wider world and secluded within an entirely domestic, entirely 
English lifestyle; her biographer presents her as thus uniquely positioned to record such a 
life.  “I doubt whether it would be possible to mention any other author of note,” Austen-
Leigh writes, “whose personal obscurity was so complete” (90). Having taken pains to 
present her as an author who writes only of what she knows, Austen-Leigh therefore also 
demonstrates her perfect suitability for capturing domestic English life within her class as 
it was once. He testifies to her accuracy of observation in the novels, noting “my age 
renders me a competent witness” to establish  
…the fidelity with which they represent the opinions and manners of the class of 
society in which the author lived early in this century. They do this the more 
faithfully on account of the very deficiency with which they have been sometimes 
charged – namely, that they make no attempt to raise the standard of human life, 
but merely represent it as it was…. These writings are like photographs, in which 
no feature is softened; no ideal expression is introduced, all is the unadorned 
reflection of the natural object; and the value of such a faithful likeness must 
increase as time gradually works more and more changes in the face of society 
itself. (116) 
 
 The Memoir catalyzed a comparative flood of critical reviews, and her public 
personality changed further as critics styled her a truly natural genius (Southam 28, Miles 
134).46 She became even more remarkable as an observer due to her lack of formal 
apprenticeship; her utterly artless works began to seem a kind of transcript of reality from 
this artist who could not help but (almost photographically) reproduce what she saw.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45Austen-Leigh consistently locates her novels in her personal experience: “She was always very careful 
not to meddle with matters which she did not thoroughly understand” (18). 
 
46A few reviewers of the biography challenged this myth of dear Aunt Jane, but they seem to have been 
largely ignored by a public and a professional elite who preferred the myth (Southam 6). 
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 Underlying this hagiography the emphasis on observation continued. She is 
frequently ascribed almost supernatural powers of sight, as when a review of the Memoir 
in the Spectator describes her portrait in the front matter: “The little head is carried with 
great spirit, with a certain consciousness of seeing rapidly beneath the surface of life, and 
with an air of enjoying its own rapidity of vision” (qtd in Southam 163). Here her power 
of sight becomes almost visionary: observation moves beyond watchfulness to an ability 
to discern inner qualities. Even critics reluctant to bestow the mantle of high art praise her 
observation. Macmillan’s Magazine notes in 1884, “She possessed one literary 
instrument which she used with extraordinary skill and delicacy – the instrument of 
critical observation as applied to the commoner types and relations of human life” (87, 
qtd in Southam 184). Critics who challenged the mythic persona still positioned Austen’s 
powers as specifically visual; while George Pellew objected to the public adulation of a 
natural genius half-created by the critics, he also wrote “But one rare faculty she 
possessed, that redeems her work from insignificance, -- the faculty of describing 
accurately what she saw.  She anticipated the scientific precision that the spirit of the age 
is now demanding in literature and art” (47, qtd in Southam 177). Victorian hagiography 
presented Austen as a keen observer of daily rural life among the minor gentry, now so 
interesting. This “scientific precision” in observation and description provides an 
additional key to her illusory power. 
Cognitive Analysis of Austen in Context: Clear Seeing and Clear Knowing 
Partly because empiricism considered that knowledge was conditioned by 
perspective, as I have discussed in the introduction, nineteenth-century epistemology 
emphasized the importance of “virtual witnessing,” that cognitive artifact developed by 
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late seventeenth-century British researchers following Robert Boyle. Knowledge could 
not be taken as truth unless multiple “eye-witnesses” corroborated its observation, as in 
an experiment (Shapin 487). This produced a problem for natural philosophers working 
alone, isolated from collaborators and away from public trials: how could a single 
experimenter secure eyewitnesses? Boyle’s innovation was virtual witnessing through 
precise description: “the production in a reader’s mind of such an image of an 
experimental scene as obviates the necessity for either its direct witness or its 
replication,” though such replication could be performed from the description if desired 
(Shapin 491). Readers could “witness” the experiment “virtually” through “their 
realization in the laboratory of the mind and the mind’s eye” (Shapin 491). Boyle’s prose 
provided such descriptive clarity that readers could envision his actions and thus 
“observe” his experiments.47 As Steven Shapin explains this cognitive artifact, virtual 
witnessing was both a “literary technology by means of which the phenomena produced 
by [the experiment] were made known to those who were not direct witnesses; and a 
social technology which laid down the conventions natural philosophers should employ 
in… considering knowledge claims” (484). The reproduction of an experiment in the 
mind’s eye meant that that reader could share the experience of inductive reasoning – the 
scientific process – with the researcher-writer (Tucker 7). 
This emphasis on simple language and rich description continued in the 
nineteenth century in fantastically popular naturalist prose. Victorian natural history 
writers described their subjects with such detail that their readers could picture specimens 
and procedures with clarity, even as they likewise exhorted readers to go out into the field !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47He also took care to present himself as a trustworthy writer and experimenter, reporting his failures as 
well as his successes to suggest honesty, and adopting a plain style that seemed modest and objective even 
as the writer sought to describe richly and thoroughly (Shapin 494-497). 
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or sit behind the microscope and see for themselves.48 Natural history writers thus took 
on the mantle of individual authority as visual observers and also recruited readers as 
virtual witnesses, whose subsequent work could corroborate, correct, or augment existing 
knowledge about the natural world. Natural history writing simultaneously set up the 
writers as visual authorities, popularized scientific knowledge through appeal to the 
visual imagination, and established a social relationship uniting writer and readers in 
epistemic communities privileging vision as a means of knowledge.  
Given the prevalence of natural history writing and “popular science” in general 
during the mid- and later nineteenth century, it is not surprising to find Pellew 
commenting that his age expected “scientific precision” in visual observation and 
description. But imagination remained key: like Romanticism, nineteenth-century natural 
history appreciated the ordinary and the quotidian, and made an explicit virtue of 
audience participation. Neoclassicism privileged ideal presence, but preferred the 
finished work that hid its created ontology; by contrast, Romanticism valued the process 
of creation because it engaged audience imaginations. Where Neoclassicism elevated 
reason, wholeness, and the ideal, Romanticism allowed instinct, fragmentation, and the 
ordinary. Instead of a passive, “receptive” audience, Romantic theories of mind 
postulated an active participant in perception (Abrams 58). Romantic art could be 
fragmentary, spontaneous, and expressive in part because this would better engage 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48Typical in this regard is Philip Henry Gosse, who claims (in the third person) that he has attempted “to set 
down simply what he himself could see,” which he then invites the reader to “gaze” upon, and narrates with 
such clarity that the reader can indeed seem to “see” (Evenings iv, 77). His “pen-pictures” appeal to the 
imagination, but he asserts their factuality as well, for “Precision is the very soul of science, -- precision in 
observation, truthfulness in record” (Gosse Rambles v, vii). Gosse conveys the truth of what he has seen 
with such precision and particularity that the reader can see, and therefore know, it as well. Readers were 
encouraged to make their own study, however, and even sometimes exhorted to report their findings to the 
writer, as when John Quekett asks readers of his Practical Treatise on the Use of the Microscope to send 
him “any hints bearing on matters relating to the” instrument and its use in the study of natural history (ix). 
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audience imaginations. Such “unfinished” work also seemed to put the audience in touch 
with the creator, because it was closer to the original spark of inspiration. 
 That cultural expectations for art had changed, to emphasize the importance of 
both visual precision and attention to the imaginative possibilities inherent in the 
ordinary, is evident in Victorian comments on Austen. In addition to her “scientific 
precision” and the authentic vision she allows of turn-of-the-century life, commenters 
also praised her work specifically as it enabled her to engage readers’ imaginations. One 
such review, in Macmillan’s Magazine in 1884, proclaimed:  
It was her possession of the qualities of condensation that made Jane Austen what 
she was. Condensation in literary matters means an exquisite power of choice and 
discrimination— a capacity for isolating from the vast mass of detail which goes 
to make up human life just those details and no others which will produce a 
desired effect and blend into one clear and harmonious whole…. And if to this 
temper of self-restraint you add the imagination which seizes at once upon the 
most effective image or detail and realises at a glance how it will strike a 
reader… you have arrived at the component parts of such a gift as Jane 
Austen’s….” (89-90, qtd in Southam 185, my emphasis) 
 
If Austen’s subject matter failed to meet earlier expectations for elevation or interest, her 
style was at least closer to Neoclassical elevation of spare, restrained perfection. But this 
allowed her novels to stoke later readers’ imaginations, too. In the context of a culture 
that expected descriptive clarity, her use of details came to serve the purposes of virtual 
witnessing as they might originally have served ideal presence – and were now also 
appreciated for the light they shone, both imaginative and precise, on ordinary subjects.  
Cognitive analysis suggests that the Victorian impression of “scientific precision” 
may have been served in another experiential way as well: the details of Austen’s novels 
call on many of the same inductive processes humans use to read others in daily 
interactions. Regularly we notice details about others’ dress, behavior, speech, and body 
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language; we assign these details to patterns and use them to draw conclusions about 
others’ inner lives. Since conclusions are often hard to confirm, we operate on 
conditional hypotheses that we revise as we go. Which details we notice, sometimes 
because our own expectations and desires prime us to notice them, will affect the kinds of 
hypotheses we make (Palmer 178). Austen’s novels uniquely deploy limited cues to 
reproduce this process – one that should have been particularly convincing for 
nineteenth-century readers trained to associate observation of detail with special insight.49 
Much good work has been done on Austen’s novel techniques using cognitive 
studies;50 here I will narrow this wide field to focus on her famously real characters and 
by extension on her narrator, as this narrator can take on the role of a character. Her 
characters stand as one of Austen’s most realistic components. 51 Yet she does not often 
describe these characters at any length. Instead, Austen chooses the essential particular !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49Immersion in fictional reading, also variously called “transportation,” “make-believe,” and “absorption,” 
has come under psychological study in recent years.  Psychologist Keith Oatley compares the experience of 
art to running a simulation using the imagination instead of a computer, in “a kind of guided dream” 
(“Meetings” 441). As I have indicated, the reader co-produces the world of the novel from the necessarily 
incomplete prompts of the text, accepting its laws for the duration of reading (Ryan 91-94). As Marie-
Laure Ryan puts it, “Simulation is the reader’s mode of performance of a narrative” (113). While the 
simulation runs, we give substance to its environment and life to its personalities, the props of its world.  
We push our beliefs about its fictiveness to the background, but our emotions respond to the narrative much 
as they would to a true story: “simulation makes [the fictive] temporarily true and present,” while the 
background knowledge that this is all make-believe remains available on some level to allow us pleasure in 
the experience even of negative emotions (Ryan 156).  This also helps to explain how we can experience 
real emotions with and for characters we know are not real. Readers seem to differ in the degree to which 
they want extensive detail provided by the text as well as in the detail of their own constructions, which 
investigation suggests run the gamut from generally to clearly visualized (Ryan 120).  Regardless, it is in 
the gaps, however wide they may be, that the reader’s imagination has room to work. !
50See Lisa Zunshine’s comments on Austen in Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel for a 
discussion of Austen’s unique use of free indirect discourse and multiple levels of intentionality. For 
Austen’s use of contemporary theories of brain injury, see Alan Richardson’s “Of Heartache and Head 
Injury: Reading Minds in Persuasion.” For more on Austen’s presentation of minds, see Kay Young’s 
Imagining Minds: The Neuro-Aesthetics of Austen, Eliot, and Hardy. 
 
51The issue of realistic characters is not precisely the same as the question of immersion, but rather, both 
can be considered to produce and be facilitated by readerly engagement with the text. Realistic characters 
can help a reader feel immersed, and an immersed reader is probably more likely to find the characters she 
meets in a text realistic. 
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and leaves the rest of her characters’ appearance and personality up to the imagination: 
Elizabeth Bennet has “fine eyes” and a sharp wit; Jane is pretty but “smiled too much;” 
Mr. Bingley is “good looking and gentlemanlike.” Readers get merely the “general 
effect,” but this produces “distinct impression[s]” (Bertelsen 370).52 Moreover, if this 
general effect arrives in spare, essentialized, and therefore rather Neoclassical prose, 
rather than the typical Victorian abundance of detail, it also focuses on details more 
concrete than abstract. Readers hear about specific aspects of appearance and behavior: 
eyes, smiles, tics, habitual items of clothing, and typical exclamations, like Lydia’s oft-
repeated “Lord!” (Bertelsen 370). DCT clarifies that the more concrete such references 
are, the more quickly they will evoke reader associations, and the more memorable they 
will be. Austen’s Neoclassical prose pares virtual witnessing descriptions down to the 
bare minimum, but in its very isolation of details, provides those most calculated to make 
evocative and lasting reader impressions. 
Via their dual coding in both verbal and non-verbal channels, Austen’s 
characterization thus takes unusual advantage of the reader’s imaginative participation in 
the creation of her story worlds: the description triggers a reader’s memories of both the 
character’s actions throughout the novel, and also experience with similar personalities in 
real life and in other fiction.  For example, Austen writes of Mrs. Bennet that  
She was a woman of mean understanding, little information, and uncertain 
temper.  When she was discontented she fancied herself nervous.  The business of 
her life was to get her daughters married; its solace was visiting and news. (3) 
 
This is indeed a short description of one of the novel’s major supporting cast, but the 
reader will remember Mrs. Bennet’s consistently silly speech throughout the first chapter, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52Lance Bertelsen suggests that Austen is thus like contemporary portrait painters who experimented with 
“suggest[ing] the essential ‘effect’ of the original while allowing the audience to project onto that 
generalized form the particulars derived from their experience of the character” (362). 
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and may also be reminded of people she knows, or characters she has met in other fiction, 
and will use these memories to flesh out her understanding. Since we never know any 
other minds, fictional or nonfictional, completely, the reader constructs her perception of 
Mrs. Bennet using much the same process she uses to produce hypothetical models for an 
actual acquaintance: from inferences on the basis of limited information (Palmer 200). In 
this way Austen’s highly connotative details use a familiar process to allow us to find 
people we already know in her pages. In Virginia Woolf’s words, Austen “stimulates us 
to supply what is not there.  What she offers is, apparently, a trifle, yet is composed of 
something that expands in the reader’s mind” (197). 
Meeting Austen Herself: Cognitive Analysis Continued 
Austen’s story in Pride and Prejudice is told, as are her other novels, by a 
famously perceptive, ironic narrator, whose speech calls on similar inductive processes of 
inference.  We might expect this narrator to interrupt a sense of presence in the story 
world, by reminding readers that the story is fiction.53 However I suspect that Austen’s 
narrator is a foundational pillar supporting the firmament of her story world: an integral 
part of the inductive process. The shrewdly ironic narration is consistent from the first 
sentence: “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a 
good fortune, must be in want of a wife” is, it is soon evident, not a truth necessarily held 
by anyone other than Mrs. Bennet (Austen 2, Deresiewicz 503).  The narrator’s knowing 
tone and implied invitation to the reader to laugh along is established immediately as part 
of the simulation, rather than as an interruption to it.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53Research shows that such interpositions between audience and story can easily disrupt immersion, as 
when whisperers in a movie theatre disturb the concentration of other viewers (Green 321). 
 
! 77!
Keith Oatley suggests adding a third term to the standard literary studies 
distinction between the events of a story and its discourse, to refer to the reader’s 
personal associations with and judgments of a text.54 As he says, understanding Austen’s 
irony relies on this work; it requires the reader to recognize that a statement has multiple 
possible interpretations. While precisely how to take the narrator’s hints is up to the 
individual, readers have to make these decisions for the narrative to work and the narrator 
to come to life (Oatley Dreams 46, 72). This sort of inference from indirect cues mirrors 
the cooperation of conversationalists in real life; even face-to-face conversations run on 
many other cues besides words.55 Similarly, we construct “hypothetical versions of the 
minds” we meet in fiction, revising them as we go (Palmer 177). Some research suggests 
that having to construct this sense of cooperation with a narrator actually increases, rather 
than decreases reader comprehension (Bortolussi and Dixon 428-429). 
In fact, the sense we have that this is not a novel in which events tell themselves, 
but one in which a perceptive narrator who is highly aware of human foibles conveys a 
story, may actually increase our sense that the story itself is real. The illusion the novel 
offers is one not of simply witnessing events and personalities, but of witnessing them as 
told by a narrator who tells the truth. The simulation incorporates not just the 
visualization of people and observation of minds, but also the sense of a narrator that we 
can trust. As when Austen’s narrator notes of Mrs. Bennet that she “attended [Jane] to the 
door with many cheerful prognostics of a bad day,” hoping rainy weather will further her 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54This is the Russian Formalist distinction between the fabula (event structure), the fictional events in 
chronological sequence, and the syuzhet (discourse structure), which includes the events but also the 
instructions about “how to turn the events into a story” – how to run the simulation (Oatley Dreams 69). 
 
55In daily interaction with others we regularly form working hypotheses about their thoughts, operating on 
these conjectures until we receive new information.!
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matrimonial hopes by forcing Jane to stay at Netherfield (22), the irony consistently 
demonstrates that the narrator perceives human nature clearly, down to private 
motivations, rationalizations, and faults. It invites readers to share that vantage point.  
If Victorian readers then tended to conflate this narrator with the author herself, 
the public perception of Austen as an expert observer may have only increased their 
predilection both to find Austen-as-narrator an authority, and also to enjoy the story as a 
truthful glimpse of the past world its story seems to reproduce. Austen uses the voice of a 
perceptive teller to construct a compelling but clearly narrated world – one that is all the 
more compelling because it is related by a speaker whose perceptions the reader must 
trust implicitly in order to share her irony. It is no wonder so many nineteenth-century 
readers commented on feeling as though they became a part of the novel’s limited social 
circle. As Anne Thackeray put it in her 1871 review, which conflates Austen’s powers of 
illusion with her nostalgic appeal, “we seem not only to read [her novels] but to live 
them, to see the people coming and going: the gentlemen courteous and in top-boots, the 
ladies demure and piquant; we can almost hear them talking to one another…” (162-163, 
qtd in Southam 166). 
Constable’s Early Reception: Cultural Aesthetic Expectations 
 Constable’s early reception was chillier than Austen’s. Because he painted 
landscapes, his work was destined to seem less important during the first decades of the 
century than paintings of historical or mythological scenes. Academic art circles, which 
scaled landscapes lower in importance when they lacked historical or mythological 
themes, thought landscape paintings should at least show “picturesque” beauty, or views 
that offered pleasing variety. Constable’s images thus failed by several of the most 
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important Neoclassical standards, being neither ideal nor interesting in this sense, though 
even the earliest critical accounts note his paintings’ peculiar power of illusion. The early 
consensus among many reviewers was that his subject matter was “incapable of engaging 
the intellectual faculties or of probing those mysteries which were the prerogative of 
High Art” (Ivy 5). Constable’s landscapes of rural life were also – not always, but often – 
too georgic in the representation of orderly productive agriculture to be strictly 
picturesque, a category that usually called for ruined cottages and ragged peasants.56   
Furthermore his handling, or brush technique, was unusual: early critics 
reproached Constable for his lack of finish, commenting that his paintings looked too 
much like sketches to be exhibition paintings. Over his career, his technique became 
increasingly expressive, so that even in the finished paintings his movements remain 
visible: a viewer can see where his brush dragged through the paint, where he scraped or 
rubbed away layers to reveal the ground and even the weave of the canvas, where paint 
has hardened standing up, where he left globs or splashes or tiny spots. Often he would 
use a palette knife to add flecks of paint, especially but not exclusively on foliage, to 
“create an effect of shimmering light and movement” (Cove “Materials” 512). 
In an era of high finish, these techniques puzzled and repelled reviewers, who 
recognized the “force and power of his paintings” but did not know how to assign them 
artistic importance (Lyles 39). They ridiculed his highlights as “Constable’s snow” (Cove 
“Materials” 513). Because evidence of the painter’s work called attention to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56Dismayed critics also noticed that he infrequently varied locations; one reviewer wrote in 1825 that 
Constable “seems to have a peculiar affection for the dullest of subjects, and to be unable to quit them” 
(“British Institution” 67). In a period when paintings hung in public exhibitions had to compete in close 
quarters, Constable’s friend John Fisher noted of one of his early paintings, “It is most pleasing when you 
are directed to look at it; but you must be taken to it.  It does not solicit attention; and this I think true of all 
your pictures” (qtd in Leslie 40). His landscapes, which did not elevate the mind with subject matter 
considered “intellectual,” were also just not sufficiently eye-catching according to the standards of the day. 
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ontological status of the painting as an artist’s creation on a flat surface, for early viewers 
it could negate the illusion. For instance, Robert Hunt (one of Constable’s more sensitive 
reviewers) wrote in The Examiner in 1812, “Mr. CONSTABLE has much originality and 
vigour of style, but bordering perhaps a little on crudeness of effect” (363). An 1822 
reviewer of The Hay Wain commented, “If the vigour, freshness, and truth of effect, 
apparent in every part of the work, were united to a little more neatness of execution, the 
picture would be perfect” (qtd in Ivy 92). When such reviewers commented on the 
naturalistic impact of Constable’s paintings, they seem not to have considered that this 
effect depended on the very treatment they denigrated (Ivy 47-8). 
Constable’s Later Reception: Victorian Nostalgia 
As with Austen, however, Constable’s images offered later generations material 
for narratives of cultural nostalgia. The growing popularity of landscape photography, 
more affordable and accessible than paintings, attests both to this widespread Victorian 
nostalgia and also to the growing appeal of once “uninteresting” British landscapes. 
These photographs both documented a way of life that was passing, and elegized it 
romantically, paradoxically commodifying it by making it (at least seem) available to the 
middle and lower-middle class consumer. England was presented as rural, agricultural, 
stable, tranquil, orderly. Typical idealized landscape photographs excluded all notice of 
agricultural upheavals (of which there were plenty), focusing instead on “ancient manor 
houses and gardens, views of an unspoiled landscape depicted through the seasons, 
ordinary countrymen at their toil and the gentry engaging in country pursuits” (Strong 
36). Despite the variety, many images from this period are unified in that they “exud[e] a 
lyrical romanticism,” “conjur[ing] up” visions of “a lost countryside in which the honest 
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craftsman had practised his skills and passed his life within the security of an unchanging 
village community… guided by the landed classes who dominated local affairs as their 
natural right” (Strong 21, 36-7). Yet this lifestyle was now accessible to the non-landed 
classes, who could afford a postcard or a book of photographs.57 
Constable’s paintings of harmonious rural work and agricultural landscapes were 
well suited to this kind of popular nostalgia. His mid-century biographer Charles Robert 
Leslie makes an explicit virtue of the fact that Constable never traveled outside England, 
positioning him as a specifically British painter. Writing about an age when professional 
and amateur painters frequently traveled for their scenery, Leslie says that  
Travelling is now the order of the day, and it may sometimes prove beneficial,—
but to Constable’s art there can be little doubt that the confinement of his studies 
within the narrowest bounds in which, perhaps, the studies of an artist ever were 
confined, was in the highest degree favourable; for a knowledge of atmospheric 
effects will be best attained by a constant study of the same objects under every 
change of the seasons, and of the times of day.  His ambition, it will be borne in 
mind, was not to paint many things imperfectly, but to paint a few things well. 
(314-15) 
 
His accuracy of observation of these “few things” is confirmed by the inclusion (among 
others) of comments from Constable’s brother and a plowman from Suffolk, both of 
whom testify to the truthfulness of what Constable has depicted in his scenes of rural 
England. Leslie quotes Constable’s own testimony that it was these scenes that “made me 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57Victorian landscape photographer Andrew Pringle, well-known for his publications in The British Journal 
of Photography, asserted in 1882 that the goal of such photographs was not just to convey visual truths but 
also spiritual ones: the ideal is “so to imitate that our imitations, while presenting so far the same 
impressions to the eye as visible nature, may carry with them a feeling of what is not perceptible to the 
bodily eye, but must, from the nature of man, be sensible to the mind” (Pringle, qtd in Green-Lewis 42).  
They should not only record the present moment for posterity, but provide “imaginative access to the past” 
(Green-Lewis 44). Photography in this vein was an effort at preservation, romanticization, and 
commercialization; viewing thus became acts of “belonging” to the culture being preserved and celebrated, 
and “owning” the scenes that now a viewer could keep on a coffee table or carry on the train with her 
(Green-Lewis 40).  If “the idea of England too was for sale,” the purchaser of a magazine like Country Life, 
or a series of postcards representing rural life, could own a little piece of “true” England, and through it, 
participate in “a mystified but collective fantasy of the past as home” (Green-Lewis 45-59).   
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a painter” (qtd in Leslie 93) for “I was born to paint… my own dear old England; and 
when I cease to love her, may I, as Wordsworth says, ‘never more hear/Her green leaves 
rustle, or her torrents roar!’” (qtd in Leslie 110). After his death, Leslie’s biography 
began the public work of establishing him as indeed “the most genuine painter of English 
landscapes that has yet lived” (79). Subsequent treatments take their cue from Leslie’s 
work, repeating his anecdotes to demonstrate Constable’s accuracy of observation; by the 
final quarter of the century this authority has flowered into a peculiarly English vision.58 
As the century progressed, Constable’s paintings gradually became more 
accessible to the general public, who were otherwise snapping up cheaper landscape 
photography.59 This increase in public access was accompanied by an increase in critical 
literature positioning Constable as a specifically British painter, with interest to a 
nostalgic public. John Ruskin’s public distaste for his work, and Leslie’s public !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58See for example James Smith’s (1853) Lights and Shadows of Artist Life and Character, which repeats 
the sketching episode at George Beaumont’s that Leslie records, to show what Smith calls Constable’s 
“persevering study of nature” (208), or the Art Journal’s (1855) “British Artists: Their Style and Character” 
series, which led off with Constable as one of the preeminent English landscape painters because of his 
“fidelity to nature” (10).  In 1871 Joseph Sandell is still utilizing anecdotes from Leslie, including West’s 
approval of Constable, in Memoranda of Art and Artists, Anecdotal and Biographical. 
 
59As Ian Fleming-Williams and Leslie Parris point out, the average Victorian in 1850 who wanted to see “a 
Constable” would have had to do some work to find one (36). If she were very, very lucky, she might find a 
copy of Various Subjects of Landscape, Characteristic of English Scenery, the set of twenty-two 
mezzotints that David Lucas had engraved for Constable, published in small runs in 1830 and 1833.  She 
would be slightly more likely to find an 1843 edition of the Life, which included the same mezzotints.  Four 
prints of additional large Lucas engravings after Constable’s landscapes had been published by 1850, and 
became his most popularly accessible and therefore most recognizable works: The Cornfield and The Lock 
in 1834, The Young Waltonians (or Stratford Mill) in 1840, and The Rainbow (of Salisbury Cathedral) in 
1848.59  But if this average Victorian wished to see an original, she could have visited the National Gallery 
in London, which displayed two: The Cornfield, donated by friends of Constable’s in 1837, and The Valley 
Farm, given by a collector in 1847.  Otherwise she would have had to have known a purchaser or been 
connected to one of Constable’s own circle, with access to the family house at 16 Cunningham Place. 
Gradually Constable’s paintings became more accessible to the middle classes as the century progressed. In 
1857 the Sheepshank donation to the South Kensington Museum (later the Victoria and Albert) included a 
handful of Constables; these had been followed by a permanent loan of the full-size sketches for The Hay 
Wain and The Leaping Horse in 1862. Beginning in 1871, works by Constable appeared in the Royal 
Academy’s winter exhibitions almost every year (Fleming-Williams and Parris 72). But the most enormous 
influx of his work into public access occurred in the final two decades of the century, as Constable’s 
children gradually died, bequeathing a breathtaking number of works to the nation, and as his grandchildren 
rapidly sold the remainder at auction (81). 
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rejoinders, must have drawn some attention during the middle decades of the century.  
But Richard and Samuel Redgrave offered one of the first extended treatments of 
Constable’s art, in addition to his persona, in their 1866 A Century of Painters of the 
English School. It is in their pages that Constable begins to wear the mantle of full-
fledged nationalism as part of his public appeal: “His art is purely and thoroughly 
English,” write the Redgraves, “English in subject, English in feeling, English in 
treatment and execution” (382). Repeating the idea begun with Leslie’s biography that 
Constable was both an unusually excellent observer and also free of the influence of any 
“school” or “manner,” and therefore best equipped to reproduce the “feeling of truth” in 
his natural scenes, they assert: “Look at any or all of his pictures and see how England 
rises before us” (387-9). This commandment is followed by an extended descriptive 
catalogue of varied English scenery, and another paean to Constable’s authority as a 
specifically English painter of true English landscape: “Such is our English pastoral 
scenery; such Constable played in in his infancy, and painted in his manhood” (387). 
Much of the literature that followed picked up this louder strain of nostalgia and 
nationalism that the Redgraves had sounded, making Constable’s heritage and style the 
twin poles of his appeal. As an updated version of The Lives of the Most Eminent British 
Painters noted in 1880, Constable’s art “is above all genuinely English, locally English 
even….”; she later notes his “scientific knowledge” underlying in his observation and 
reproduction of clouds (192, 199). Always underlying this appeal, for both style and 
heritage, is his status as authoritative observer. As Heaton puts it,  
Many things that we have passed by unheeded in our country walks become 
noteworthy to and beautiful to us after we have seen them truthfully recorded by 
art; so, although Constable for the most part merely records, and does not, like the 
greatest landscape painters, give us a new revelation of nature, we shall be likely 
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to find enough in his art to occupy our minds, as we shall in that of every artist 
who has expressed, simply and honestly, truths that he has seen for himself 
without the aid of the spectacles belonging to another master. (192) 
 
A decade later, art critic P. G. Hamerton follows a related trend the Redgraves 
began in suggesting the appeal both of his sketches and of his sketchy handling in 
finished pictures, “which makes them richer and more suggestive than work done with 
mechanical exactness” (166). He notes that Constable “was British to the backbone” and 
later adds, “The chief interest of the studies is that they show the manly and straight-
forward spirit in which Constable went to nature” (167-169). As more Constable 
paintings appeared to public interest in the 1890s, a relative flurry of popular books 
followed. A beautiful new edition of Leslie’s Life was published in 1896 with new 
illustrations of Constable’s work, while Charles John Holmes wrote the first real attempts 
at art historical analysis of Constable in 1901 and 1902 (Fleming-Williams and Parris 
104-109). Like Austen’s, Constable’s popular appeal to nostalgic Victorians lies in his 
very ordinariness, now narrated as authentically and specifically British.  
Constable as Visual Authority in an Age of Visual Epistemology 
 Also like Austen, Constable’s popular Victorian reputation began with his 
biography – especially during the earlier years when fewer of his paintings were available 
to the public – and conditioned Victorian audiences to find him an expert observer. When 
Constable died suddenly on March 31, 1837 at the age of sixty, he had hardly enjoyed the 
fame his works have since garnered. Constable’s fellow artist and close friend Leslie 
published the aforementioned Memoirs of the Life of John Constable Esq, R. A. 
Composed chiefly of his letters in 1843, in an effort to begin to rescue Constable’s 
reputation; a cheaper revised edition followed in 1845. Essentially the only book-length 
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treatment of Constable for decades, this “became the standard image” of the artist, 
“achiev[ing] for Constable what he had failed to achieve for himself; he became widely 
known, better known in fact than his paintings” (Fleming-Williams and Parris 30-31, 35).  
 The Constable of Leslie’s 1845 biography is serious, industrious, sensitive, and 
often wittily penetrating in his comments about his own and others’ failings, though 
Leslie silently smoothes his pricklier prose and frequently protects the guilty by redacting 
names. He is an unacknowledged artistic genius, wholly dedicated to his art, and above 
all a perceptive observer of nature.60 As Leslie presents him, Constable’s genius is 
founded on his persistent, patient, precise observation of nature, which is also the reason 
for the sad lack of public appreciation during his lifetime; Leslie writes, “to fail in 
attracting general notice” is proof only that people have grown so used to mannerism and 
servile imitation that they “do not know how to estimate” art “so simple and natural” 
(23). In this biography Leslie is the first to publish the famous words from a private letter 
that have since come to define Constable’s public persona: 
For the last two years I have been running after pictures, and seeking the truth at 
second hand.  I have not endeavoured to represent nature with the same elevation 
of mind with which I set out, but have rather tried to make my performances look 
like the work of other men.  I am come to a determination to make no idle visits 
this summer, nor to give up my time to common-place people.  I shall return to 
Bergholt, where I shall endeavour to get a pure and unaffected manner of 
representing the scenes that may employ me.  There is little or nothing in the 
exhibition worth looking up to.  There is room enough for a natural painter.  The 
great vice of the present day is bravura, an attempt to do something beyond the 
truth.  Fashion always had, and will have, its day; but truth in all things only with 
last, and can only have just claims on posterity.  (qtd in Leslie 16) 
 
As Constable would later put it, “When I sit down to make a sketch from nature, the first 
thing I try to do is, to forget that I have ever seen a picture” (qtd in Leslie 307). Like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60Leslie also adds that he was equally socially discerning, and “seldom failed to penetrate the real 
characters of men through the disguises of manner” (305). 
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Wordsworth inventing a new poetics, or the researcher seeking virtual witnesses, or the 
naturalist writing to inspire the visual imagination, or Austen as the Victorians saw her, 
Constable seeks to record what he sees rather than what artistic convention dictates. 
To this end, Constable’s activity throughout his life as Leslie reports it indicates 
his consistent, even reverent immersion in the natural world he sought to record. In an 
excerpt from an 1815 letter to Maria, the woman who became his wife, Constable 
confesses that he has lost touch with news of the outside world completely, because as he 
says “I live almost wholly in the fields, and see nobody but the harvest men” (qtd in 
Leslie 62). Leslie notes that he would often sit so still and stare so intently at a scene that 
once when he got up he found a field mouse in his pocket (307). Late in Constable’s life, 
Leslie reports, he and others observed similar habits in the artist’s routines: 
He rose early, and had often made some beautiful sketch in the park before 
breakfast….  His dressing-table was covered with flowers, feathers of birds, and 
pieces of bark with lichens and mosses adhering to them, which he had brought 
home for the sake of their beautiful tints.  Mr. George Constable told me that 
while on the visit to him, Constable brought from Fittleworth Common, at least a 
dozen different specimens of sand and earth, of colours from pale to deep yellow, 
and of light reddish hues to tints almost crimson.  The richness of these colours 
contrasted with the deep greens of the furze and other vegetation on this 
picturesque heath, delighted him exceedingly, and he carried these earths home 
carefully preserved in bottles, and also many fragments of the variously coloured 
stone. (Leslie 258-9) 
 
The artist’s activities are reminiscent of the amateur natural historian collecting 
specimens in the field – of color rather than creatures.61 The artist’s own writings also 
attest to his alert eye, with his various scattered observations on the changing foliage, on 
“Father Thames… scattered over with swans” (qtd in Leslie 257), and on skies, saying in 
one letter “I can hardly write for looking at the silvery clouds” (qtd in Leslie 245). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61Like the quintessential nineteenth-century naturalist, Constable seeks to observe nature for himself. 
Indeed, Leslie reports that a friend noted Constable’s “own way of close observation” in Gilbert White’s 
habits and recommended The Natural History of Selborne to the artist (qtd in Leslie 85). 
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Though Leslie almost never describes any of Constable’s images (and when he 
does, there is very little to convey to a reader what the painting physically looks like) he 
includes testimony from those who did appreciate Constable’s work to convey his 
paintings’ uniquely naturalistic effects.  Leslie himself writes of one of Constable’s views 
from Hampstead Heath that “I know no picture in which the mid-day heat of Midsummer 
is so admirably expressed” (79), and includes a mention of Fuseli’s famous comment that 
Constable’s paintings made him want his umbrella (316). Constable himself reports in a 
letter that another viewer says “he breathes the open air in my pictures, they are more 
than fresh, they are exhilarating” (qtd in Leslie 163). Leslie’s biography thus presents an 
artist purposefully observant of the natural world, succeeding (if unacknowledged) in his 
attempts to convey impressions of living landscapes with freshness and immediacy. 
 But if Constable is insistent on any good landscape artist’s need to observe nature 
closely and for himself, he is equally insistent on the need for long and dedicated training 
of hand and eye. Leslie records Constable’s comment in his second lecture at the Royal 
Institution that “A self-taught artist is one taught by a very ignorant person” (qtd in 
Leslie 338). Patient dedication to studying the works of other artists marks Constable’s 
activity from the first chapter of the biography, and the senior artist’s lifetime of acquired 
knowledge is later demonstrated by Leslie’s inclusion of notes from Constable’s lectures 
covering the history of landscape art. In those lectures Constable also argues consistently 
that even art that seems the work of a moment, capturing the most transitory of 
atmospheric effects, requires both a long history of study and a patient application of 
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skill; the master artist who has achieved facility from long and continuing study wisely 
utilizes this mastery to help him capture a fresh impression with every painting.62   
Constable’s famous assertions comparing painting to science are consistent with 
the artist’s long study and patient observation. Leslie includes in a list of Constable’s 
memoranda a quotation he had copied from naturalist Gilbert White: “Without system, 
the field of nature would be a pathless wilderness; but system should be subservient to, 
not the main object of, our pursuit” (qtd in Leslie 299). In Constable’s own words, 
“painting should be understood… as a pursuit, legitimate, scientific, and mechanical” 
(qtd in Leslie 299-300) and can be “considered as a branch of natural philosophy, of 
which pictures are but the experiments” (qtd in Leslie 355) in part because, like the 
trained scientific observer, the landscape artist depends upon his internalized system to 
help him record what he sees first-hand with his own eyes. Constable is presented as the 
expert observer of England’s everyday natural world at his time. His work, once too dull 
for interest and too ordinary for the ideal, is now both authentic and scientifically precise. 
Cognitive Analysis of Constable in Context: Clear Seeing and Clear Knowing 
Such scientific precision in an age privileging vision relied on drawing as much as 
on verbal description.63 By the early years of the nineteenth century, drawing was an 
amateur hobby, a social accomplishment, and a useful ability: learning to draw was 
essential to a well-rounded nineteenth-century education. It was a crucial skill in the 
portfolios of cartographers, architects, engineers, craftsmen, seafarers, geologists, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62As Constable commented in his fourth lecture to the Royal Institution: “…in reality, what are the most 
sublime productions of the pencil but selections of some of the forms of nature, and copies of a few of her 
evanescent effects; and this is the result, not of inspiration, but of long and patient study, under the 
direction of much good sense” (qtd in Leslie 355). !
63Shafer notes Boyles’ careful use of engraved line drawings in his texts to promote virtual witnessing. 
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military officers, botanists and natural historians, and of course professional artists. 
Learning to draw in many cases also entailed learning to see and record the right degree 
and kind of detail. As Ann Bermingham has noted, drawing conventions developed in a 
fashion roughly consistent with the evolution from Neoclassical to Romantic aesthetics.64 
 Over the last decades of the eighteenth into the nineteenth century, William 
Gilpin taught countless amateurs to sketch according to picturesque rules, which were 
based on classical landscape conventions. While he encouraged a new enthusiasm for 
observation of the natural world, Gilpin’s books emphasize general effect over detail: 
“the province of the picturesque eye is to survey nature, not to anatomize matter…. It 
examines parts, but never descends to particles” (Three Essays 26). Since part of the fun 
of picturesque sketching lies in showing views to friends, Gilpin advocates second drafts 
with clarifying compositional features and “a little ornament also from figures” (Three 
Essays 66).65 What is most important is neither fidelity to the actual scenery nor precisely 
rendered observations, but the overall impression and effect. The effect of the 
composition should correspond to a Neoclassical harmonious ideal even if, in Gilpin’s 
treatment at least, the drawing was not as highly finished as an exhibition oil painting.66 
 But with Romantic wonder over the ordinary and increasing interest in natural 
historical specificity, closely observed and naturalistically rendered detail grew !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64See Learning to Draw: Studies in the Cultural History of a Polite and Useful Art. !
65Already by the turn of the century, artists were reacting with disapproval to Gilpin’s lack of finish and 
emphasis on general effect: drawing master William Marshall Craig called Gilpin’s technique a “disease of 
the pencil” (qtd in Viscomi 35). 
 
66This is one reason why Alexander Cozens could recommend composing landscapes using random ink 
blots for inspiration rather than any actual scene: the drawing master uses his “powers of abstraction and 
his knowledge of form” to arrange blots more or less randomly, according to general ideas about 
composition, and the amateur student then uses the blots as inspiration (Bermingham Learning 97). !
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increasingly important in sketching. For instance, where Gilpin advised his readers in 
1792 that “Among trees, little distinction need be made, unless you introduce the pine, or 
the cypress, or some other singular form” (“Three Essays” 78), in the first few decades of 
the nineteenth century at least six different drawing masters published drawing books that 
taught amateur sketchers to detail different species of trees (Bermingham Learning 114-
5).67 As the century progressed and Romantic ideas took hold of popular imagination, 
sketching convention moved even farther along the spectrum towards close observation. 
This could take two forms: the “universal” but precisely rendered details of natural 
historical and botanical illustrations, and a more artistic, yet still closely observed, 
attention to the visual effects resulting from accidents of perspective and condition. 
Drawing could be expressive, capturing idiosyncrasies of perspective; meanwhile 
sketches and unfinished drawings seemed closer to the moment of artistic inspiration and 
thus better able to aid audience participation in artistic perception.68  
Constable’s style is in some ways the apotheosis of the second, artistic form, 
incorporating a “scientific precision” of effect within its exploratory attention to 
contingencies of weather, time of day, and perspective. For the Victorians, increasing 
elevation of closely observed effects of perceptual processing over the ideally composed 
manifested itself diversely, for example in admiration for Turner’s sprawling 
masterpieces that captured the subjectivity of perception and in Pre-Raphaelite hyper-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67Gilpin had not been without his detractors, who criticized the picturesque popularizer for his use of signs 
that called attention to themselves and lacked intrinsic connection to the thing they represented. Craig 
thought sketch marks should avoid notice as marks: they should be “as transparent a transcription of the 
referent as possible” (Bermingham Learning 109). Gilpin’s and Craig’s ideas can thus be seen as two 
positions along the Neoclassical end of the spectrum: where Gilpin seeks a harmonious general effect 
through attention to composition rather than precise detail, Craig prefers realistic depiction using natural 
signs, universally recognizable as their referents, which disappear in favor of the represented scene. 
 
68 For more, see Klonk. Bermingham. 
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realistic detail (William Holman Hunt, for example, supposedly visited the shore of the 
Dead Sea precisely the time of his setting for The Scapegoat, purposefully to ensure that 
he captured lighting conditions correctly (Bronkhurst 153-154).) And it meant that as 
Constable’s subject matter became more interesting for its nostalgic appeal, his technique 
itself also became interesting for its imaginative possibilities as a record of an expert 
observer’s perception. His technique now seemed to allow virtual witness: the illusion of 
experiencing the painting as Constable himself experienced the scene. 
Cognitive analysis deepens appreciation for Constable’s achievements in 
reproducing these effects. Constable’s images offer the viewer the sense of experiencing 
the painting as the painter experienced the natural scene. In this way, like Austen’s 
novels, they provide a kind of “virtual witnessing,” in which the viewer follows an 
inductive process. Even early viewers commented on the naturalistic appeal of 
Constable’s paintings, although their internalized expectations seem to have prevented 
them from full comprehension of its causes. Most simply, of course, his paintings 
maintain a perspective that locates the “body of the spectator” at the “center of 
projection,” opening up the sense that the landscape continues beyond the frame (Ryan 
3).69 But his use of perspective is merely necessary, not sufficient, for the full effect of 
the illusion of presence in a painting like The Hay Wain.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69Each physical object in an actual scene reflects light in every direction, but human eyes perceive only 
those reflected rays that follow a path directly into the pupils, meaning that farther objects appear smaller, 
and objects whose reflected rays are blocked by other objects will be occluded from vision to the degree 
that they are blocked (Livingstone 103-104). Translating a three-dimensional world into a two-dimensional 
representation is harder than most non-artist twenty-first century viewers probably realize. Artists since the 
Renaissance have been inventing methods to help them see in two dimensions: time-honored techniques 
include framing a scene with a mirror or a gridded screen, or staring until the brain systems that produce 
the awareness of location and depth tire after a moment or two (Livingstone 104).  Constable is rumored to 
have utilized versions of both. The field mouse episode suggests Constable’s staring habit, and a rumor 
persists that he used a framed piece of transparent glass to help him compose (Bermingham Ideology 220). 
 
! 92!
 
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
 
Figure'1:!John!Constable,!The&Hay&Wain.!1821.!National!Gallery,!London. 
 
Constable’s unique technique is in fact crucial to the illusion. He takes advantage, 
probably from experimenting with paint, of the physical properties of human vision.  
Commenters often noted that where Constable’s handling is “splotchy” up close, it will 
resolve into unified, vivid images from farther away.70 This is true to a degree: the size of 
photoreceptors, the retina cells that translate light into information for the brain, limits 
visual acuity. Resolution of a paint splotch (or any fine detail) requires that multiple 
photoreceptors perceive it: if it becomes small enough, with distance, that only one 
photoreceptor picks it up, then the eye cannot resolve it from other splotches (Applegate 
S548).  Splotches of different color can seem to merge, producing a shimmer between 
irresolution and distinctness (Livingstone 172).   
 However, Constable’s reproduction of light and movement has additional causes.  
Constable’s spots of “snow” are probably not merely contrasting colors with their 
surroundings, but also contrasting in luminance. Luminance is the measure of “perceived 
lightness” relative to the brightness of surrounding objects (Livingstone 37). The receptor 
cells in human eyes and the neurons in human visual cortexes are more sensitive to high 
contrast in luminance than they are to gradations, and the greater the luminance contrast, 
the greater the sense of depth (Livingstone 108-109). The spots of brightness on foliage, 
for example on the smaller trees on either side of the Stour in The Hay Wain, make the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70Early reviewers suggested, wrongly, that there is a “correct” distance at which to view a Constable 
painting (Ivy 48). Constable wanted the public to be able to examine his textured surfaces from up close, as 
well as view them from a distance, as his pleased comments after exhibitors lowered his paintings in the 
Paris Salon make evident (Lyles 39). !
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leaves stand out to varying degrees, with some receding and some extending to catch the 
light. High contrast between light and dark leaves signals depth to the visual system, 
aiding the image’s illusion (Livingstone 108-109). Additionally, wherever a semi-
repetitive pattern appears in Constable’s foliage, we perceive volume and perhaps 
movement, because the brain cannot settle on a match between the two slightly divergent 
positions of each detail in each eye. 
Wherever details seem jumbled, his paintings will produce a different kind of 
“illusory conjunction” (Livingstone 74) assisting the impression of a transient moment. 
Human vision is the sharpest in the center of the gaze; acuity decreases dramatically with 
increasing periphery. Usually we are not aware of this difference because we use 
peripheral vision to detect what to focus on with central (or foveal) vision. While foveal 
vision provides fine detail, peripheral vision is responsible for the “big picture,” or 
context for that detail (Livingstone 68). Objects seen with peripheral vision will be not be 
blurry so much as imprecisely located, so they can seem to combine. As a viewer leans in 
close to study one area of The Hay Wain, other “splotchy” areas seen in peripheral vision 
will resolve. Because they resolve differently every time the viewer moves her eyes, the 
image will seem like the capture of a transient moment as the eye really sees, with the 
central clarity and peripheral imprecision of a glance or a memory, based in part on how 
the viewer creates a scene initially and recreates it with every act of remembrance 
(Livingstone 75-77). When we remember a view, that memory is constructed from a few 
salient details situated within a general whole. Constable’s paintings can suggest the 
effect of memories because his technique partly reproduces how the human visual 
system, feeding into the brain and memory, works. 
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Constable’s images activate the imagination and increase the sense of depth in 
other ways. Where his details are imprecise, as in the features of the boy in the wagon in 
The Hay Wain, they frustrate stereopsis.71 Normally, each eye returns visual information 
from a slightly different angle, and the brain uses the differences to perceive depth. This 
means that even a photograph will ultimately fail in reproducing a complete illusion of 
depth, because the eyes receives identical images from it. But when the details of a flat 
image are slightly blurry, the brain depends more on other cues, like perspective and 
occlusion, to determine depth. Thick paint that stands up from the surface, like so much 
of Constable’s, can provide such a cue because the neurons in the visual cortex are more 
sensitive to abrupt than gradual changes.  Thus even the shallow discontinuity provided 
by a thick visible line of paint will signal depth, and “contribute disproportionally” to the 
overall perception of three-dimensionality (Livingstone 140-143). Furthermore, viewers’ 
perception of imprecise forms will depend partly on their imaginative response, based in 
memories and expectations. The face of the boy in the wagon may look, though perhaps 
below conscious awareness, like someone the viewer has seen. 
Meeting Constable Himself: Cognitive Analysis Continued 
Constable’s brushstrokes, the visible evidence of his work, are therefore crucial 
for the illusion of presence when it works.  As John Gage notes, “The terms [Constable] 
used for the movement of nature: fresh, blowy, sparkle, found their equivalents in the 
movement of brush or pencil” (29). The vigor and sensitivity of his brushstrokes index 
his emotions. Much research in cognitive science suggests that humans understand 
emotion by mirroring it, both when they perceive emotion directly and when they hear or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71Sarah Cove notes that, at the time Constable was painting, “The public… expected a high level of detail 
and realistic depiction of the foreground staffage, the figures and animals that invite close inspection…” 
(“Painting” 63). 
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read evidence of it in language. Could an indexical demonstration of emotion in a brush 
stroke produce such a mirroring, in viewers trained in drawing and painting like educated 
nineteenth-century Britons were, by suggesting the movement of hand and brush? The 
visible strokes are Constable’s lingering presence, facilitating the experience of that work 
as direct contact with the landscapes he represents, and in a sense with the artist as the 
conveyer of those landscapes as well.  Their illusion offers the viewer the sense that he or 
she experiences the painting as the artist experienced the scene, recreating his vision.72 
Seeing Romantic landscapes: Late Victorian Perception and Reception 
Examining common public and critical responses over the centuries in this way, 
to speculate on their cognitive underpinnings, provides a useful look into the way 
Constable’s painting and Austen’s novel produce illusions by stimulating inductive 
processes. In perception “bottom-up” (from sensory information to cognitive 
understanding) processes twine with “top-down” processes as the viewer matches 
incoming sensory information with memory, expectation, and experience. This seems to 
be why cultural expectations interrupted early appreciation for Constable and Austen’s 
work. Later, when cultural expectations for art had changed, Victorians who encountered 
either Austen or Constable first as authoritative observers through their public personas – 
and who wanted to maintain the sense of narrative continuity with the past via apparently 
authentic glimpses of it – seem to have been predisposed to experience their works like 
virtual witnesses. This illusion was always latent; cultural expectation affected how far 
readers and viewers entered and enjoyed it. That by the final decades of the nineteenth 
century, Britons admired Constable’s preparatory sketches as much or more than his 
finished paintings indicates the thorough success of the Romantic revolution in aesthetics. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 I am indebted to Dr. Joseph Viscomi for this phrasing. 
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If their shared artistic legacy was as expert observers, and their works seem to capture a 
vanishing England, then Victorian audiences conditioned to approach those works as 
relics would also be predisposed to find them the “real thing”: magically illusory 
glimpses of the way rural Britain really appeared when each was created. Austen is 
famous for her polished prose, Constable for his comparatively “messy” surfaces. But 
both use masterfully chosen cues to elicit an increased imaginative response from their 
audiences, who participate in the creation of the illusion via a process of induction that 
mimics, and runs on, daily human function. This illusory power comes to full fruition in 
audiences who seek authentic visions of a vanished past. 
 A look at late Victorian tourism offers a final clarification of the Victorian 
canonization of Austen and Constable as authoritative observers. Nicola Watson argues 
for the importance of studying literary tourism (in which I here include artistic tourism) 
as “indicators and records of that otherwise most elusive of things to pin down, how 
readers experience and live out their reading” (Literary Tourist 8). Victorians seem to 
have found Austen and Constable themselves in their work. The touch of the creator does 
linger in painting and novel, suggested by Constable’s visible strokes and the subtle 
persistent awareness of Austen’s story-teller, increasing the illusion of simulation guided 
by a Prospero unparalleled in expert witnessing. Late-Victorian pilgrimages to “Austen 
land” and “Constable country” suggest that audiences who responded to this lingering 
presence sought traces not just of a rural British past but of author and artist in their 
landscapes. In the final decade of the century, tours of Constable’s scenery in Suffolk and 
Austen’s homes in Hampstead began in earnest – an industry that still flourishes today.  
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Constable’s growing public presence in museums and at auction combined with 
new ease of travel near the end of the century to turn the area around Flatford and 
Dedham into an increasingly popular tourist destination as the original scenes of 
Constable’s paintings. 73 In response to the public’s increased desire to see the original 
scenes from Constable’s paintings, Cook’s began offering a coach tour titled “A Visit to 
Constable’s Country” in 1893, and the Great Eastern Railway Company also began 
running arranged tours (Fleming-Williams and Parris 112). In 1900 Pall Mall Magazine 
published a typical article offering the experience of one such traveler, which serves as a 
virtual tour, a practical itinerary, and a commentary on the interest in “Constable 
Country.” Its author, Frederick Wedmore, testifies that he had long been an enthusiast of 
Constable’s work, but he did not fully appreciate “the art and truth of the master” until he 
traveled to Suffolk (437). Providing the name of his hotel and his itinerary, Wedmore 
then details his movements with an extended description of the scenery he views, 
including records of the time of day and the light (as any good Constable enthusiast 
should note). Satisfied that what he sees looks sufficiently like Constable’s paintings, 
Wedmore asserts that he has “found Constable” himself in the landscape (437),.  
For Austen, too, readers who felt transported an older England were beginning to 
desire to travel to see “her” in her own places.74 Interest in visiting her “homes and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73Suffolk was known as “Constable country,” at least to a select few admirers, as early as 1832, according 
to an anecdote in a letter Constable shared and Leslie later included in the biography (232). As I have 
mentioned, increasing public access to Constable’s paintings and sketches was accompanied by an increase 
in critical literature addressing Constable. 
 
74As Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine from 1866 describes her appeal, “One of the greatest charms to 
us of Miss Austen’s novel is the complete change of scene they afford: we are transferred at once to an old 
world which we can scarcely believe was England only half-a-century ago.  If it were only for the 
completeness with which she holds the mirror up to the society in which she lived, they would be of great 
interest” (qtd in Southam 211) 
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haunts” was solidly part of popular culture by the turn of the century, and has increased 
since (Watson lecture).75 T. E. Kebbel’s 1885 article for the Fortnightly Review conflates 
the existing village of Chawton, the village as it was in Austen’s day, and the experience 
of reading her books in a way that became typical for visitors: “the scenes, the houses, 
and the classes of society,” he writes, “which we find in her delightful stories are exactly 
those with which she was familiar at home; and it is impossible to walk through the 
village of Chawton without feeling that we are in the presence of old acquaintances to 
whom we were introduced in the pages of Mansfield Park, or Emma” (264). 
 As with visitors to Constable Country, those who made the pilgrimage to “Austen 
land” sought to discover a recognizable countryside in which something of Austen herself 
lingers. In Jane Austen: Her Homes and Her Friends (1902) Constance Hill retells the 
story of Austen’s life through recounting her own travels to each of Austen’s homes.  
Along the way, a deep familiarity with Austen’s novels, her nephew’s Memoir, and the 
edition of her letters published in 1884, allows Hill to weave together the description of 
her own impressions with imaginative reconstructions of what Austen herself and her 
family members would have seen. Hill, like Wedmore finding Constable, sees not just 
Austen’s raw materials but Austen herself. On locating the ballroom where Austen would 
have danced, Hill describes the room as it is (“mouldering,” stacked with hay) and how it 
was (“A chandelier… hangs in the middle of the room…”), and finally brings in Jane 
herself: “Amidst that gay company there is one figure around which all the interest of the 
past is gathered. Let us glance for a moment at Miss Jane Austen as she enters the ball-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75Watson indicates that literary tourism was becoming a popular pastime in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, but it most often centered either on poets whose local scenery seemed to invest their 
poetry with visual significance, or on novelists who set their books in a real place. Austen, being neither, 
was the subject of fewer pilgrimages than she might otherwise have been; her name is more often not 
included in the tourist guides that were appearing over this period (lecture). 
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room” (54). Hill’s Jane Austen looks like Emma Woodhouse, so that her own mental 
images of Austen and one of her heroines conflate. This imaginary sight seems to be 
standard for visitors who go to find Austen in her homes; as Kebbel had written of 
Chawton earlier, “He who cannot do the rest for himself and rehabilitate Jane Austen’s 
house as it was during her living occupation of it, had better not visit it at all” (266).  
Kebbel’s implication is that Austen occupies her haunts even posthumously, and so she 
seems to for all those who, like Hill, account themselves one of Austen’s Friends. 
This is, as Watson has aptly termed it, an attitude of “nostalgic belatedness” 
(Literary Tourist 13), in which the visitor imaginatively overlays a physical scene with 
personal emotion and memory, simultaneously viewing the present and the past. It is not 
hard to find continuities with today’s tourist activity. Modern travel guides continue the 
rhetoric: the 2011 version of Frommer’s England hails “Constable Country” in Suffolk as 
“one of the most beautiful, unspoiled areas left in southeast England” (Porter and Prince 
554), while the tourist webpage for Winchester suggests that the reader “Visit the 
landmarks of the author’s life in Winchester and Hampshire’s surrounding countryside to 
get closer to the ‘real’ Jane Austen” (“Things to do”).   
It seems likely that this desire and its fulfillment depends on much the same 
combination of perception and imagination as immersion in a Constable painting or 
Austen novel, where artist and author linger to be met in their visions. As sociologist 
Erving Goffman put it, “There seems to be no agent more effective than another person in 
bringing a world for oneself alive” (41). The Romantic poets elevated this imaginative 
life-giving act into an art form with its own conventions when they invested the natural 
world with human consciousness and then found the numinous breathing within it. Lit by 
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imagination, an Austen novel or a Constable painting flicker into life like magic windows 
on the past. Today’s tourists who, like their Victorian forebears, seek Austen and 
Constable in the British countryside indicate both the continuing hegemony of 
Romanticism, and also the power of well-loved art to inspire persistent enchantment.
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CHAPTER 3: READING REFLECTIONS  
IN LADY CLEMENTINA HAWARDEN’S PHOTOGRAPHS 
AND CHARLOTTE BRONTË’S VILLETTE 
 
 
 
 During her summer 1851 trip to London, Charlotte Brontë visited the enormous 
glass structure of the Crystal Palace on five different occasions. Afterward, she made a 
distinction between consumption of its spectacular glittering surfaces, and any true 
understanding of the curiosities it housed. “It is an excessively bustling place;” she wrote, 
“and, after all, its wonders appeal too exclusively to the eye, and rarely touch the heart or 
head” (Gaskell 24). Yet on a different visit in that same summer in London, this time to a 
phrenologist, Brontë found that surfaces could provide true understanding of inner 
essences (all jokes about “touching heads” aside). As critic Nicholas Dames points out, 
this visit “exhilarated” Brontë through the “potential” it revealed “of seeing so accurately, 
so completely, and so quickly” into the soul via the surfaces of the head (367). Brontë 
wrote of her phrenologist’s two reports, “I wanted a portrait, and have now got one very 
much to my mind…. it is a sort of miracle – like – like – like as the very life itself” (qtd in 
Dames 367). Brontë believes the phrenologist has indeed discovered and reproduced her 
likeness: that her own visible surfaces, read visually and tactilely, have allowed her 
expert reader true insight into her interiority and even her identity – her “very life.” 
 In the fall Brontë returned to work on Villette, a novel that combines the 
phenomenology of glass, a Victorian obsession, with attention to an equally 
quintessential Victorian desire to know others’ private inner spaces by their visible 
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surfaces. Its publication in January 1853 elicited disturbed responses from unsettled 
readers. Harriet Martineau wrote that the “almost intolerably painful” book was “perhaps 
the strangest, the most astonishing” of Brontë’s novels (Bloom 102-103). Matthew 
Arnold believed the “writer’s mind” of such a “disagreeable” book must be filled with 
“nothing but hunger, rebellion, and rage” (Bloom 105). George Eliot found Villette 
“wonderful” but also admitted that “[t]here is something almost preternatural in its 
power” (Bloom 105). Modern readers often agree: Ruth Robbins speaks for many when 
she terms it “a very creepy book” (223). As John Hughes puts it, “Villette is an affect 
before it is an object of criticism” (716). 
 I suggest that this affect derives from Brontë’s use of glass to expose the flaws in 
any desire to know another by sight, which is conditioned by personal expectations: Lucy 
Snowe, her icy protagonist, hides her interiority from other characters and even the reader 
behind a façade that seems as transparent as glass but that is actually as opaque and 
reflective as a mirror. What readers can learn of Lucy from her narrative “face” reflects 
their own experience, which can produce the “creepy” half-realization that the process of 
deciphering others’ inner lives from their appearance is always open to egocentric errors. 
 Brontë’s novel thus finds a useful comparison in the glass-obsessed photographs 
of Lady Clementina Hawarden, active between 1857 and 1864. The bulk of Hawarden’s 
oeuvre consists of images of her daughters inside their London home, positioned with 
windows and mirrors whose reflective surfaces suggests metaphors of mental reflection. 
The women’s pensive, enigmatic visages irresistibly invite speculation on their private 
interiority, yet frustrate attempts at interpretation through consistent denial of Victorian 
narrative. The surfaces of their faces offer the apparent depth and the flat impenetrability 
! 103!
of a mirror, reflecting less the women’s own thoughts than the preoccupations of the 
viewer who attempts interpretation. The result, as critical response shows, is a sense of 
“creepy” transfixion.76 Critics often describe their interactions with these photographs in 
terms of being personally struck, even hypnotized. Carol Shires notes the photographs’ 
“luminous intensity” (73). Jennifer Ramirez, author of a dissertation on Hawarden, is 
“entranced” (1). Carol Mavor writes, “Clementina Hawarden’s photographs have always 
been erotic to me; they make my finger-words write desire” (xxiv). Marina Warner calls 
the archive of Hawarden’s photographs at the Victoria and Albert Museum “an 
enigmatic, closed treasure… the images swam into my eyes, as they do for all their 
beholders, with the intensity of a hypnagogic dream” (6). Gillian Rose describes it thus: 
“To me the images are compelling, demanding.  They ensnare my look because they 
always make me wonder what it is they’re showing me, exactly” (103). 
This noted power of both novel and photographs to arrest, transfix, and disturb 
their audiences, I suggest, derives from demands they make on viewers’ “Theory of 
Mind” or “mindreading” ability. The term for that faculty by which humans read others’ 
perspectives, thoughts, and emotions, to “mindread” in this sense is to interpret behavior 
and appearance as evidence of inner states. Recent psychological studies propose a “two-
system” model for mindreading. The lower-level system carries us through most of our 
daily interactions so smoothly that we are unaware we are using it; we shift into the 
higher-level system only when confronted with situations in which reading others poses 
an unusual problem. I propose that Hawarden’s and Brontë’s enigmatic subjects provoke 
this higher-level system. As I will explain, this higher-level system is also more prone to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76Hawarden won awards for her brilliant technical prowess in her own day, but then lapsed into obscurity 
after her early death, so considerably more modern than contemporary critical response exists. 
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egocentric error, which derives in part from its use of counterfactual, or hypothetical, 
models for the other’s mental state. These models begin as models of the interpreter’s 
inner state, which the interpreter then adjusts (or fails to adjust) with knowledge of the 
other.Hawarden and Brontë suggest counterfactuals for their subjects’ inner lives, but in 
key ways refuse to reveal enough information about the implied actual version. The 
counterfactuals, realized in image and in concrete descriptive language respectively, are 
more vividly present and memorable to audiences who can encode them using both the 
verbal and the nonverbal systems. But these counterfactuals seem to point away from 
themselves to an actual that is actually missing. It its absence, audiences find themselves: 
their own perceptual and imaginative processes busy with the work of interpretation.  
This chapter, then, explores exceptions to the dissertation’s focus on vision and 
curiosity as both lead to sympathy: it analyzes art objects that do disrupt empathetic 
audience response with deflection of visual information. Glass as these artists use it, in 
mirror, window, camera, and narrative phenomenology, reveals the possibilities for 
mistake inherent in the desire to know the interior via sight of the exterior. In the very 
place where an audience might reasonably expect a glimpse of another’s inner world, 
Hawarden and Brontë show the audience in reflection, instead, as if art that seemed to 
offer a window into someone else’s private spaces turned without warning into a mirror. 
The potent response this evasion can produce suggests the “rule” it breaks, that vision 
offers one important avenue for information about others in daily life and in fiction. 
Victorian glass culture 
 
 Glass structured the physical and phenomenological world of the mid-nineteenth 
century to an unprecedented degree. England had possessed Venetian glass-blowing 
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technology since the end of the sixteenth century, but achieving flat glass for windows 
and mirrors from this traditional method was a difficult, expensive process (Pendergrast 
155). Robert Lucas Chance introduced technology for blowing sheet glass in the 1830s, 
allowing English factories to produce sheets in mass quantities and previously 
unimaginable sizes. Parliament abolished the Excise tax on glass in 1845 and the 
Window Tax in 1851, causing the price of glass to plummet between 1845 and 1865 (I. 
Armstrong 43). The combined result of a “huge increase in production, new methods of 
working, and falling prices” meant that over these years glass quickly evolved from a 
luxury item to a ubiquitous one (I. Armstrong 1). Newly glazed shop windows “radically 
transfigured the experience of walking through commercial sections of London, 
fashioning the streets into gas-lit spaces” of glittering display (Miller 1). For the first time 
pedestrians could watch their own moving images reflected in the cityscape. Domestic 
glass also increased as box sash windows proliferated in Victorian architecture (I. 
Armstrong 96). The height of what Isobel Armstrong calls “glass culture” is probably the 
Crystal Palace, wherein the glass reproduction of the Hope Diamond was considered to 
outshine the real thing, housed one floor down (2, 134). 
Glass’ new accessibility meant that Victorian tools and toys changed as well as 
the physical environment. Better glass meant better lenses for microscopes and 
telescopes, while cheaper glass encouraged “window games” including the stereoscope 
and the stereopticon or magic lantern (Joseph 71). Glass facilitated the development of 
the photographic camera via the glass plate and wet collodion process. Mirrors appeared 
everywhere in middle class interior design books and homes; for the average Briton it 
was a new experience to see the whole body reflected in a cheval glass (I. Armstrong 96).  
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 Victorian culture responded with its own glass preoccupation. Windows and 
mirrors as “perceptual apertures” and metaphorical views appear everywhere in Victorian 
art and literature (Joseph 70). Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass, and What 
Alice Found There of 1871 is only the most famous example from a list of glass-, 
window- and/or mirror-obsessed novels from this period that includes Wuthering 
Heights, Bleak House, Middlemarch, and as I will show, Villette.77 Robert Browning, 
Alfred Tennyson, Dante Rossetti, and Matthew Arnold all wrote poetry utilizing 
windows, mirrors or window-like apertures.78 Isobel Armstrong has noted the Victorian 
popularity of the Cinderella story, with its central glass slipper and frequent illustrations 
of lavish chandeliers (204-215). In the world of painting, the Pre-Raphaelites frequently 
depicted scenes with mirrors or windows: for instance John Everett Millais’ Mariana 
deploys a window as a seemingly metaphorical representation of the psychological state 
of Tennyson’s protagonist, Edward Burne-Jones’ The Mirror of Venus turns a natural 
pool into a mirror, and William Holman Hunt’s The Awakening Conscience juxtaposes 
both mirror and reflected window. James McNeill Whistler’s famous Symphony in White 
No. 2: The Little White Girl uses a mirror to show his model Joanna Heffernan’s face.  
This cultural and artistic preoccupation with mirrors suggests both the creative 
affordances of glassed surfaces, which reflect light and double images, and also a crucial 
Victorian concern with how to read people’s surfaces. Gerhard Joseph argues that 
 The pervasive recourse to framed transparent or reflecting surfaces in the  
 narrative situations of Victorian [art and literature] would seem to tell us !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77In Bleak House, Lady Dedlock’s repeated views of domestic scenes through windows help lead to her 
breakdown. Middlemarch includes a famous mirror metaphor; repeated gazing through her boudoir window 
catalyze Dorothea Brooke’s epiphany. 
 
78See respectively “Pippa Passes” or “Andrea Del Sarto,” “The Lady of Shalott,” several sonnets from The 
House of Life, and “Dover Beach” or “Lines Written in Kensington Gardens,” just to name a few. 
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 something about how that period as a whole “saw” the world. (70-71) 
 
That “something,” I suggest, is the necessarily incomplete, mediated interpretive process 
involved in reading others via their appearances – a process that always begins with the 
self. If consciousness is awareness of the self in the act of perception, then reflective 
glass surfaces can perhaps be particularly conducive. Isobel Armstrong suggests of 
windows that “Because [a window] insists on the self and what is outside the self… the 
window is always about a double experience of self and beholder” (131). Mirrors produce 
a doubly-charged version of this experience, in which self and beholder are one: seeing 
oneself in reflection can prompt both consciousness of the self and unusual awareness of 
one’s own external, visible appearance. Glass as it appeared in windows and mirrors at 
mid-century was thus not just the ubiquitous raw material for new and improved 
products, but also the means for an encounter. Capable of functioning as both medium 
and barrier, sometimes simultaneously, glass provoked Victorian consciousness that 
perception is not unmediated, and that surfaces conceal as well as reveal. No wonder, 
then, that Victorian cultural narratives of interpersonal interpretation draw on glass. 
Early Hawarden and Glass Culture 
If glass can specifically contrast inner realities and outer appearances, then Lady 
Hawarden’s photographs are perfect exemplars of Victorian glass culture. Hawarden left 
behind very little biographical material that might help her modern interpreters 
understand her artistic intent – she kept no journal and never wrote about her photographs 
– but from her earliest work, her images show a playful knowingness about surface 
appearances and inner truths, about seeing and being seen.79 Hawarden probably began !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79She seems to have taken up photography about 1857, when she was in her mid-thirties. Born in 1822, she 
spent her childhood pursuing female “accomplishments,” which would have included the arts. She married 
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her photographic career in 1857, shortly after her family moved to Dundrum, an estate in 
Ireland; most of her early photographs are records of Dundrum, including its landscapes 
and workers, or family portraits, some of which are staged in fancy dress. Hawarden’s 
fancy dress portraits situate her in an ongoing British art tradition that includes Joshua 
Reynolds’ fancy-portrait paintings of aristocrats dressed as shepherdesses, Roger 
Fenton’s photographs of friends masquerading as Arabs, or Julia Margaret Cameron’s 
images of family and servants posing as figures from myth and literature. But unlike 
these images, Hawarden’s early fancy dress portraits taken outside at Dundrum seem to 
finesse the inherent play-acting of this tradition quite overtly. In these photographs (for 
example, see Figure 2), she has dressed her husband as an Irish fiddler and her barefoot 
daughters in peasant garb, and posed them within a photographic booth. But she frames 
the composition so that the sides and edges of 
the booth appear. Given Hawarden’s skillful 
composition on display in other framed early 
scenes, of figures in doorways, of windows in farm buildings, and of the interior of a 
railway depot, it is difficult to imagine that she intended to trim the fancy dress 
photographs manually. The environment obvious beyond the booth’s boundaries suggests 
that the photographer wants to call attention to the constructed, playful nature of these 
images, behind which the reality of a wealthy family with leisure, beauty, and talent to 
spare shimmers like a hologram.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the Honorable Cornwallis Maude, the future Viscount Hawarden, in 1845. Although his parents initially 
opposed the match, perhaps because Clementina brought comparatively little fortune, the marriage was by 
all accounts a happy one. Clementina bore her husband ten children; seven daughters and one son lived to 
adulthood. The couple lived in London until her husband inherited the viscountcy and Dundrum, the family 
estate in Ireland (Dodier 14-21).   
Figure'2:'Clementina!Hawarden,!!PH.457:166D1968.!c.!1859D1861.!!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&!
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Similarly, Hawarden’s early work shows a fascination with reflective surfaces 
hiding depths (see fig. 3 and 4). The vast majority of her early landscape photographs 
taken at Dundrum in Ireland include water in some form, whether the Multeen River or a 
flooded quarry nearby. In many of these, the reflection on the surface of the quiet water 
forms a central component of the composition, often repeating the actual view of bare-
branched trees above or exploring the visual possibilities of ice reflecting light.  The 
water’s flat reflective surface holds its own dark depths in tension with the heights of 
mirrored sky above. In this obsession with reflection and in her play with surface 
appearances, Hawarden’s early photographs prefigure her later interest in windows and 
mirrors in the photographs she took of her older daughters inside, on the second floor of 
their South Kensington home. 
When Hawarden’s family moved back to London in 1859, she began to focus her 
efforts largely on photographing 
her daughters and other family 
members indoors or on the balcony and terrace of their home in South Kensington 
(Dodier 21-41). It is mostly these domestic scenes, taken between 1859 and 1864, which 
have begun to attract 
recent “avid [critical] 
attention” (Shires 73). 
These images often employ mirrors or window glass to reflect and repeat female images, 
continuing Hawarden’s participation in glass culture. The images seem to offer depths of 
narrative import, inviting viewers to speculate on their subject’s mental cogitation as 
suggested in visual metaphors of reflection. Yet they remain enigmatic, flat surfaces. 
Figure'3:!Clementina!Hawarden,!PH.457:115D1968.!c.!1857D1860.!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
Figure'4:!Clementina!Hawarden,!PH.457:37D1968.!c.!1857D1860.!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.&&
&
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
'
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For example, consider Hawarden’s photograph (Figure 5) of Clementina seated 
before a cheval glass, gazing in a kind of reverie at her own image in the mirror, which 
also reflects high-rise buildings through the window in the background. Without labeling 
information or a title, this image shows a woman in a private moment, perhaps 
representing simply an accident of space or perhaps fraught with psychological drama. 
The woman’s pensive face in reflection suggests her mental reflection on private 
thoughts. Her bare arms and disarray, and her apparent unselfconsciousness, suggest 
intimacy. But without the heavy-handed clues and symbolism of Victorian narrative art, 
the viewer is left to interpret formal elements and body language: the woman’s body 
turned towards the mirror, her shaded facial expression in reflection with perhaps the 
ghost of a smile, her cheek resting on her hand, the shirt falling over one shoulder, the 
lines of light and shadow crossing her skirt and reflected in the mirror.! 
Virginia Dodier notes that the “lady-and-looking-glass motif… became something 
of a cliché in portrait photography in the 1850s and 1860s,” perhaps in part because a 
mirror reflecting light can brighten areas that would otherwise be shadowed (48-50). But 
they appeared in paintings, too, where 
the artist was presumably less reliant 
on momentary lighting conditions. James Abbott McNeill Whistler’s The Little White 
Girl: Symphony in White, No. II is perhaps the most famous painting from the period that 
foregrounds a woman’s reflected countenance; in fact at least one critic has suggested 
that Hawarden’s photographs, remarkably similar in other respects as well, may have 
Figure'5:!Clementina!Hawarden,!PH.457:177D1968.!c.!1861D1862.!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
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influenced this painting (Haworth-Booth 113).80 Mirrors and windows as props may have 
become artistic cliché during the period, but that also suggests the cultural interest in 
glass. Beyond technical considerations, mirrors were a newly ubiquitous glass household 
item that, like photographic cameras themselves, vexed the relationship between surface 
and interior, between the felt subjective and the apparent objective.  
Photography both promised to capture unmediated views, and also opened up new 
perspectives, making visible what had been invisible to the unaided eye. The English co-
inventor of photography, William Fox Talbot, called his invention “the picture which 
makes itself,” a phrase that was picked up in newspaper announcements.81 On the one 
hand, then, photography seemed a purely mechanical process for capturing views – or for 
views to capture themselves, as clearly and directly as in a mirror – without human 
interference. Its apparatus of box and glass and window (aperture) seemed so mechanical 
that many even doubted whether photography could count as art.  
 On the other hand, however, photography made subjectivity and the vagaries of 
perspective newly visible. As Nancy Armstrong points out, photographic technology 
exposed radically new views of what had seemed familiar: “the panoramic lens and rapid 
exposure allowed the camera to focus on certain details” that were not immediately 
apparent to the naked eye, and yet “immediately came to be seen as so many properties of 
its subject matter” (14-15). Photography captured and displayed what was not always 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80Other well-known glass culture works that seem highly influenced by Hawarden’s compositions include 
Hunt’s The Awakening Conscience and Lewis Carrolls’ photographs of figures (including Ellen Terry and 
the Millais family) in or through windows. See Dodier. 
81The Corsair echoed Talbot’s words thus: 
All nature shall paint herself—fields, rivers, trees, houses, plains, mountains,  
cities, shall all paint themselves at a bidding…. Here is a revolution in art…. 
Talk no more of ‘holding the mirror up to nature’—she will hold it up to herself, 
and present you with a copy of her countenance for a penny. What would you say  
to looking in a mirror and having the image fastened!! (“Pencil of Nature”) 
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immediately visibly apparent, under the banner of empirical objectivity, which could not 
help but produce an unsettling sensation of multiplying perspectives. Furthermore, 
photographic images of “scientific phenomena” like clouds or lightning changed both 
public understanding of and even artistic convention for representing nature (Tucker 130-
155). Victorian debates over whether scientific texts should include drawings or 
photographs as illustrations demonstrate the medium’s shifting status.82 
As a medium and as an apparatus of glass and reflection, then, photography was 
doubly suited to glass culture as it influenced art. By the time Hawarden was working, 
amateur photographers such as she had begun to explore the artistic uses of photography 
even though the medium remained contested.83 Hawarden’s practice of exhibiting her 
pieces with the conventional artistic titles “Photographic Studies” or “Studies from Life” 
suggests her conscious artistic intention (Dodier 21-22). Her later work in domestic 
spaces with mirrors and windows fits squarely within this context, which she uses to 
unsettling effect. Where her early work suggests her play with surface appearances, so 
her later work challenges artistic convention by provoking awareness of tension between 
surfaces and depths or interiors in the context of glass culture.  
For example, one image 
(Figure 6) shows Hawarden’s eldest 
daughter Clementina seated before an 
open window, looking down at a book. The open window behind the young woman !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82For example Jennifer Tucker ably points out that a vocal contingent of mid-Victorian researchers and 
medical practitioners during this period of transition still preferred “the skilled eye of the observer” to the 
“mechanical objectivity” of the photographic lens (177). 
 
83This was also the period when photography was becoming available to a wider range of social classes; 
active photographers would soon include amateurs recording their lives without artistic intention and 
professionals working for public consumption, as well as amateur artists like Hawarden (Seiberling and 
Bloore 106).!
Figure'6:!Clementina!Hawarden,!PH.457:288D1968.!1861.!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
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echoes the one next to her. A large camera lens lies on the floor behind Clementina, 
placed carefully in front of the second window in much the same relative position as 
Clementina in front of the first window. The photograph suggests duplication of eyes: 
doubled windows, camera lens and camera lens, and camera lens as window. The latter 
comparison also positions the book as a metaphorical window for the imagination.  Yet 
Clementina’s thoughts, like her reading, remain opaque. In another image Clementina 
stands in the open sash window as if arrested as she stepped in from the balcony. She 
leans her head on the window frame, her face pensive with private reverie. Her liminal 
position between outside and inside the room suggests an equal tension between her 
inviolate inner thoughts and the intimacy of her appearance, with skirts gathered and shirt 
slipping over her shoulder.  
In these later works, Hawarden’s images continue to offer tantalizing surfaces. 
They differ strikingly from her contemporary fine art photographers in her refusal to 
supply a narrative: her works participate in Victorian narrative convention just far enough 
to promise depths of meaning, yet they refuse interpretation. Much popular Victorian art 
suggested a story with heavy-handed references to tales familiar from literature or 
history, or offered an over-abundance of clues that a viewer could use to “read” the 
painting not unlike a novel. Such clues included physical details such as clothing, setting, 
or symbolic objects, and also the physiognomy of figures, whose faces were believed to 
reveal habitual traits. Viewers reading these images became active participants in creating 
meaning (Thomas 15, 30). Following in the tradition of painting, Julia Margaret 
Cameron’s, Oscar Rejlander’s, and Henry Peach Robinson’s (sometimes composite) 
photographs of highly staged scenes demonstrate that Victorian art photographers eagerly 
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participated in this narrative tradition.84 In sharp contrast, “Hawarden shatters nineteenth-
century expectations for story and works against a reduction of the image to language” 
(Shires 75). Hawarden does not often provide clues prompting a viewer to read in a 
narrative; where she does use props they are swept free of easy significance. Her 
photographs of her daughters perusing letters or gazing solemnly through windows are 
not contextualized with other details suggesting anecdotes of lost love or sudden news. 
Unlike Cameron’s or Reynolds’ images, even her costume tableaux lack allusive titles to 
explain their precise identity or significance. And while her daughters’ expressive faces 
convey emotion with clarity, their countenances suggest secret reverie as often as any 
specific personality trait or feeling.  
Dodier suggests that Hawarden’s images participate in a different tradition, that of 
the Victorian “subject picture” – or what Dodier has argued might “more rightly be called 
‘subjectless’ because… they have no real subjects beyond the beauty of women and the 
comforts of home” (44). This sort of art, derived from Dutch and Flemish genre painting, 
often presented women in domestic settings to celebrate idealized femininity. Similarly, 
Hawarden’s images anticipate the work of Whistler and the Aesthetic movement in a 
fondness for beautiful women and refusal of explicit narrative meaning. Aestheticism 
moved painting towards decorative art, away from its long tradition of intellectual 
stimulation; confusing or emptied clues in Aesthetic painting “block[ed] the longstanding 
habit of interpreting visual forms for their underlying meanings [and] force[d] the viewer 
to fall back on sheer contemplation” (Prettejohn 76, 67). Meanwhile Victorian 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84Rejlander may have pioneered the composite photograph, which uses multiple negatives to create one 
printed image. One of Robinson’s most famous images is “Fading Away,” in which five negatives 
construct a sentimental deathbed scene.  For more on Robinson, see Ellen Handy et al’s Pictorial Effect 
Naturalistic Vision or Margaret F. Harker’s Master of Photographic Art. 
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photographers, like their predecessors in genre painting, continued to place beautiful girls 
and women in windows as objects of aesthetic interest.  
Hawarden’s images are certainly beautiful, but their enigmatic subjects ask 
viewers to question their surfaces: they do not let the viewer rest in contemplation of 
“meaningless” beauty. Her photographs’ hints of secret inner worlds distance these 
women’s feminine beauty from the figures in subject pictures, whose faces suggest blank 
surfaces available for inscription in any preferred domestic ideology. These images 
irresistibly invite interpretation beyond an appreciation of composition and light or of 
women’s domestic beauty, and yet consistently foil attempts to pin down precise meaning 
via titles or other narrative clues. An image (Figure 7) like the one of Clementina 
reclining in rest, eyes closed, is littered with objects that seem to mean – the mirror, the 
window, the vase, the plate, the small purse whose handle she holds – and yet add up to 
nothing coherent. Clementina’s own physiognomy, seen directly and in reflection, seems 
to offer potentially better clues within a Victorian system of narrative interpretation. Yet 
they too turn the viewer inward on her own thought processes, provoking awareness of 
the viewer’s own reflection 
within whatever 
interpretation she creates.!!
Physiognomy: Surface and Interior 
 A desire to read surfaces as evidence of inner realities seems to have driven the 
Victorian popularity of physiognomy, a system that promised practitioners knowledge of 
other people’s characters through their appearance. Though the practice of physiognomy 
is at least as old as the ancient Greeks, most Victorian Britons encountered it through the 
Figure'7:!Clementina!Hawarden,!PH.309D1947.!c.!1863D1864.!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
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influence of Johann Kaspar Lavater’s 1772 book. Published first in German, but 
translated into English, Lavater’s work enjoyed immense popularity in the nineteenth 
century, when cheap editions became common. His work regularized a typical human 
tendency to judge others by appearances into a system that, like natural history and other 
disciplines of taxonomy, provided a classificatory framework for knowledge (Pearl 16). 
In fact Lavater borrowed habits of comparison based on visual features from the natural 
history of his day, writing, “Precision in observation is the very soul of physiognomy” 
(qtd in Wheeler 431). His work uses “hundreds of examples” to show “how to use the 
shape and placement of facial features to interpret faces,” and how to “describe an 
individual’s whole form and each particular feature, beginning, as natural historians do, 
with stature and proportion of limbs” (Wheeler 430). Readers who studied his techniques 
and compared his examples could, like natural historians learning to identify species in 
the field, learn to discern the characters of those they met on the street. 
Some natural historians tried to distance themselves from Lavater’s unscientific 
system, which of course relied not on intrinsic relationships between form and character 
but on cultural norms and associations.85 But such effort itself indicates the degree to 
which physiognomic principles were part of popular and even intellectual culture. As 
Sharrona Pearl points out, physiognomy became not just a system but a cultural discourse 
whose participants needed little more than familiarity with the basic idea. Even those who 
had never laid eyes on a page of Lavater’s book had eyes to see their neighbors, and 
could easily absorb the interpretive framework from novels, visual art, the theatre, wax 
museums, and advertisements. As a “loosely codified, infinitely flexible system,” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85Charles Darwin went to great lengths to distinguish his work on emotional expression from general 
physiognomic principles. See for instance Jonathan Smith’s two chapters titled “Darwin’s Faces” in 
Charles Darwin and Victorian Visual Culture. 
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physiognomy for “most Victorians… was a fact of life in all relational and 
representational contexts; from faces in the street to drawings on the page, physiognomy 
was the quickest and most immediate way of understanding who people were” (Pearl 8). 
Physiognomy thus offered comfort to Victorian anxiety about knowing others in 
the absence of traditional social bonds and long familiar communities. As Walter 
Houghton puts it, “In one sense democratic-industrial society was not a society at all,” at 
least in the felt judgment of a culture only recently emerged from “a Christian-feudal 
organism where everyone has his recognized place and function” (77). In the “huge, 
impersonal city”, “simply a ‘place’ where a mass of unassorted atoms is collected 
together for greater business efficiency,” familiar neighbors and a sense of community 
could seem things of the past (Houghton 79). Though the Victorian middle class 
attempted to carve out suburban spaces, away from the lower classes and therefore 
supposedly safer, no part of the city was truly free from “outsiders” (Whelan 40-59). 
Victorians sought reassurance, then, in the idea that the dangerous and the untrustworthy 
could be identified by their immediately visible surfaces. If visual appearance indexed 
interiority, then upstanding and socially acceptable Victorians could identify each other, 
as well as pretenders and the untrustworthy (Pearl 15). 
Mindreading in Today’s Psychology 
Victorian physiognomy, like its cultural precursors, was predicated on culturally 
privileged aesthetic norms rather than actual connections between character and 
appearance. Yet modern cognitive psychology has returned to a version of the idea that 
appearance indexes inner states – not of character but of thoughts and emotions. Some 
cognitive psychologists today study how fleeting expressions, posture, body language, 
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behavior, and similarly visible (as well as audible) cues, rather than skin color or facial 
shape, communicate without language how others think and feel. 
As I have mentioned, “Theory of Mind” is the cognitive science term for this 
ability to infer thoughts, beliefs, desires, and feelings from appearance and behavioral 
cues. Researchers who assert that we do not experience this capacity as a conscious, 
comprehensive theory about our own or other people’s minds suggest “mindreading” as a 
better term (Apperly 3). We use this ability when we interpret our own proprioception, 
emotion, mental imagery, and internal dialogue as our conscious thought processes. 
Likewise, we use it when we read meaning – inferring feelings, thoughts, plans, and 
intentions – into other people’s appearance, actions, and words, even though these are 
limited and indirect indicators by comparison (Carruthers 2-3). As Zunshine and 
psychologist Keith Oatley point out, mindreading is also the function we use to flesh out 
limited cues about characters in a novel, a visual image, or a movie into more or less fully 
realized people with their own internal experiences including memories, thoughts, 
feelings, desires, and plans for the future (Oatley 18-20, Zunshine 6).86 
 Though this much is consensus, cognitive psychologists disagree about how 
exactly such mindreading works. The “theory-theory” of mindreading is the idea that 
children gradually develop concepts for mental states like beliefs; after a certain stage of 
development, humans can reason via a kind of “folk psychology” about other people’s 
inner lives using these concepts. By contrast, adherents of “simulation theory” assert that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86Ian Apperly also notes that this process of inference occurs in both mindreading and in reading (whether 
fiction or nonfiction): “When we read text we not only process the words in front of us but also make 
elaborated inferences about the meaning behind them, which go far beyond what is on the page.  When we 
mindread we often have to process perceptually accessible social stimuli, and we always have to make 
significant further inferences to arrive at the underlying thoughts, desires, knowledge or intentions that we 
cannot directly perceive” (4). 
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we understand others not through intellectual processes of reasoning about how minds 
work, but by putting ourselves in their positions and using our own emotional responses 
to understand theirs (Apperly 5). An emerging group of cognitive psychologists suggest 
that both models are incomplete, and pose a third, two-systems model that moves away 
from the two older models, both of which are grounded in philosophy of mind and 
therefore depend on more or less conscious inferences. It is this “two-systems” model 
that I use to analyze Hawarden. 
 Adherents of the “two-systems” model note that mindreading, considered as one 
monolithic system, must function in contradictory ways. At times, it must allow us to 
make considered judgments, as in Ian Apperly’s example of a jury member deciding a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence; at other times, it must help us leap to seemingly thought-
less determinations in fleeting social encounters. But what any cognitive system gains in 
speed and efficiency, via settings prepared by nature or experience to respond quickly, it 
loses in flexibility, which is needed for thoughtful, considered conclusions (Apperly 8-9).   
Thus Apperly, Peter Carruthers, and others conclude that mindreading actually 
depends on two systems. One efficient, “lower-level” system requires less cognitive 
processing and functions without full awareness. This system does not require conscious 
inferences, and therefore would not even count as “mindreading” under the older 
philosophy of mind models. Yet adherents of the “two-systems” model suggest that it 
nevertheless facilitates much of our effortless daily social interaction. A perceptual 
system like vision provides a useful analogy for this efficient mindreading system: vision 
happens not in one centralized location, but across a network of brain modules, each of 
which is calibrated to respond to a narrowly defined perceptual input, like edges or 
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motion (Apperly 120). Similarly, this lower level mindreading system uses division of 
labor and inflexible modules responding to strictly defined inputs to process social 
information efficiently and without the need for inference. The system’s inputs are social 
and behavioral cues; its outputs are responses from the observer.   
Apperly explains that this pragmatic system runs on schemas, or organized 
frameworks for knowledge, including social knowledge, and scripts, or internalized 
procedures for repeated interactions with regularized participant roles, such as asking for 
a table at a restaurant. There is, for instance, little inference required to know that a polite 
guest thanks a waiter for receiving a glass of water. Similarly, it may be that conversation 
between members of the same culture does not always require the work of inference; 
rather, conversationalists each use the first explanation of the other’s speech that comes 
to mind, unless plainly ill-fitting (Apperly 115-125). 
The second system, by contrast, is slower but allows greater flexibility because its 
constraints are looser. Processing thus requires more cognitive effort, and produces the 
sense of the self in thought. This is the system we use in special situations requiring extra 
attention. It is also the system most like the older models described above as theory 
theory and simulation theory, in that both of these older models require a greater degree 
of cognitive processing, and more or less conscious awareness. Where Apperly and 
likeminded cognitive psychologists differ most is in their assertion that we shift into 
using the second, high-level system only when we need it, rather than in every 
mindreading situation. We use it only when we confront a situation that requires more 
than just schemas, scripts, and roles to understand (Apperly 154-5, Carruthers 236-240).87   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87Schemas, knowledge, and other internalized social and cultural norms are still important to the second 
higher level system, insofar as they help us determine what information of unlimited possibilities might be 
! 121!
The activity of the higher-level mindreading system feels like thinking because it 
is thinking; it shares with other forms of reasoning a method for mentally representing 
information that cognitive psychologists call a “situation model.” Such a model includes 
relevant information extracted from a text, a work of art, a conversation, or a social 
encounter, represented in the mind and fleshed out with associations from memory. The 
higher-level mindreading system seems to represent another person’s state of mind as a 
mental model within the larger situation model encompassing the circumstances in which 
that other person is encountered (whether fictional or in real life). The mental model will 
be richer or flimsier depending on available cognitive resources and the mindreader’s 
motivation for constructing it (Apperly 126-8). Along the way we feel ourselves in the 
process of thinking. As Apperly notes, it is this mindreading system at work when 
mindreading feels “less like perception and more like reasoning” (Apperly 125). While 
Apperly’s theory incorporates scripts and schemas, I will speak of exemplars to be more 
consistent with Dual Coding Theory.88  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
relevant for the work of interpretation. Yet the higher-level system does not merely use schemas, 
knowledge, and norms as frameworks for identifying and organizing relevant information; it also allows us 
to create a full model of the thoughts and feelings of someone else, when we wish.  
 
88Apperly’s explanation is inconsistent with Dual Coding Theory insofar as it relies on schemas, which are 
generalized concepts based on the abstraction of regular features from repeated situations or encounters. 
Paivio argues that such abstraction requires too much cognitive work, both to create and to use. A DCT 
version of Apperly’s theory would replace schemas with exemplars, which are particular examples of a 
given situation or encounter, based in single concrete experiences. A “good” exemplar will be the central 
node in a distribution of related variants, likewise concrete and particular, any and all of which may be 
activated by a similar encounter. The DCT explanation of the pragmatic lower-level mindreading system, 
then, would suggest that it activates exemplars without needing to bring them into conscious awareness for 
extra cognitive processing. Instead, the whole process from perception through interpretation to response is 
automatic and nearly instantaneous. The higher-level system likewise activates exemplars, but requires a 
greater degree of conscious awareness for active interpretation. It takes over when automatic associations 
are not enough for social function – when, in other words, we need to do more work to determine what 
someone else is thinking or feeling. Mental models are not abstractions, but a kind of “folk psychological” 
belief about another person’s specific mental state, based partly on exemplars from previous experience and 
partly on concrete details from the current larger situation. I will adopt this DCT version of Apperly’s ideas 
going forward; it is after all consistent with Apperly’s own assertion that we do not experience ideas about 
other people’s mental states as abstract theory but as concrete, lived instances. 
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Cognitive Analysis: Theory of Mind Applied to Hawarden 
 As I have noted above, the mysterious reveries of the young women appearing in 
Hawarden’s photographs can provoke questions without ever answering through the 
popular Victorian art narrative. In one such photograph (Figure 8), Hawarden’s eldest 
daughter Clementina reclines in an armchair, her head cradled in the crook of an upraised 
arm. Her other hand holds her place in an open book. Positioned between the window on 
the left and the shadow of its bars and lacy curtains on the wall on the right, Clementina 
closes her eyes as if in sleep or reverie. The photograph invites speculation about her 
dreams – inspired by her reading?  Her window-gazing? – to which it will never respond. 
Clementina’s beauty seems fragile, fine, vulnerable, intimately glimpsed, yet her interior 
life remains utterly unavailable and unassailable. Gazing at her image can provoke the 
wish to enter the photograph to rouse her and ask questions, to “enter the paper’s depth” 
as Roland Barthes puts it (Barthes 100) but the apparent glimpse that seems to promise 
entry remains a flat surface as inviolable as Clementina’s own mind.  
With no easy answers in the form of title or other narrative clues, which would 
conform to original viewers’ learned cultural expectations for narrative visual art, those 
viewers who felt themselves interested in the photographed woman’s reverie would have 
to use higher level mindreading processes to infer a mental state from Clementina’s 
physical attributes. (Latter day viewers, who might not comprehend the meaning of 
Victorian narrative clues without education, are only more prone to this effect.) Because 
this high-level system is both less frequently used, and also elicits the sensation of the 
self involved in thinking, using it to build a mental model for Clementina will involve her 
mindreader in the less frequent and more conscious, effortful work of comprehension. If 
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such conscious work without the chance of confirmation also makes the mindreader-
viewer even dimly aware of his or her tendency to import personal biases into not only 
this, but every higher-level mindreading task, then it is no wonder the photographs 
maintain such unsettling, yet transfixing, appeal.  
This possibility points to another way in which the two systems account 
elucidates response to Hawarden: the higher-level system is indeed more vulnerable to 
egocentric errors, or those which stem from an individual’s personal experiences, 
memories, and associations. This vulnerability occurs in three ways. First, exemplars help 
to determine what information is relevant to higher-level system processing, biasing the 
results of that process. Along with a mindreader’s other associations, memories, and 
knowledge, they will also help to determine the result of that process – the situation 
model and its embedded mental model. Thus the higher-level system is doubly vulnerable 
to the influence of egocentric assumptions, which require conscious work to correct. 
Secondly, the information that exemplars suggest is relevant is likely to be most accurate 
for people who share the same culture and society. Change over time unavoidably alters 
what modern people versus Victorians 
would find salient. And thirdly, our 
mental model for another person may 
begin as a model of our own beliefs and feelings, which we then alter according to what 
we learn or know about the other.  
Hawarden’s Counterfactuals 
 Some evidence suggests that higher-level mindreading depends on the human 
ability to think using counterfactuals, or hypotheticals that describe a not-actual state. A 
Figure'8:!Clementina!Hawarden,!PH.457:268D1968.!c.!1862D1863.!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.!!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
! 124!
counterfactual usually posits a hypothetical change (“If x were y instead”) and then traces 
its consequences (“then z would result”). Like narrative plotting, counterfactuals offer 
reasoning strategies that allow thinkers to imagine alternative pasts, presents, or futures 
for themselves or others. Apperly notes that Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich base their 
entire theory of mindreading on counterfactuals, in which mindreaders first “build a 
hypothetical model that initially inherits all of [their] own beliefs by default” and then 
“adjust specific beliefs on the basis of what [they] know about the target person” (125-6). 
In this theory, a mental model is a counterfactual, dependent on what the mindreader 
would think or feel in the other person’s position. The mindreader secondarily adjusts the 
model to fit what he or she knows about that other.89 Research shows that mindreaders 
usually fail to account fully for differences, which means they typically fail to adjust the 
model enough. Any mental model is thus highly likely to inherit more of the 
mindreader’s own mental content than would be strictly accurate (Apperly 130-132) 
In short, the higher-level mindreading system allows us much greater flexibility 
for navigating novel, complex, or challenging social situations that require deciphering 
others’ mental states. But this open-ended power comes at a cost: because the system 
requires so much individual input and subjective thought, it is much more susceptible 
than the lower-level system to egocentric biases. Because the surfaces of Hawarden’s 
photographs tempt this higher-level system, but offer little in the way of material for 
those who respond to its interpretive call, perhaps they leave viewers with the original 
counterfactual model, and a haunting awareness that it is inaccurate. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89Apperly adds that Nichols and Stich are unclear about how the mindreader decides what information is 
relevant for adjustments, but calls the theory “a useful starting point” (125). 
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For example, return to the photograph (Figure 5) of Clementina in reverie before a 
cheval glass. The viewer who answers the photograph’s appeal to consider its figure’s 
mental state with the higher level mindreading system will draw from personal exemplars 
and cultural influences to construct a situation model. (Note that while this viewer will 
likely be aware of thinking, she will not be conscious of this process in these terms.) If 
the viewer recognizes that the photograph was made in England about 1861 or 1862, then 
his or her situation model will likely include what the viewer believes about English 
culture during the Victorian era, about Victorian photography, and/or about women in the 
Victorian period, among other possibilities. Whatever is most salient in memory will 
influence the situation model for the photograph, which will in turn help to influence the 
mental model the viewer constructs for Clementina. If the mental model begins as a 
personal counterfactual, then influences should include personal experiences and 
associations related to the situation model and ranging from individual memories to 
experience with other works of art and literature.90 
Part of the activity of this higher-level mindreading process can involve conscious 
“checking” of the nested models against alternative versions (Apperly 130). The 
mindreader might learn new information, or consciously incorporate previously learned !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90If, for instance, the viewer is highly familiar with the idea of separate spheres for men and women in the 
Victorian period, then she might well read the photograph as an image of female confinement. If that 
modern viewer knows, even unconsciously, that she herself would have found Victorian society confining, 
our tendency to underestimate difference means she will be likely to attribute such a feeling to Clementina. 
Perhaps the bars of reflected balustrade and shadow, Clementina’s obscure expression, and her pose turned 
away from the window will then provide additional evidence that Clementina feels frustrated, contained, or 
only ignorantly accepting of her limited lot. If the viewer associates a woman looking into a mirror with 
Tennyson’s 1842 “Lady of Shalott” then this might also influence a situation model of confinement and 
separation, and lead her to see Clementina as mournful or sadly pensive. If the viewer knows, as 
Hawarden’s original viewers likely did, that the mirror into which Clementina gazes was called a “psyche,” 
then she might consider the image as a metaphor for introspection, as if Clementina is studying her own 
soul by gazing on her appearance. In this way each individual’s situation model for the photograph will be 
different, and the personal memories and emotions it elicits will influence the counterfactual mental model 
for Clementina, which will be rich and full or limited depending on the viewer’s motivation and interest.   
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information, that shifts the situation model and/or the mental model within it. For 
instance, more information about Hawarden’s London residence may change or reinforce 
the situation models I have described above. When the Hawarden family moved to South 
Kensington in 1859, their house at 5 Princes Gardens had just been built in a wave of 
construction sweeping the area. Along with new residences, the city was building 
institutions of various kinds, which would include the South Kensington Museum (later 
the Victoria and Albert, where Hawarden’s photographs are now archived), the 
Horticultural Gardens, and the buildings housing the 1862 International Exhibition, an 
echo of the 1851 Great Exhibition. Indeed, the buildings visible in Clementina’s mirror 
are those International Exhibition buildings.  
Lady Hawarden could thus look out of the windows of her house over rising 
structures symbolizing “the most innovative and progressive aspects” of London’s 
“alliance of science and art” at the time (Dodier 32). They were, furthermore, ones that 
were open to women, as Hawarden’s own participation in nearby exhibitions proves.  
Knowing this may bring new personal associations to bear on the counterfactual mental 
model, but the changes will vary. Does it reinforce the idea of Clementina before her 
mirror as a young woman seeing only by reflection what the men of her city are doing 
outside her window? Or does the image reinforce the sheer closeness of the buildings 
representing London’s most progressive culture to this young woman’s daily experience, 
and subtly suggest that Clementina has the fortune, born of familiarity, to find her own 
inner life equally fascinating? The viewer’s counterfactual mental model for Clementina 
will be as rich as the viewer chooses, within this larger situation model, but it will be 
little aided by clues from Hawarden herself.  
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Shifting the models may therefore make the viewer aware of two uncomfortable 
truths: that Clementina’s thoughts remain inviolable – there is not even any chance to ask 
her – and that this process of imagining her inner life depends inevitably on subjective 
processes, always open to error. Clementina is uncanny, both as familiar as one’s own 
thoughts (which is, after all, where she exists) and as distant and inscrutable as any 
woman dead for more than a hundred years.  
To return, then, to Thrailkill’s formula: if we speculate, as the artworks invite us 
to do, then we find ourselves in reflection.91 One of the most poignant of Hawarden’s 
images for illustrating this “if-then principle” of her work’s affect is a photograph of her 
daughter standing next to the cheval glass (Figure 9). Clementina’s body is turned 
towards the mirror though she looks forward. With one hand holding the frame of the 
glass near its midpoint on the right side, and the other near the top, her position suggests 
that she is displaying the glass for the viewer’s attention. Her gaze directly at the 
camera’s (and the viewer’s) eye offers a half-inviting, half-daring challenge to step 
forward and look in the mirror. Should the viewer take the invitation and look into the 
mirror, she might be physically reminded that insides and outsides are often not exact 
correlates. Given that viewers are restricted to looking at mirror and woman in a surface 
that none can enter, the unanswered challenge can remind viewers that whatever they 
choose to imagine Isabella or 
her photographer might be 
thinking reflects their own 
subjectivity in the act of recognizing itself.! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91I refer to Thrailkill’s “if-then” formula for how a literary effect “works”: if a reader (or viewer) responds 
in such a way, then certain cognitive processes seem to be at work underlying the effect (47-48). 
Figure'9:!Clementina!Hawarden,!PH.296D1947.!c.!1862D1863.!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
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Hawarden’s camera is clearly visible in the mirror, and the blurry smudges around 
its large eye may be her own hand removing and replacing the lens to take the exposure. 
This is an unusual exception to Hawarden’s usual practice of arranging reflective surfaces 
to avoid catching her own image or her camera’s.92 The conscious choice to reveal her 
camera suggests that whatever of Hawarden’s own subjectivity viewers seek can be 
found in her images, even as it simultaneously hints that what they find will also be 
overlaid with the reflection of their own minds.  
The photographs are certainly Hawarden’s vision, shaped by her talent and 
technical skill. But while their flat surfaces may appear to offer a glimpse inside the 
subjectivity of the photographer, her consciousness remains as mysterious as those of the 
women she presents. Seeing her images and her models means knowing, not their 
subjectivities, but one’s own consciousness in the act of perception of an object that 
continually reverts from a glimpse to a photograph and back again. Viewers become 
aware of the usually subtle presence of themselves in the act of perceiving this object that 
periodically alerts them to its status as flat image, and may be led to realize how much 
self determines perception, even of another’s inner life. As her audience viewers 
experience their own perceptual and imaginative processes as the subject of such works, 
as if art that seemed to offer a window had turned subtly into a mirror.  
Counterfactuals in Action: Modern Critical Response to Hawarden 
Hawarden began to attract scholarly attention in the 1970s when general interest 
in art photography was on the rise, but it wasn’t until 1989 that the museum mounted a 
major exhibition of her work (Dodier 110-111). Dodier published the first biography on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92In fact there is only one possible image of the photographer in her entire oeuvre, and without a title it is 
only a tentative identification. The woman in question stands holding a photograph in her hand (Dodier 36). !
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Hawarden in 1999, and critical interest has gradually increased over the last fifteen 
years.93 Rather uniquely for modern criticism, however, the response remains small 
enough to read comprehensively. Critics who have discovered Hawarden almost always 
attest to her peculiarly powerful affect, yet often attribute it to narratives of Victorian 
women’s confinement to domestic spaces and pursuits. 
I suggest that Hawarden’s affect cannot be attributed solely to this interpretation, 
and furthermore that modern critics may have responded to their own counterfactuals for 
Hawarden’s models, even as subtle awareness of these models’ flaws persists. First of all, 
actual biographical data, though poignant, does not fully support the idea of a woman 
frustrated by her culture’s constraints. Hawarden’s technique and artistic skill did win 
notice from her contemporaries, both at the two London exhibitions in which she 
participated and in the photographic press. The Photographic Society of London awarded 
her two medals for her work in 1866, though Hawarden herself was sadly absent from her 
own ceremony, having succumbed to pneumonia in January 1865 at age forty-two, after 
just one week of illness (Dodier 35). This success, though brief, suggests that Hawarden’s 
artistic efforts met at least some public recognition. 
Secondly, I note that the words of the critics themselves suggest the photographs 
expressive, boundary-pushing power instead of their limitations. Yet the same critics tend 
to describe the photographs in terms dependent at least in part on personal preoccupations 
with Victorian domestic containment. Perhaps the most obvious, though not scholarly, 
example of such a response can be found in Andy Grundberg’s 1990 review of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93Prior to Dodier, Graham Ovenden edited a volume entitled Clementina, Lady Hawarden (published in 
1974) that provides a very basic introduction. She had first appeared for art historical purposes in 1939, 
when her granddaughter donated 775 of her photographs to the Victoria and Albert Museum. In the 
scramble of World War Two the collection of album-less photographs disappeared again. It reappeared in 
1952 in the corner of a museum office, and the prints were mounted on cards for preservation. 
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Museum of Modern Art’s show “Lady Hawarden, Victorian Photographer” for the New 
York Times. His title “Victorian Mother’s Daughters: So Pure, So Romantic” is a good 
indicator of the half-dismissive tone he takes towards the images, which he represents as 
products of saccharine Victorian womanhood. After asserting that “to modern eyes” these 
images may seem “incurably insipid” examples of repressed narcissism and cloying 
sentimentality, Grundberg writes that Hawarden’s images offer “a condensed and 
mysterious simulacrum of her Victorian reality” – except that the Victorian reality 
Grundberg mentions seems to be largely a matter of his own stereotyping. Yet even 
Grundberg must note Hawarden’s enigmatic, transfixing appeal: “Her world is… so 
suffused with a melancholy dreaminess, that one yearns to cross its fragile proscenium.” 
For her mostly-female academic critics, as I have shown, Hawarden’s Victorian 
reality is often that of confined domestic spaces, of motherhood, of particularly female, 
and therefore limited experience. Linda Shires notes Hawarden’s “ability to speak deeply 
to women about aspects of femininity and female roles” (74). Though Shires briefly 
questions “to what extent separate spheres are being binarized in these photographs,” her 
argument similarly restricts them to a largely female sphere in which “Life at home with 
mother becomes not only a playground but a training ground for the very upper-class 
world in which Hawarden’s daughters were expected to function,” presumably as 
domestic angels (79). Even as Shires notes that Hawarden “illustrates… that our view of 
figures and the meanings we attach to them can never be monocular, singular, or fixed,” 
the view she proposes has much in common with other critics writing Hawarden into the 
modern cultural narrative of Victorian femininity (86). Thus for Carol Armstrong, 
confinement is the condition of Hawarden’s photography: “It was… the four walls of her 
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confinement – the limits presented by the… domestic domain of the family and the home 
– that opened up her extraordinary free play in the shut rooms of self-reflexive 
photography” (114). For Mavor, Hawarden’s work is “girl play with a camera,” a phrase 
that suggests the subversive but here also means limits imposed by self-obsession (46). 
Perhaps variants of this interpretation have appeared so often not just because it is 
possible, but also and especially because this vision of Victorian culture is a salient one 
now. Hawarden’s recent critical history demonstrates the power of her art to provoke 
higher-level mindreading processes, which produce powerful counterfactual mental 
models without much aid for adjustment, casting interpreters back on their own 
knowledge and preoccupations. This reflection of self may explain why it is unusually 
easy for critics to read their own interests into Hawarden’s photographs, most notoriously 
when Mavor apostrophizes the images and then answers for them in the absolute 
(“Clementina, did you feel flirtatious when you stood up in a corner of the drawing room 
at another window…? Clementina’s lips will never part to answer me. But her off-the-
shoulder blouse… murmurs yes: it flirts” (7) or fantasizes at length about “a mother who 
could have, who would have, indulged in [Mavor’s own] adolescent beauty” (16). We 
certainly can see, as Mavor notes, eroticism and mother-daughter collaboration in these 
photographs. But that is not all we can see. Mavor’s habit of assigning ahistorical, 
personal titles to these images further imbricates them in her own subjectivity, potentially 
disserving new viewers who see them first through Mavor’s lens rather than Hawarden’s 
(Shires 76). Any limited exclusion from this effect that I can claim derives from my 
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purpose in attempting to describe how the process of interpretation works when viewers 
find themselves drawn into these hypnotic photographs.94 
Brontë and Glass Culture 
The unsettling effect of counterfactuals is increased in Villette, where readers dual 
code vivid, visually descriptive narrative counterfactuals that also hint at Lucy’s mental 
state. Lucy uses narrative counterfactuals to hint at her interiority, but withholds 
information that would clarify her meaning, so that readers have deceptively little 
narrative input to help them adjust their own counterfactual mental models for Lucy. The 
face Lucy shows her reader, in this novel of deceptively lucid surfaces, is one she 
carefully controls to reveal little while seeming to reveal much. 
Isobel Armstrong reads Villette as a primary novel of glass culture, noting its 
pervasive and “acute awareness of a reflective world” (96).95 Within this glass world, the 
surfaces of physiognomies point only indirectly to inner states. For instance, Lucy’s 
“countenance” is her only recommendation or “reference” as governess to Madame Beck, 
the icy ruler of a girls’ pensionnat, and the older woman engages her even though the 
“reading” brings mixed results (Brontë 73-4). Lucy’s refusal to show her true face to 
others extends to self-recognition of her own outer appearance: she repeatedly feels 
“jar[red] with discord” on seeing her image in a mirror (Brontë 234). For Lucy, seeing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94If a viewer does not feel called to question and consider, then this process will not follow. If she does, 
then to a unique degree among art objects, what she finds is herself reflected. 
95Windows and mirrors provide avenues for knowledge and spaces for encounter throughout the novel. 
Madame Beck rules her pensionnat with an all-seeing eye rather than a visible fist, and her constant silent, 
unobserved observation extends to watching the grounds of the school’s garden through her window via a 
surreptitiously placed mirror. Wayward student Genevra’s lover materially defies this surveillance, again 
by using a window, through which he drops letters for the girl into the garden. Crossed glances in mirrors 
occasion revelations of the inner thoughts of others, as when Dr. John Bretton discovers Lucy observing 
him closely in reflection and asks what “defect” she has discovered (Brontë 108). Similarly Lucy glimpses 
a weakness that Madame Beck would have preferred to hide when she sees the older woman shudder and 
pluck a gray hair while looking on her face in a mirror (Brontë 115). !
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herself “as others see” her is like seeing a stranger, so little does her outer reflection seem 
to her to correspond to her inner life (Brontë 234).96 
By contrast, M. Paul reads Lucy more accurately, describing her inner state to her 
with precision: “you seem sad, submissive, dreamy, but you are not those things; I will 
describe you: Savage! Your soul is on fire, lightning in your eyes…” (Brontë 352 
translation). M. Paul’s talent for piercing through appearances to discern inner truths 
seems to result from his use of intuition to read what he sees, as much as from his 
uncanny ability to watch everyone; it is this sometimes-ruthless combination that allows 
him to “gaz[e] deep through the pupil and the irids into the brain, into the heart” of the 
human under his surveillance (Brontë 389). 
Lucy’s own phenomenology is of a glass world, where she is separated from 
most. Brontë repeatedly uses metaphors that seem drawn from bodily experience with 
glass to describe Lucy’s relations with others.  For example, Lucy writes of her thwarted 
love for Dr. John Bretton that “An invisible, but a cold something, very slight, very 
transparent, but very chill: a sort of screen of ice had hitherto, all through our two lives, 
glazed the medium through which we exchanged intercourse” (Brontë 214). This is in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96Eyes in particular offer a powerful communicative window in the context of physiognomies. Dr. John 
seems to possess special knowledge of others because he diagnoses their visages with his professional eye, 
for instance discerning merely from watching her gaze that Genevra has had a sexual liaison (Brontë 250).  
Later, he detects that Lucy has seen the mysterious figure of the nun, who appears in the pensionnat’s 
garden, merely from looking at the teacher’s eyes: “her figure crossing your eyes leaves on them a peculiar 
gleam and expression not to be mistaken,” he asserts to Lucy, as if he can see the reflection of the nun’s 
shape persisting on Lucy’s corneas (Brontë 285). Yet willful obstruction and poor reading can block eyes’ 
communicative power, as when Lucy attempts to apologize to Dr. John for an uncharacteristic outburst, and 
is repeatedly “baffled” because “Again and again [his] eye just met mine; but, having nothing to say, it 
withdrew” (Brontë 213). Lucy and Madame Beck silently agree to maintain mutual disguises, with Lucy 
pretending she does not realize the older woman has inspected her private things; otherwise “I should have 
looked into her eyes, and she into mine – we should have known that we could work together no more, and 
parted in this life forever” (Brontë 131). Dr. John also ignores Lucy’s true feeling for him: as Lucy writes, 
“He did not at all guess what I felt: he did not read my eyes, or face, or gestures; though, I doubt not, all 
spoke” (Brontë 352). Similarly, Madame Beck misreads both Lucy and M. Paul perhaps because her own 
masterful eye is nevertheless cold and emotionless: “her peaceful yet watchful eye [never knew] the fire 
which is kindled in the heart or the softness which flows thence” (Brontë 79).  
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contrast with Bretton’s own feeling for his eventual wife, which as Lucy watches creates 
“a kind of gossamer happiness hanging in the air” between the lovers; their growing love 
builds a sheer, delicate screen that might be clouded or “disturb[ed] by drawing too deep 
a breath” (Brontë 333). Feeling communicates between others, but for Lucy, whose loves 
are always checked, it creates a barrier instead – one she can see through but not cross. 
In fact, Lucy does seem to be separated by a “sort of screen of ice” or pane of 
glass from almost everyone – an apparently-transparent but absolute barrier that makes 
itself felt in her controlled refusal to show her inner life. This glass-like barrier is 
connected with the novel’s close attention to tension between surfaces and depths, for the 
face Lucy shows to other characters hides as much as it reveals. If she can see through 
this barrier, she can also hide her face behind it. Because Dr. John “never remembered 
that I had eyes in my head; much less a brain behind them,” Lucy tells us (Brontë 108), 
she is able to watch him unobserved, and realizes his identity long before he has any idea 
that she is the Lucy of his childhood experience. She is almost supernaturally invisible 
while gliding through the novel’s dream-like festival scene, which allows her to spy on 
Madame Beck and her co-conspirators unseen; although Lucy’s subsequent conclusion 
about M. Paul’s affections is misguided, her unseen watching allows her secret 
knowledge which Madame Beck would have otherwise concealed.   
The Reader and the Glass World: Counterfactuals in Narrative and Mental Models 
 Lucy hides her “face” from her reader as well. Though this narrative of her 
private life can seem forthcoming – after all, the reader has hundreds of pages of Lucy’s 
thoughts and experiences – her unreliable narration means the reader often finds Lucy’s 
surfaces frustratingly opaque. For instance, Lucy conceals from the reader that she has 
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recognized Dr. John as her childhood friend and godmother’s son under another name for 
nearly a hundred pages. “Graham” is a major character of the first chapters, and “Dr. 
John” is similarly a major character in the later chapters, but Lucy allows no hint that 
they are both John Graham Bretton, or that she knows it, until the moment of her 
choosing. This “deception” persists even as Lucy half-hints at her unstated love for Dr. 
John. Lucy eventually tells her reader that she “recognized him… several chapters back” 
in part because his adult physiognomy retains traces of his child’s face: “he had his eyes, 
he had some of his features; to wit, all the excellently-moulded lower half of the face; I 
found him out soon” (Brontë 195-6). But if faces can reveal identities, Lucy’s does not; 
Dr. John has not recognized her until the moment the reader learns the truth as well.  
Similarly, the reader finds the surfaces of Lucy’s pages – her narrative “face” – to 
reflect the reader’s rather than Lucy’s interiority at key moments that promise to reveal 
Lucy’s most painful inner experience. At several important junctures Lucy employs 
narrative counterfactuals, or in narrative terms, imagined alternatives to “life trajectories” 
(Dannenberg 1). The most straightforward example occurs when Lucy recalls how close 
she came to allowing a kindly Catholic priest to influence her life’s course. Isolated 
during a school holiday, possibly physically ill, and heartsick with loneliness, Lucy 
confessed to a kindly Catholic priest in part simply to make a human connection. 
Perceiving her plight, he suggested that her destiny was to become a Catholic nun, and 
asked her to visit him again the following day. But she did not keep the appointment. 
After narrating the incident, Lucy imagines a counterfactual version of her life as it might 
have been had she gone to see the priest again: 
That priest had arms which could influence me; he was naturally kind, with a 
sentimental French kindness, to whose softness I knew myself not wholly 
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impervious…. Had I gone to him, he would have shown me all that was tender, 
and comforting, and gentle, in the honest popish superstition…. I know not how it 
would all have ended…. I might just now, instead of writing this heretic narrative, 
be counting my beads in the cell of a certain Carmelite convent on the Boulevard 
of Crécy in Villette. (Brontë 180) 
 
This passage imagines a counterfactual life trajectory in which Lucy visits again with the 
priest, whose kindness and offer of membership within an apparently “comforting” 
community convinces her that she would be happiest serving God in a nunnery. Lucy 
presents a hypothetical antecedent (she keeps the appointment with the priest) and its 
consequent (she ultimately becomes a nun). As I have suggested, such causative 
relationships in which a prior event is seen to influence a later event represent a typical 
“cognitive pattern” for narrative that humans use to “comprehend a randomly initiated 
but causally linked sequence of events in time” (Dannenberg 27). As Dannenberg writes, 
counterfactuals in the context of fiction borrow this cognitive strategy from daily use 
and/or adapt it from use in nonfictional narratives like journals, autobiographies, and 
letters; they “simulate the cognitive processes of an autobiographical consciousness by 
framing the kind of retrospective evaluations that are part of authentic autobiographical 
reflection” (184, emphasis in original). Because Lucy’s counterfactual reproduces a 
familiar cognitive pattern, it may increase the reader’s sense that the collection of words 
Brontë has assembled are the utterances of a real person, with thoughts and a past. 
 The fact that Lucy sets up a counterfactual life path at all also helps to weave the 
story’s spell more thoroughly. Lucy asks us to imagine a hypothetical version of her life – 
one that clearly is not factual – which in turn reinforces the idea that the novel’s version 
of her life events is factual. Lucy’s narration of alternate possibilities for her life 
increases the reader’s absorption in her tale because it increases the feeling that the life 
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story she provides is a real one. Like real lives, Lucy’s life seems to have had multiple 
possible outcomes at various crucial “turning points;” her choices have led her down one 
path rather than others, but she can imagine that making different choices would have led 
to different outcomes. Her counterfactual thus recapitulates normal human cognitive 
strategies. It also subtly asserts the reality of the life narrative she relates through its 
contrast with another, non-factual possible life. Both facets of this technique work to 
immerse the reader more thoroughly in Lucy’s tale (Dannenberg 110, 118-119). 
 The content of this counterfactual narrative is also key. The image it conveys is a 
powerful one in the context of the novel, which repeatedly foregrounds Lucy’s celibate, 
intensely solitary loneliness. Heavy symbolism revolving around convents appears 
repeatedly throughout the story, in the pensionnat’s original identity as a convent, and in 
the old tale that a wayward nun from that convent who had fallen in love had been buried 
alive beneath the tree in the garden, and in the repeated appearance of a ghostly nun to 
Lucy herself right at moments when she contents with her feelings about her frustrated 
heart. The figure of a nun literally and metaphorically haunts Lucy, like the persistent 
return of her own struggling loves. The concrete counterfactual vignette she offers thus 
should activate both representational logogens but also, importantly, referential imagens 
powerful in the context of this novel for illustrating Lucy’s barely-named and always 
repressed emotion. Like other concrete language, this counterfactual should be dually 
coded by both verbal and nonverbal systems, and therefore also be more vivid and 
memorable than the same idea narrated in more abstract language. 
 This counterfactual in which Lucy becomes a nun is the most straightforward one 
she employs as narrator. In an earlier moment, she combines the counterfactual with 
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metaphor in a much more evasive fashion. Lucy seems to explain her life as it continued 
in an otherwise unnarrated gap between chapters, but actually withholds more than she 
reveals. Rather than relating her history, she presents a metaphor that is also a 
counterfactual, but she temporarily withholds the information that it is counterfactual: 
Far from saying nay, indeed, I will permit the reader to picture me, for the next 
eight years, as a bark slumbering through halcyon weather, in a harbour still as 
glass…. A great many women and girls are supposed to pass their lives something 
in that fashion; why not I with the rest? Picture me then idle, basking, plump, and 
happy, stretched on a cushioned deck warmed with constant sunshine, rocked by 
breezes indolently soft. (Brontë 38) 
 
The opening phrase, “Far from saying nay,” alerts the reader that this difficult narrator is 
suggesting that her readers might prefer to envision a happier life than she has led. This is 
the more so as the immediately previous sentences imply that Lucy would “contradict” 
the “conjecture” that her home life was happy, except that to do so would leave her 
readers less happy (Brontë 38). Yet the image that Lucy asks readers to “picture” is 
undeniably positive, and she does not fully confirm that it is false until after the reader 
has already presumably imagined that picture. Thus although the image may be shot 
through with doubt, its concrete language should also manifest itself (even 
unconsciously) to readers as a dually coded image, activating both imagens and also other 
associated logogens with their own related imagens. Because it is a metaphor, the image 
exists in a kind of “blended conceptual space” that combines inputs: Lucy is a bark and 
her life is a calm sea (or Lucy is a traveler and her life is a boat on a calm sea). The 
concrete imagery of the boat in a calm sea is the source for imagining Lucy’s life, which 
then seems memorably “idle” and “happy” – the more memorably so as the immediately 
preceding concrete language should be processed in both verbal and nonverbal systems. 
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 Immediately after indirectly inviting her readers to visualize these happy images, 
Lucy destroys them. The pleasant versions, the reader discovers definitively, were indeed 
a counterfactual metaphor. Should she really have been a little “bark slumbering” or an 
“idle, basking, plump, and happy” girl resting on deck, she writes, she “must somehow 
have fallen over-board, or… there must have been wreck at last” (Brontë 38). The 
metaphor as she continues it is aligned with her actual, not her counterfactual life, and it 
is as concretely cold and disastrous as the former were warm and calm: 
I too well remember a time – a long time, of cold, of danger, of contention. To 
this hour when I have the nightmare, it repeats the rush and saltness of briny 
waves in my throat, and their icy pressure on my lungs…. For many days and 
nights neither sun nor stars appeared; we cast with our own hands the tackling out 
of the ship; a heavy tempest lay on us; all hope that we should be saved was taken 
away. In fine, the ship was lost, the crew perished. (Brontë 38) 
 
The “bark” and the “halcyon weather,” the “cushioned deck” and “constant sunshine” 
and “breezes indolently soft” are replaced with even greater detail in “rush and saltness,” 
“briny waves in my throat,” “icy pressure on my lungs,” the tackling, the darkness, the 
“heavy tempest” and the shipwreck. Besides the visual image of shipwreck, Lucy’s 
metaphor incorporates taste and touch and sound as well. As with the positive image, 
then, the negative image comes to the reader in concrete language that should activate 
nonverbal imagens across modalities. The immediate contrast with the earlier metaphor, 
still part of the context in the reader’s mind, may increase the sense of disaster. 
The series of metaphors takes the form of an upward counterfactual followed by 
its actual counterpart. An upward counterfactual imagines a “better possible world” than 
the one actually experienced, and therefore it both articulates and elicits regret 
(Dannenberg 112). Research shows that people are more likely to use counterfactuals as 
narrative tools for making sense of experience after a tragedy or a negative outcome to an 
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event (Dannenberg 111). If anything, then, Lucy’s use of a counterfactual in explaining 
this otherwise unnarrated segment of her history should enhance the reader’s sense that 
this is a real story, and increase immersion.  
However, the counterfactual is also a metaphor, as is its actual counterpart. Lucy 
says nothing else about these “troubles” (Brontë 38), and the reader must infer from the 
metaphors. The concrete imagery of ship and sea is again the source for imagining 
Lucy’s life, but now we realize – again memorably – that it has been a time of storm and 
wreck, with whatever personal associations the reader brings to those concepts. Lucy 
does not offer actual details from her experience even as she appears to reveal them. Her 
only elaboration is a metaphorical abstraction: “In fine, the ship was lost, the crew 
perished.” This phrase should be coded dually, and therefore be vivid and memorable, but 
it provides only metaphorical rather than actual information. Lucy’s emotional pain over 
her experience is implied through metaphorical hints that allow the reader to construct a 
counterfactual mental model for her affect. Yet Lucy never elaborates on what this meant 
for her, either in terms of events or in terms of emotions. The reader’s counterfactual 
mental model has only the reader’s own associations to provide it weight and heft. 
The Ending: A Counterfactual without an Actual 
 The most famous counterfactual of the novel is, of course, the ending, which 
seems to allow readers to choose a positive or a negative outcome even as it also points to 
the un-narrated negative version. Lucy and M. Paul have avowed their love, and M. Paul 
has left at Madame Beck’s bidding for three years abroad. But he has promised to return 
to her, and frustrate all Madame Beck’s plotting; in the meantime, Lucy works at the little 
school he has given her and waits for his return, peaceful and happy for the first time. 
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On the penultimate page, Brontë’s tense changes from past to present: “And now 
the three years are past: M. Emanuel’s return is fixed. It is Autumn; he is to be with me 
ere the mists of November come” (545). The tense change produces the effect of the 
eternal present, as though Lucy and the reader are frozen in the time of Lucy’s waiting, as 
“The sun passes the equinox; the days shorten, the leaves grow sere; but – he is coming” 
(Brontë 545). This eternal present focuses on one fateful night of Lucy’s waiting, when 
readers know M. Emanuel is at sea, as outside a storm rages: “it shrieks out long: wander 
as I may through the house this night, I cannot lull the blast” (Brontë 546). Then the 
narration becomes past tense again: “That storm roared frenzied for seven days. It did not 
cease till the Atlantic was strewn with wrecks: it did not lull till the deeps had gorged 
their full of sustenance” (Brontë 546). A fatal ending seems implied: 
Peace, be still! Oh! a thousand weepers, praying in agony on waiting shores, 
listened for that voice, but it was not uttered – not uttered till, when the hush 
came, some could not feel it: till, when the sun returned, his light was nigh to 
some! (Brontë 546) 
 
But then Lucy speaks in present tense once more: 
Here pause: pause at once. There is enough said. Trouble no quiet, kind heart; 
leave sunny imaginations hope. Let it be theirs to conceive the delight of joy born 
again fresh out of great terror, the rapture of rescue from peril, the wondrous 
reprieve from dread, the fruition of return. Let them picture union and a happy 
succeeding life. (Brontë 546) 
 
Lucy seems to offer readers the choice of endings, one in which M. Paul returns safely 
and is reunited with Lucy, and one in which he perishes at sea and she is presumably left 
alone with her heartache, all the worse, perhaps, for the period of hope that preceded it. 
The present tense of the “pause” seems to leave the ending always open, as if readers 
may linger – or are trapped – in the uncertain darkness of Lucy’s own waiting.  
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Yet Lucy’s very reticence to name an ending in favor of letting “sunny 
imaginations hope” heavily implies a negative one. In this case, the ending she narrates, 
of “rescue from peril” and “union and a happy succeeding life,” is counterfactual. This 
would seem consistent with the tenor of much of the rest of the book, in which Lucy’s 
actual life is emotionally desolate, and it is only in her fantasy that she can ever dare to 
hope for more fulfilling emotional connections. But Lucy refuses to confirm the 
counterfactuality of this positive ending, just as she will not narrate its opposite. Thus, as 
Dannenberg pithily notes, “the text narrates the virtual and only implies the actual” (194). 
 The result of this peculiar narrative strategy is that the reader must imagine the 
implied actual ending from vague hints, while the “virtual” or counterfactual ending 
exists in a more concrete form that is also more accessible and memorable. Lucy’s text 
mostly refers to abstractions like “union” and “happy life” rather than explicitly narrating 
a return (which itself may reinforce reader suspicion of its counterfactuality). Where her 
text is concrete she names emotions (joy, terror, dread) rather than people or events. 
According to DCT, these logogens would activate a less direct path to imagens than 
named nouns, because comprehending them requires activating associated logogens for 
concrete nouns, events, and circumstances first. But this is still far more concrete and 
direct than the implied actual ending, which takes no verbalized form at all.  
This counterfactual ending may also suggest to readers’ memories the space of 
happy union that was M. Paul’s and Lucy’s last night together before he left. It is on this 
night that the glass walls surrounding Lucy (temporarily?) shatter. She answers M. Paul’s 
proposal in stumbling but heart-felt acquiescence: “In such inadequate language my 
feelings struggled for expression: they could not get it; speech, brittle and unmalleable, 
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and cold as ice, dissolved or shivered in the effort” (Brontë 537).  The shattering of her 
words also seems to represent the shattering of glass-like barriers between self and other.  
Her communion is with a man who has seen her with real empathy, who has as Lucy says 
“looked into my face and eyes, and arbitered my destiny” (Brontë 542).   
In this novel with more enclosed spaces than a Russian doll, the result is the 
expansion of a private space once restricted to her own heart, after her other refuges, 
from Madame Beck’s garden to her own little workbox near her bed, have all proved 
violable. Her last evening with M. Paul and their moonlit walk back to the Rue Fossette 
from the Faubourg Clotilde becomes a kind of encapsulated memory, a “pleasure 
consecrated to us two, unshared and unprofaned,” as M. Paul describes their secret plans 
(Brontë 538). Lucy describes their walk lit with “such moonlight as fell on Eden – 
shining through the shades of the Great Garden, and haply gliding a path glorious, for a 
step divine – a Presence nameless. Once in their lives some men and women go back to 
these first fresh days of our great Sire and Mother – taste that grand morning’s dew – 
bathe in its sunrise” (Brontë 541). If Lucy has no power to compel that “Happy hour” of 
union  to “stay one moment!” (Brontë 538) she does at least have the ability to turn 
repeatedly to re-experience it in memory, where it lives again for reader and narrator as 
window onto an image of happiness, onto a “garden” as safe and private as it is 
irrevocably lost. Lucy’s inviolable interiority here allows her this small defiance of the 
inexorable rule of time and space.  
Hints that this moment of “union,” and its promise of continuance in “happy life,” 
are the counterfactual to which Lucy returns in memory, and permits her “sunny” readers 
to imagine do appear in her final words. After all, “a thousand weepers, praying in 
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agony” hope in vain for calm seas and are disappointed. Typically, with this image of 
multiple mourners, Lucy speaks nothing at all of her own actual emotions, but only 
implies that those she names are counterfactual. 
If the more concrete counterfactual is thus much more concretely present than its 
lurking, ambiguous, implied but never named actual alternative, then the reader’s 
mindreading skill applied to Lucy has little to work on. Readerly response to the 
counterfactual ending will of course be as personal as each reader’s experience and 
associations, but will also at least be directed by Lucy’s text. Readers who seek to 
comprehend Lucy’s actual mental state in response to implied actual events have no such 
guidance. Their interpretations will be wholly their own, and perhaps open to even 
greater subjectivity. Though of course the point of the ending is to leave the outcome 
open and, despite Lucy’s claims, perhaps even to unsettle the reader with vaguely implied 
but unstated disaster, the effect may be increased in readers who begin to suspect (even 
semi-consciously) that their curiosity about the actual ending can be answered only by 
recourse to their own resources. The narrative counterfactual seems to reveal through 
vivid and memorable language, but ultimately points to an actual that does not exist. With 
it, Lucy asks her reader to imagine her mental state as it seems not to have been, and 
provides very little information about how to adjust it accurately. 
Conclusion: Art as Window into Other Interiorities 
Lucy, of course, has never existed. Her “deceptions” are not real. That she seems 
to exist every time a reader opens the book and simulates the world of the novel, to such 
a degree that her deceptions and reticences can profoundly unsettle, is testament to the 
power of fiction to communicate. The novel uses the Victorian obsession with glass to 
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suggest flaws in one culture’s desire to read others by their visible surfaces, which Lucy 
uses to hide more than she reveals. But by the very conventions it frustrates the novel 
also demonstrates art’s real capacity to transport audiences into other interiorities. 
Brontë’s letters reveal that contemporary readers did respond to Lucy and M. Paul 
as if they were real people, with lives lived outside the bounds of the novels’ covers. 
Brontë had received mail from readers who asked for the truth about M. Paul’s drowning. 
She responded so as to leave everything still a “puzzle” (Gaskell 415). In 1853 letter to 
George Smith, her publisher, she again claimed that she meant the reader to judge: 
With regard to the momentous point – M. Paul’s fate – in case any one in Future 
should request to be enlightened thereon – they may be told that it was designed 
that every reader should settle the catastrophe for himself, according to the quality 
of his disposition, the tender or remorseful impulse of his nature.  Drowning and 
Matrimony are the fearful alternatives.  The Merciful… will of course choose the 
former and milder doom – drown him to put him out of pain.  The cruel-hearted 
will on the contrary pitilessly impale him on the second horn of that dilemma – 
marrying him without ruth or compunction to that – person – that – that – 
individual – “Lucy Snowe.”(Wise and Symington 55-6)! 
 
To the last Lucy remains “a personage in disguise” (Brontë 341) even as she narrates her 
censored feelings indirectly via striking visual image. That she seems a “personage” at 
all, however, offers evidence of a different kind, of the meeting of minds in fiction. 
That writing and visual art might provide analogous “windows” into other lives is 
suggested by one of Hawarden’s images (Figure 12). Viscount Hawarden stands before a 
side table positioned in front of a window. One of his wife’s cameras rests on the table, 
looking like a windowed box; Lord Hawarden is posed as if writing on top of the camera. 
Writing and photography appear to be analogous activities, both of which capture many 
dimensions in two and provide window-like glimpses into other consciousnesses. 
Another photograph (Figure 13), unusual among the upstairs domestic scenes in that no 
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people are visible, shows a book propped upright on a chair, open to an illustration of a 
woman and children. Hawarden positions a book of images in the place where she 
habitually posed a living daughter (then preserved in two dimensions). Images take the 
place of faces, which themselves survive as images evoking interpretive engagement.! 
I see Hawarden’s domestic interiors as assertions of her imaginative power, and 
Hawarden herself as a Prospero who invites recognition of possibilities available to the 
active mind. Her domestic interiors are thus “contained” only insofar as the mind is 
contained within the skull. Her eyes, her camera lens, her house’s windows, and the 
metaphorical “windows” offered the imagination by books and art mirror each other as 
apertures offering glimpses of the 
infinite. Likewise Lucy ultimately 
seems to conceal only because Brontë 
has ushered readers into a space of revelation, where they expect to find interiority. As 
fiction the novel has the capabilities of a guided dream or a simulation, to take readers 
inside others’ inner lives. Wherever this interpretation glimmers through my argument, it 
evidences my own mindreading biases at work. The surfaces of Hawarden’s photographs 
and Brontë’s pages, no less than the mirrors and windows within them, suggest and 
provoke such reflection. 
 
 
Figure'10:!Clementina!Hawarden,!PH.457:335D1968.!1861.!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
Figure'11:!Clementina!Hawarden,!PH.457:71D1968.!c.!1861D1862.!Victoria!and!Albert!Museum,!London.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
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CHAPTER 4: COMMUNITY UNDER STUDY 
IN MIDDLEMARCH: A STUDY OF PROVINCIAL LIFE 
 
Marian Evans spent most of the summer of 1856 on the British coast with George 
Henry Lewes, looking for marine specimens such as mollusks, anemones, and seaweeds, 
which they brought indoors for further study using a microscope. Natural history, a 
popular Victorian passion, had cast its spell over Lewes, who had grown “obsessed with 
vision” in its pursuit: the forms he saw through his microscope during these heady 
months, he later wrote, “filled [his] dreams with fantastic images” and “came in troops as 
[he] lay awake during meditative morning hours” (Merrill 52, Lewes Sea-Side 34). 
Marian shared his enthusiasm, and she recalled that “every day I gleaned some little bit of 
naturalistic experience, either through G.’s calling on me to look through the microscope 
or from hunting on the rocks” (“Recollections” 266). Her diary recounts their shared 
study: morning “hunts” in the tide pools, afternoon work with the microscope, evening 
reading in zoology, botany, and natural history.  
Her writings from these months also record her budding consciousness, under the 
influence of her naturalist study, that artists (authors included) bear a weighty 
responsibility to aid visualization and perspective change in their audiences. The artist’s 
faithful observation and representation of specific individuals within their particular 
communities, she claims, elicits a profounder and more sympathetic response than even 
the most eloquent diatribe from statesman or social reformer. Like the natural historian 
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whose texts teach theory only gradually, via the accumulation of specific, concrete 
examples, so the artist improves a social body with “picture[s] of human life” rendered in 
a degree of particularity that “surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that attention 
to what is apart from themselves, which may be called the raw material of moral 
sentiment” (Eliot “Natural History” 54).97 Artists perform “the Natural History of social 
bodies,” for they embody abstract conceptions in vivid specifics that demand audience 
engagement (Eliot “Natural History” 72).98 Audiences who respond to the artist’s 
“picture of human life” learn that “moral sentiment already in activity” that “[a]ppeals 
founded on generalizations and statistics” require for effective change (Eliot “Natural 
History” 54). Artists are necessary for social policy to perform its work. Natural history !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97“Natural History,” as she describes it elsewhere that summer, is explicitly concerned with the particular, 
the specific, and the concrete – with taxonomy and theory largely as it offered clarity about morphology. “I 
never before longed so much to know names of things as during this visit to Ilfracombe,” she writes in 
“Recollections of Ilfracombe;” “the desire is part of the tendency that is now constantly growing in me to 
escape from all vagueness and inaccuracy into the daylight of distinct, vivid ideas.” (272). 
 
98“Just as the most thorough acquaintance with physics, or chemistry, or general physiology” she writes in 
the same review, titled “The Natural History of German Life” (July 1856), 
will not enable you at once to establish the balance of life in your private vivarium, so that your 
particular society of zoophytes, molluscs, and echinoderms may feel themselves, as the Germans 
say, at ease in their skin; so the most complete equipment of theory will not enable a statesman or 
a political and social reformer to adjust his measures wisely, in the absence of a special 
acquaintance with the section of society for which he legislates, with the peculiar characteristics of 
the nation, the province, the class whose well-being he has to consult. In other words, a wise social 
policy must be based not simply on abstract social science, but on the Natural History of social 
bodies. (“Natural History” 71) 
It is therefore the special responsibility of the artist to bring the “daylight of distinct, vivid ideas” to bear on 
the pressing social questions of the day. In the same July review she castigates English artists for idealized 
pictures of peasant life, “under the influence of traditions and prepossessions rather than… direct 
observation,” and then asserts, 
The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet or novelist, is the extension of our 
sympathies. Appeals founded on generalizations and statistics require a sympathy ready-made, a 
moral sentiment already in activity; but a picture of human life such as a great artist can give, 
surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is apart from themselves, which 
may be called the raw material of moral sentiment. […] Art is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode 
of amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of 
our personal lot. All the more sacred is the task of the artist when he undertakes to paint the life of 
the People. Falsification here is far more pernicious than in the more artificial aspects of life. 
(“Natural History” 54) 
A truly “wise social policy” relies on intentional direct observation of specific individuals within their 
particular communities in addition to “abstract social science” (“Natural History” 71).!
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as Evans writes about it in the summer of 1856 thus comes to seem a kind of general 
epistemology for wise decisions as well as for artistic practice; both require a basis in 
precise observation and awareness of one’s own subjectivity. 
 These summer months under the spell of natural history proved a turning point in 
the careers of both Lewes and Evans. Lewes afterwards joined Philip Henry Gosse and J. 
G. Wood as one of the great popular Victorian writers on natural history.99 “George 
Eliot,” meanwhile, turned her hand to fiction. Near the end of their summer travels in 
1856 she began to imagine the plot of Amos Barton, and soon after began “a novel that 
examined the enclosed world of provincial clerical life with the same rigor, determination 
and precision she had brought to her inspection of rock pools” (Stiles). Under her pen 
name she would go on to author several revered Victorian novels, including Adam Bede 
(1859), The Mill on the Floss (1860), Middlemarch (1871-2) and Daniel Deronda (1876). 
Lewes’ and Eliot’s working lives remained so intertwined that she was able to complete 
Life and Mind for Lewes after his death in 1878; her novels likewise show his ongoing 
influence in their constant allusion to Victorian science. 
 This chapter argues that Middlemarch, despite its distance in time from the 
summer of 1856, continues Eliot’s preoccupation with natural history. In fact, I suggest 
that it illustrates the full flowering of her naturalist-inspired effort to create art that 
“extends the sympathies” through observation of particular individuals within a 
community context – a style of observation that the novel both models and teaches. 
Begun towards the end of the “heyday of natural history,” in 1869, the novel adapts 
rhetorical strategies common to Lewes and other naturalist writers at the time to envelop !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99He turned his work in the rock pools into a series of articles for Blackwood’s Magazine, republished in 
volume form as Sea-Side Studies in 1858; Studies in Animal Life followed in 1862. Interest in organic life 
continued to inspire his writing in popular articles and his final opus, The Problems of Life and Mind. 
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the reader in the text’s world, and to practice the reader in the kind of observation Eliot 
earlier recommended in her nonfiction prose as a “Natural History of social bodies.”  
Victorian natural history writing is highly “participatory,” in that it ushers readers 
into an imagined “community of wonder,” in which multiple perspectives are important 
for constituting general knowledge (Merrill 52). Writers frequently discuss their 
experimental observations in plural, incorporating readers into a “we” who view together, 
excitedly direct their readers to “see” and “look” at the marvels they note, and describe 
their activity in such detail that a reader can both visualize and also physically reproduce 
the observational scenario. Despite securing “virtual witnesses” in this way, these writers 
also encourage readers to use their texts as guides to their own observations: readers are 
meant to “get a microscope,” collect specimens, and above all see for themselves, 
whether in the field or through the lens (Animal Life 8).100 Though these readers must 
learn certain strategies for empirical observation, natural history writers do not try to 
discipline subjectivities; rather they express sanguinity about the possibilities inherent in 
multiplied perspectives. Microscopists examine their specimens at varied degrees of 
focus, just as all natural history enthusiasts observe their subjects both up close and 
within their habitats. Similarly, just as natural historians pay attention to community 
when observing animals in the field, so they pay attention to contingencies of condition 
in microscopical observation. Differences in condition and subjectivity teach the savvy 
observer more, rather than less, as long as he or she accounts for them. 
Middlemarch overtly compares these habits of observation inherent to natural 
history and microscopy (itself a crucial component of Victorian naturalist study) to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100I refer to Shapin’s idea of “witnesses” to scientific experiments described in such detail that readers can 
both visualize and reproduce them. See “Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology.” 
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process of sympathy – a comparison that some critics have taken to represent Eliot’s 
doubt that accurate knowledge of others’ perspectives is possible. I suggest that this 
reading results from incomplete understanding of both Eliot’s influences, and also of her 
sources in Victorian empiricism, particularly popular natural history. In addition to the 
novel’s overt comparisons, it also mimics popular natural history writing in its 
participatory character. Eliot asks readers to “see” and to “look.” She describes the 
thoughts of individual characters, of small groups of friends and neighbors, and of their 
shared community with a perspective always vacillating, like the natural historian’s, 
between the panoramic and the particular. She traces the consequences of characters’ 
perspectives not just to show how limited perspectives can lead to disaster, but also to 
demonstrate how varying perspective provides crucial information. In short, Eliot not 
only asks the reader to take a naturalist’s attitude, she creates a lens through which the 
reader views her subjects at varying powers as a naturalist would do. 
To revise critical understanding of Eliot’s statement on sympathy with 
Middlemarch is also to refine conceptions of vision in the nineteenth century and to 
propose one answer to this dissertation’s questions about how readers become involved in 
other lives via visualization. When Eliot recommends and models a vacillating 
perspective, she adapts rhetorical strategies for visualization that popular natural history 
writers use to help readers learn observational practices, particularly with the microscope. 
Eliot thus clarifies the process of sympathy with another person through comparison to 
concrete actions that might well even be familiar through motor habit to her Victorian 
audience, given the widespread enthusiasm for natural history. She turns abstract 
concepts like “perspective” and “sympathy” into concrete experience conveyed through 
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language that Dual Coding Theory suggests should be easier to process, to visualize, and 
to remember. These moments of sympathy may even be encoded triply – twice in the 
nonverbal system, as visual and as motor imagens. The novel thus becomes not just a 
guide but also an instrument: it both illustrates and practices the reader in observation as 
it leads to sympathy. Middlemarch is a story that exercises perspective change. 
Middlemarch and the Microscope 
 Eliot’s novels are famously full of scientific allusion, and Middlemarch is no 
exception. One of the novel’s oft-repeated allusions is to the microscope, as Mark 
Wormald notes, which was itself “central to so much mid-nineteenth-century science” –
including natural history (Wormald 502, Merrill 30). Although the microscope was not a 
new invention, it “came into its own” in the nineteenth century, when improvements in 
manufacture and design made the instrument “widely available and relatively cheap” for 
the first time (Merrill 116). At the same time, natural history was evolving from the 
“despised” activity of a few enthusiasts into a truly national craze (Barber 13-14). 
Because it taught observational habits, offered a never-ending source of useful facts, and 
pointed towards a greater appreciation of God’s handiwork, natural history eminently 
qualified as “rational amusement” in an age that liked nothing better (Barber 16).  
Moreover, the study of natural history was available to anyone who wished to 
pursue it, including children, women, and the working class. Equipment included 
financially accessible gear like nets, pins, boxes, and jars – and a reasonable microscope 
could be had for “two or three guineas” (Barber 35).101 No university degree was 
required, or even offered. The enthusiasm crossed class boundaries, offering !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101Even to those for whom this price was too expensive, the microscope would be a familiar sight from 
exhibitions and lectures, particularly the “oxy-hydrogen” microscope that was startling Londoners with 
views of microscopic animals cavorting in a drop of water by the early 1830s (Merrill 119). 
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“improvement” to working people and respectable entertainment for the middle and 
upper classes. 
 Finally, besides its capacity for amusement, its utility, and its accessibility, 
natural history offered great “visual appeal” (Barber 85). Flowers, birds, shells, seaweeds, 
ferns, even strange underwater creatures provided excellent satisfaction for nineteenth-
century curiosity when examined through lenses, under microscopes, and via increasingly 
lavish book illustrations. Brought into drawing rooms in boxes and books, and even live 
in aquariums and Wardian cases, collections of natural objects added beauty and visual 
interest to Victorian homes – and inspired wallpapers, upholstery, fabric, and decorative 
carving as well (Barber 85-86, 111-124). In this context of truly widespread cultural 
enthusiasm for the visual delights of natural history, the microscope quickly became a 
ubiquitous tool for pleasurable study and useful work. 
Middlemarch’s narrator offers herself explicitly as an historian with a decades-old 
story to relate, but the moments when microscopy infuses this historian’s language 
provide further insight into how Eliot intends her novel to be a “study” of Middlemarch 
as representative provincial community. The narrator can seem as much a natural 
historian as an historian of human activity.  She writes, 
I… have so much to do in unravelling certain human lots, and seeing how they 
were woven and interwoven, that all the light I can command must be 
concentrated on this particular web, and not dispersed over that tempting range of 
relevancies called the universe.  (Middlemarch 132) 
 
This passage makes an obvious comparison between the “interwoven” lives of 
Middlemarchers and familiar Victorian images of web-like networks. The most direct 
reference for the need for light is the one Gillian Beer notices: the historian is like the 
weaver who needs a “concentrated light” to see her work. But as Beer also suggests, the 
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web can connote not just fabric but ecology. It thus also offers a comparison between the 
activity of the historian-narrator and that of the microscopist, whose instrument did not at 
this time project its own light (Beer 156-160). Using the microscope required the 
microscopist to take full advantage of light in the environment: guidebooks like 
recommended users place their instruments near a window with bright but indirect light, 
or use an oil lamp for evening study (Quekett 181-2, Lankester 9).102 Microscopists 
employed accessory implements such as lenses, called condensers, and reflecting mirrors 
to “catch the rays of light and concentrate them on the object” under study (Lankester 8-
9). Like a microscopist concentrating all available light on the object he or she wishes to 
see clearly, Eliot’s narrator must center all her powers of observation and interpretation 
on this small circle of humanity to understand and convey its activity accurately. 
 This comparison of narrative interpretation to microscopy becomes the reverse, a 
comparison of microscopy to the interpretation of human events, in a later passage in 
which Eliot discusses the desires of Tertius Lydgate. Her narrator describes Lydgate’s 
ambitions in terms of microscopy when she informs us that the young doctor 
 was enamoured of that arduous invention which is the very eye of research,  
provisionally framing its object and correcting it to more and more exactness of 
relation; he wanted to pierce the obscurity of those minute processes which 
prepare human misery and joy, those invisible thoroughfares which are the first 
lurking-places of anguish, mania, and crime, that delicate poise and transition 
which determine the growth of happy or unhappy consciousness. (154) 
 
The microscope is the “eye” that Lydgate plans to use to discover not just the “primitive 
tissue” of life but also the origins of Fever in the “minute processes” of biology (Eliot 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102Gas lamps were preferable to candles because their beams do not flicker.  On the other hand, the light of 
a gas lamp is yellow and can therefore interfere with clear vision in a different way.  Quekett recommends 
certain shades or a particular kind of gas lamp for the microscopist who wants to avoid this problem (489). 
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139, 154).103 But Eliot’s language also connotes human fates beyond physical or mental 
illness. Just before this passage, her narrator remarks Lydgate’s inability to apply the 
arduous thought and committed observation he brings to microscopy to “the complexities 
of love and marriage” – the very same social ties that will entrap him in just a few 
chapters (154). The narrator, by contrast, seeks to utilize precisely this degree of focused 
attention, analogous to thorough microscopy, to trace the hidden origins of “happy or 
unhappy consciousness,” and remain alert to the effect of even the most minor conditions 
on eventual circumstances. Eliot’s language assumes a certain scientific literacy among 
her readers, as if she can count on her public to recognize her allusions and their 
implications. Her historian narrator seems thoroughly familiar with microscopy as the 
tool of the scientist and natural historian. Middlemarch, the town, becomes the object of 
the “eye” of Eliot’s research – her “study” – and Middlemarch, the text, will search out 
its hidden connections and varied perspectives via focused observation. 
Questions of Accuracy in Eliot’s Microscopical Allusions 
 As Mark Wormald notes, “deconstructive readers” tend to assert that the famous 
passage in which Eliot compares the work of interpreting others’ perspectives to 
microscopy expresses doubt about its possible efficacy that undercuts any other more 
positive statement of sympathy the novel makes (501-502). In this famous passage 
discussing Mrs. Cadwallader’s matchmaking activity, Eliot writes: 
Was there any ingenious plot, any hide-and-seek course of action, which might be 
detected by a careful telescopic watch? Not at all: a telescope might have swept  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103Although germ theory was not validated until after Eliot wrote in the early 1870s, precursors to the idea 
that microscopic entities might cause illness were appearing even in popular science books by mid-century. 
Witness for example Gideon Mantell’s 1850 recommendation of microscopy for its benefits to humankind, 
for “it is probable that many of the most serious maladies which afflict humanity, are produced by peculiar 
states of invisible animalcular life” (89). Lydgate’s ambition is thus in line with the nineteenth-century 
scientific trajectory towards various related discoveries that microscopic causes can have macroscopic 
effects on individual and community health. 
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 the parishes of Tipton and Freshitt, the whole area visited by Mrs Cadwallader in 
 her phaeton, without witnessing any interview that could excite suspicion….  
 Even with a microscope directed on a water-drop we find ourselves making  
 interpretations which turn out to be rather coarse; for whereas under a weak lens 
 you may seem to see a creature exhibiting an active voracity into which other 
 smaller creatures actively play as if they were so many animated tax-pennies, a  
 stronger lens reveals to you certain tiniest hairlets which make vortices for these 
 victims while the swallower waits passively at his receipt of custom. In this way, 
 metaphorically speaking, a strong lens applied to Mrs Cadwallader’s match- 
 making will show a play of minute causes producing what may be called thought 
 and speech vortices to bring her the sort of food she needed. (Middlemarch 55) 
In this passage, Eliot first suggests and then rejects the telescope as a useful aid for 
studying Mrs Cadwallader’s social activity. Though this instrument enhances the user’s 
sight to enable super-human observation, the telescope’s lens is not powerful enough to 
descry the true causes of the activity Mrs. Cadwallader seems to set in motion. A 
microscope provides a better instrument for the task. But as experienced microscopists 
recognize, the power of the lens can make a vast difference to perceived degree of detail, 
which in turn will alter possible interpretations an observer can make about what he or 
she sees through the instrument. Seen with one lens power a microscopic specimen seems 
to vacuum in its prey as if these smaller protozoa were magnetized coins (“animated tax-
pennies”), but a stronger lens power will “reveal” the existence of the specimen’s tiny 
moving hairs, or cilia, that perform the work for the passive larger “creature.”  
 In this way readers’ possible interpretations of Mrs. Cadwallader’s activity are 
like the possible interpretations of the behavior of Rotiferas, a phylum of microscopic 
“animalcules” or protozoa that it would have been hard for Eliot to avoid in her naturalist 
reading. The name, which translates to “wheel-bearer,” derives from the apparently 
rotating “wheels” that Rotiferas carry near their mouths. As scientific popularizer Philip 
Henry Gosse describes it in 1859, the rapid rotation of these wheels “was believed to be 
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the real fact by the earlier microscopists” who used less powerful microscopes, but it is 
actually “an optical illusion, depending on the nature of ciliary movement” (Evenings 
273). By the time Gosse wrote in the middle of the nineteenth century, better microscopes 
had revealed the existence of cilia, or tiny hairs arranged in rows that wave in successive 
motion. Gosse’s detailed explanation of “ciliary movement” clarifies that waves result in 
“an alternate succession of dark and light spots blending into each other,” which produces 
the impression of rotating movement in the Rotifera’s “wheels” (Evenings 274-5). Where 
microscopists using weaker lenses believed the Rotifera used rotating wheels to vacuum 
in food, better lenses revealed that this evident activity is actually passive wave motion 
producing a vortex. This optical illusion and its subsequent exposure provided Victorians 
with a concrete example of both the ongoing improvements to the microscope and also 
the various possibilities for (mis)interpretation it enabled. Similarly, says Eliot, to judge 
Mrs. Cadwallader’s effects on the basis of her apparent meddling activity – without 
accounting for necessary detail – would be to miss the way social currents bring her 
material, as if one had interpreted her observed behavior with a too-weak lens. 
 One way to read this comparison of community relationships to microscopic 
interpretation is to notice the contingency and inherent fallibility of the instrument as a 
mediator. Indeed, critics have pointed out the various ways in which Eliot may suggest 
that human empathy, dependent as it is on fallible human perception, is hopelessly 
conditional. Sally Shuttleworth, for instance, points out accurately that characters do 
misinterpret others based on their physical appearances, only to discover that reality fails 
to correspond (Shuttleworth 146). If the town of Middlemarch is an organism, says 
Shuttleworth, then it is one in conflict with itself: the goal of “organic unity” remains 
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“impossible” for groups of autonomous individuals unable properly to see or to 
understand one another (Shuttleworth 151).104 
A More Accurate View of Victorian Microscopy within Natural History 
Yet an exclusive focus on the supposed impossibilities of interpretative accuracy, 
in microscopy and in Eliot’s adaptation of it, may obscure historical feeling on the 
subject. As I have mentioned, the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed 
remarkable improvements to the microscope as an instrument.105 Perhaps more 
importantly, as Jutta Schickore has noted, rhetoric of optimistic perfectibility pervaded 
much public discussion of the topic, even as popularizers of microscopy continued to 
assert the value of carefully controlled, thorough observation. John Quekett’s tome, A 
Practical Treatise on the Use of the Microscope, which ran to three mid-century editions, 
begins with a narrative of constant improvements to the microscope over the previous 
century. Quekett proclaims it the “most important instrument ever yet bestowed by art 
upon the investigator of nature” (39).106 Similarly Edwin Lankester’s Half-hours with the 
Microscope asserts “The Compound Microscope is now, undoubtedly, one of the most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104See also J. Hillis Miller, “Optic and Semiotic in Middlemarch.”  Shuttleworth argues that Eliot adopts 
the “passive observer” role of the natural historian for Adam Bede, but in Daniel Deronda and 
Middlemarch takes on the role of the “creative, experimental scientist” (xii). I agree with Shuttleworth that 
Eliot’s narrator takes an active role in Middlemarch but suggest both that the relationship between the 
naturalist writer and reader was more active and participatory than Shuttleworth acknowledges, and also 
that Eliot’s narrator’s voice and role in Middlemarch is much like that of the naturalist writer. This 
argument coincides with my argument that Eliot does admit the possibilities of mistake in ways 
Shuttleworth has identified, but that Eliot is more optimistic about the possibilities for successful 
interpretation than Shuttleworth wants to admit. 
 
105Early microscopes were subject to distortions and aberrations: microscopes with a single lens offered 
weak magnification, but adding lenses to improve the magnification decreased available light and caused a 
halo of color to appear around the object being viewed. Improved design and glass manufactory eventually 
produced, in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the compound achromatic microscope, an 
instrument that solved both problems and that became increasingly easy to use and financially accessible as 
the century progressed. The microscope thus underwent real, and substantial, improvements until it was 
simultaneously quite a sophisticated, yet also familiar, instrument by 1870. !
106Later in the same guide, he quotes his own earlier accolade with the addition of the adjectives “most 
perfect” and “efficient” (459). 
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perfect instruments invented and used by man…. [I]n the Compound Microscope, we 
have an instrument working up to the theory of its construction.  It does actually all that 
could be expected from it” (5).  Lankester follows this with an exposition of 
improvements to the microscope over the previous century, which have brought it to this 
state of perfection. 
 An excessive focus on the disrupting potential of subjective error among modern 
critics may result from a more general modern suspicion of Victorian empiricism, often 
thought to promise pure (and dogmatic) insight into reality. Victorian empiricism as Peter 
Garratt redefines it for modern understanding – and his analysis specifically includes 
Lewes and Eliot – held both that knowledge requires a perceiving self, and also that 
accumulating knowledge ceaselessly changes the self. In other words, experience 
produces the self and the self’s knowledge, simultaneously. Knowledge is inextricable 
from selfhood: to say that a perceiving subject should seek to attain objective knowledge, 
or knowledge as free as possible from the influence of subjective perspective, is to speak 
impossible nonsense. To know is precisely to be situated within a certain “place, 
perspective, and personality;” it is to take up a certain, particular relationship to the 
known and to other knowers (Garratt 15-16). Increasing awareness that vision is 
inherently subjective only increased the commitment of this influential strand of 
empiricism to its position that the wise knower will both accept the limitations of his or 
her personal knowledge, and also seek the benefit of others’ views.107 If knowledge is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107As Garratt puts it,  
To be an empiricist was at once to place trust in the immediacy of one’s encounter with reality, 
and also to seek a description of reality that might hold beyond the vagaries and limitations of 
personal point of view. As this contradiction implies, the relationship between observer and 
observed, knower and object, was thus understood to be radically unstable. But it was not assumed 
by empiricist writers that this instability could simply be resolved by, say, envisioning a way of 
knowing that neutralized the contingencies of spectatorship – for example, by using magnifying 
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isomorphic with a certain perspective or position, then it will be subjective no matter how 
good the microscope. Rather than being the cause for concern and dismay, doubt and 
despair, “the incompleteness of our vision” became simply part of the circumstances of 
knowing – and sometimes even a quality to “celebrate” (Garratt 16). 
Modern suspicion may also result from considering Victorian microscopy apart 
from natural history, which was an activity that bridged an emerging divide between 
subjective and objective epistemologies. Although nearly all natural history writers this 
chapter covers assert the importance of precise observation, natural history as they 
practice it is “aesthetic science, science pursued out of a personal sense of awe and 
beauty” (Merrill 79). This aesthetic meant that Victorian naturalists hunted a “quarry… 
as much subjective as objective” (Merrill 83). Naturalists who shared their observations 
spoke to a community who defined “truth” partly in terms of a felt personal relationship 
with the natural world. This does not mean that accuracy was unimportant to Victorian 
naturalists, who did seek to discredit the nature myths of earlier generations. It means that 
an equally important aesthetic quality, grounded in personal response and facilitated 
through shared emotion, balanced objective precision in Victorian popular natural 
history. Once again, then, popular natural history provides a context in which knowledge 
is “conditioned by context, and conceived in terms of relationship” (Garratt 16). 
That Victorians were aware of the errors inherent in subjective vision and the 
fallibility of instrumentation is evident not just in popular writers’ care to praise 
contemporary microscopes’ advanced state, but also in their more direct address to such 
concerns. As Lewes writes in Sea-Side Studies, subjective results wherein “men… see !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
aids and other visual technologies to eliminate error. The deficiencies of the eye were not the 
primary question, nor was it just a case of applying oneself more and more diligently to the 
business of seeing until an accurate view of reality was achieved…. (16)
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what they wish to see, and what no one else can recognise” are “not the fault of the 
instrument” but the fault of the user (37). And yet this was cause for recourse to the 
community, rather than cause for despair. The good natural history microscopist, aware 
of vision’s reliance on inference and expectation, proceeds with caution and checks 
observations with others. Good microscopy relies on a community of observers, all of 
whom take one another into account as the community decides truth of interpretation. 108 
Accepted truth lies in the consensus of this community, which relies on the 
contributions of its members who share their observations of their shared subject. As 
Lewes puts it, “In the present state of knowledge, the independent observations of every 
one who has had any experience cannot but be welcome” (117). With so much left to 
learn, these writers suggest, the progress of the field requires as many individual 
observers as possible, and demands that each new observer see for him- or herself rather 
than take the word of written authority. Lewes instructs his readers to “keep the mind in a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108Popular microscopical writers are clear that their readers must train themselves to be skilled observers, 
through practice and by experience. Inexperienced enthusiasts who expect to begin willy-nilly and with 
ease will be disappointed, as Lewes points out in Sea-Side Studies. Finding specimens to study is the first 
problem. A budding natural historian must learn “where to look for [specimens], how to see them when 
there, and how to secure them when seen” – tasks that Lewes’ writings illuminate in some detail (Sea-Side 
Studies 15). The hunt requires a commitment to study using guides, a deliberate patience in watching, and 
attention to the proper equipment for captures and transport. 
Disciplined habits should extend to the working space indoors, as Hogg, Lankester, and Quekett 
all make clear. Instructions extend from location within the home to care for apparatus. Budding 
microscopists should choose a clean room with a window, preferably facing north and free of outdoors 
obstructions, and use a sturdy, steady table for their equipment. Equipment should be neatly stored and 
labeled, and if at all possible, the microscope and its apparatus should be left out, ready for use at a 
moment’s notice, and covered with a bell jar or other case to keep dust away (Hogg 53-4, Quekett 181-182, 
Lankester 12-13 and appendix by Ketteringham 82). Such rigor allows the amateur naturalist to use well 
“even those scraps of time which occur in the busiest life” and learn “[h]abits of observation, of patient 
research, of accurate discrimination, and orderly arrangement” (Landsborough 77). Patience and 
perseverance must accompany the new naturalist in using the microscope, as a new observer gradually 
learns to distinguish what he or she sees through the eye-piece. Yet if “all seems confusion to the 
inexperienced eye” that gazes at the “life” in a water drop, Agnes Catlow suggests that observers who 
persist will quickly learn to distinguish species one by one, until “each drop at last produces so many old 
friends, that we have leisure to watch their movements, and be amused with their varied habits of life” 
(182). Catlow’s prose suggests not just the progress of an individual’s scientific knowledge, but the 
familiarity of intimates and neighbors. This training, then, ushers the budding microscopist into a 
community that includes other microscopists and, on some level, the familiar creatures they all study. 
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state of loose moorings… not believing (but simple acquiescing, and that in a provisional 
way) in any fact which is not clear in the light of its own evidence” until they have a 
chance to see or test it themselves (Sea-Side 100-101). “So long as we unsuspectingly 
accept what is repeated in books… so long as we have eyes but observe not” the field 
will falter (Lewes Sea-Side 154). Observation itself becomes a kind of experimental test 
of what others have seen and reported. “From the illumination of many minds on many 
points,” Lewes writes proverbially, “Truth must finally emerge” (Animal 41). 
As entrancing as these vivid texts can be, therefore, they are meant to usher the 
reader out of their pages and into personal study – which will potentially make the reader 
useful to the wider community. Repeatedly these writers suggest that even the most vivid 
description or beautifully detailed illustration fails to convey the full wonder of a 
specimen seen in person. They claim that their works offer only an introduction to the 
world of wonders that is microscopy and natural history. They echo one another’s calls 
for the new observations of dedicated (even amateur) researchers. Some even appear to 
welcome correspondence from readers who can confirm or contradict an author’s 
inductive conclusions. W. H. Harvey writes that “the humblest worker in the field, if 
careful to see with his own eyes, and record faithfully what he sees, can materially assist 
the labours of the author” in perfecting his series of natural history monographs (17). 
Meanwhile Quekett asserts (of himself) that “he will always be glad to receive from 
fellow-labourers any hints bearing on matters relating to the Microscope, and ready to 
acknowledge the source from whence such information may have derived” (ix). 
Thus these texts open tension between the universal and the particular, one 
balancing the agreed standards of disciplined study and practiced observation, and the 
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mandate of the individual researcher who puts what he has read to the test. When J. G. 
Wood writes that “No two practical microscopists ever set about their work in the same 
manner… and each will arrive at most valuable results, though by different and 
sometimes opposite roads” he may be mostly reassuring his intended audience that they 
too can participate in microscopy even without the full range of expensive equipment (4-
5). Yet beyond the morally improving benefits of science to lower class readers, the 
repeated attempts of such microscopy texts to engage a wide audience suggests a genuine 
interest in sparking individual research. Such interest can seem a positive, democratic 
development today, but may more accurately reflect a felt need for multiple observers to 
balance the subjectivity of any single researcher: just as single observations are less 
useful for accurate interpretation than multiple observations under varied conditions, so 
are the observations of single workers less thorough and accurate than the knowledge 
built by observers connected within a community of exchange and correction. 
The Participatory Community of Natural History and Middlemarch 
 The stories that natural history writers offer are the medium of their community, 
meant to share observations and secure virtual witnesses, but also to turn readers into 
members. As Lynn Merrill notes, Victorian natural history writing is inherently 
“participatory” (52). Natural history writers like Lewes, Catlow, W. H. Harvey, and J. G. 
Wood adopt “rhetorical strategies” implicitly intended “to generate wonder in the reader” 
by including readers in the action (Merrill 53). For instance, Lewes frequently speaks in 
first-person plural, so that he seems to act in concert with the reader. “With our net we 
skim the surface” of a pond, he narrates, “and among the mass of leaves and weeds we 
find great varieties of tiny creatures, which we remove with the camel-hair brush, or our 
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fingers, and deposit in the glass jar” (“Only” 585). Gosse uses this technique as well. A 
typical passage begins “If we take one of the stone-boring Mollusca, a Pholas or Saxicava 
for example… and place it in a glass vessel of sea-water, it will not be difficult to detect 
[its] currents… even with the naked eye” (Rambles 64). Elsewhere he writes, “Now, by 
putting this specimen into a glass trough, and placing it under a low power of the 
microscope, we shall see what an exquisite piece of mechanism it is” (Evenings 236). 
“We” even seem sometimes to share a history as well as the present, as Gosse suggests: 
“When we were at the sea-side last summer we bought, you may remember, of a poor 
widow whom we met on the beach, a little basket of dried sea-weeds” (Evenings 71). 
Direct commands are another frequent rhetorical tactic, written as if the writer 
teaches a reader at his side. “Here is a pond with a mantling surface of green promise,” 
writes Lewes; “dip the jar into the water” and “Hold it now up to the light” (Animal 50). 
Then, once specimens have been caught, Lewes writes as if readers peer over his 
shoulder to help identify the discovery: “Give me the camel-hair brush. Gently the dab 
[of color] is removed, and transferred to the phial. Shade of Trembley! it is a Polype” 
(Animal 67-8). Similarly, Gosse instructs his readers, “just take your seat in front of this 
tank, and with a lens before your eye, watch the colony [of barnacles], which is seated on 
that piece of stone, close to the glass side” (Evenings 235). Likewise Charles Kingsley 
exhorts readers who want to see what treasures hide beneath a sea-side boulder. “Now the 
crowbar is well under” the rock, he writes, “heave, and with a will” and “you” will be 
rewarded with the sight of some truly unusual creatures (114). 
 In keeping with the link between vision and curiosity, these exhortations most 
often direct readers to “see” what the text describes in great detail for easier mental 
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visualization. Sometimes such visual imaginative participation includes reference to 
illustrations, but just as often (and within the same texts) writers assume readers willingly 
visualize the wonders they describe. Writers like Lewes and Gosse often address their 
audiences as if the reader is physically by their side, observing, even as their rich 
descriptions implicitly aid the reader who could participate only imaginatively. 
Sometimes these directions acknowledge that the reader must imagine what the writer 
describes, as when Kingsley issues the invitation to “Follow us, then, reader, in 
imagination” down to the shore (61). “And once there,” he continues, “before we look at 
anything else, come down straight to the sea marge; for yonder lies, just left by the 
retiring tide, a mass of life such as you will seldom see again” (Kingsley 61). Then begins 
Kingsley’s descriptions of what he exhorts readers to “see,” to “give a sharp look-out 
for,” to “look” at (63, 89, 122, 128).109  
 Eliot’s famous microscopical metaphor uses this language of the popular natural 
history community. “Even with a microscope… we find ourselves making interpretations 
which turn out to be rather coarse,” she writes, including the reader in the activity of 
interpretation (Middlemarch 55, my emphasis). “We,” reader and writer together, seek to 
understand the activity of the creatures in the water drop, and of the humans in 
Middlemarch. As she continues the metaphor, Eliot uses the language that Lewes, Gosse, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109Similarly, Agnes Catlow begins her text with an instruction that acknowledges the work readers’ 
imaginations must do: “My readers must fancy themselves spirits,” she says, “…and so pass with me 
through a wonderful brazen tunnel” of the microscope to “behold,” “examine,” and “see” the marvelous 
creatures it reveals – through her rich descriptions (x-xvii). More often, naturalist writers simply exhort 
their readers to “see” without any qualifications, or assume that readers can indeed view. Like so many of 
his peers, visual curiosity propels Lewes’ studies and fires the prose he wrote to share his obsession; again 
and again he exhorts readers to “look,” to “examine,” to “see” objects he describes in loving visual detail. 
Of a specimen of infusoria, Lewes writes “Observe how transparent it is, and with what easy, undulating 
grace it swims about…. This is your first sight of that ‘ciliary action’ of which you have so often read” 
(Animal 10). Of a drop of blood on the microscope stage, Gosse writes, “You see an infinite number of 
small roundish bodies, of a clear yellowish colour, floating in a colourless fluid” (Evenings 30). 
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and other natural history writers use when they direct readers to “see” what must 
implicitly be visualized. “[F]or whereas under a weak lens you may seem to see a 
creature exhibiting an active voracity into which other small creatures actively play… a 
stronger lens reveals to you certain tiniest hairlets…” adapts the popular natural history 
writer’s rhetorical strategy of detailed descriptions that facilitate the visualization of what 
the writer directs readers to “see” (Eliot Middlemarch 55). In this passage, Eliot’s 
language becomes explicitly participatory: readers become part of the community of 
observation and interpretation. Though individuals within the community may make 
mistakes – reaching one conclusion with a weak lens, and another with a stronger lens –  
the community nevertheless eventually reaches the truth by advancing shared 
interpretations. 
Eliot adopts this language again in the famous passage when she implicitly asks 
her readers to perform an experiment of their own.  “An eminent philosopher among my 
friends,” she writes, 
who can dignify even your ugly furniture by lifting it into the serene light of 
science, has shown me this pregnant little fact. Your pier-glass or extensive 
surface of polished steel made to be rubbed by a housemaid, will be minutely and 
multitudinously scratched in all directions; but place now against it a lighted 
candle as a centre of illumination, and lo! the scratches will seem to arrange 
themselves in a fine series of concentric circles round that little sun. It is 
demonstrable that the scratches are going everywhere impartially, and it is only 
your candle which produces the flattering illusion of a concentric arrangement, its 
light falling with an exclusive optical selection. These things are a parable. The 
scratches are events, and the candle is the egoism of any person now absent – of 
Miss Vincy, for example. (Middlemarch 248) 
 
Once again her prose addresses the reader directly; she directs reader attention to a visual 
phenomenon that she simultaneously describes in such detail that readers can visualize it. 
Though Eliot commands readerly activity – “your pier-glass,” “your candle,” which 
! 167!
“you” must “place” and observe – her description of the little experiment explains it so 
well that readers seem to “see” its results without physical sight. The reader is part of a 
community that verifies observations by sharing them, and presumably, corrects error 
through reference to multiple viewpoints (unlike Miss Vincy and others “now absent”). 
 In thoroughly describing these observational scenarios, here and in the 
microscopy passage, Eliot also allows her readers enough information to recreate the 
situation themselves should they wish. In this way she borrows another rhetorical strategy 
from popular natural history writers, who facilitate not only visualization but also actual 
replication when they seem to assume that readers can see what is being described. When 
Gosse writes “I have here inclosed a small window-fly in the live-box of the microscope, 
that you may examine the structure of its feet as it presses them against the glass cover,” 
he not only provides a vivid image for mental visualization, but also suggests how a 
reader might go about actually seeing the fly’s feet easily enough (Evenings 132). Gosse 
describes preparations for one session with the microscope thus:  
Here, then, is a hair from my own head. I cut off about half an inch of its length, 
and, laying it between two plates of glass, put it upon the stage of the microscope. 
I now apply a power of 600 diameters; that is, the apparent increase of size is the 
same as if six hundred of these hairs were placed side by side.[…] You see, 
crossing the bright circular field of view, a semi-pellucid object; that is the hair. 
You see also a number of fine lines drawn parallel to each other, exactly like 
those on an ivory rule or scale, with every fifth line longer than the rest, and every 
tenth longer still. This is the micrometer, or scale by which we measure objects; 
and the difference in the length of the lines, you will readily guess, is merely a 
device to facilitate the counting of them. By moving the stage up and down, or to 
either side, we easily get the hair to be exactly in the centre of the field; and now, 
by adjusting the eye-piece we make the scale to lie directly across the hair, at right 
angles with its length…. (Evenings 2-3). 
 
With this heavily detailed visual description, Gosse provides enough information for a 
reader to visualize fairly clearly the actions he describes. As in so many other passages, 
! 168!
the reader serves as a kind of virtual witness of his work. But the description also 
provides a step-by-step guide for the reader who wishes to repeat the observational 
scenario in his or her own living room, from securing the specimen (the hair) to 
measuring it with the microscope. Gosse’s text, like so many other naturalist texts, 
exhorts his readers to make their own study of what he describes; his visual details enable 
readers to follow through. Similarly, Eliot’s readers have enough detail to repeat the 
observational scenarios she describes in a step-by-step process, should they wish. In this 
way Eliot, like the natural history writers whose techniques she adapts, bolsters the sense 
of community with an underlying, implicit sense of honest communication: readers can 
always check her assertions for veracity, by testing her observations against their own. 
 In these passages, Eliot goes a literary step beyond natural history writers; she 
adapts their language of shared observation for metaphorical purposes. In both cases, her 
observation is not (just) about visual phenomena but about how humans interpret each 
other. Like the natural history writers whose rhetoric she adapts, she narrates a concrete 
observational scenario. This scenario incorporates the reader as community member and 
virtual witness, who may repeat the experiment to test it. Then, however, Eliot explains 
how the scenario is “a parable” for human interaction: for “Mrs Cadwallader’s match-
making” or for human “egoism” (Middlemarch 55, 248). The concrete, specific, 
particular details of the observational scenario offer an analogue for something otherwise 
abstract – the effect of personal perspective on interpersonal interpretation. Rather than 
explaining at length how the human tendency to interpret events and other people 
according to personal prejudices, desires, and experience can skew the way we 
understand our lives and other people’s, Eliot lets the concrete analogue of this idea 
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communicate it. Her readers participate in a community that shares understanding of this 
abstract concept through concrete observational experience. The concrete, easy to 
visualize and memorable, conveys her abstract idea with all the force of virtual – and 
perhaps even actual, for the average Victorian – experience. Eliot may be asserting the 
vagaries of perspective, but she is also creating a community of observers who practice 
sharing it. 
Middlemarch as Microcosm 
Eliot’s translation of microscopy into metaphor extends beyond just the 
occasional borrowed language. The novel’s subtitle, “A Study of Provincial Life,” 
suggests that Middlemarch is a self-contained microcosm that can stand in for a wider 
world of human relationships, at least in certain (provincial) conditions.110 In this way 
Eliot’s treatment of Middlemarch mimics the natural history microscopist’s study of the 
miniature worlds the instrument revealed for the first time. In one way, of course, 
microscopes focus and restrict vision. But in another way, especially for Victorian 
viewers who were discovering microscopic vision for the first time, the microscope opens 
up “a new dimension” (Merrill 126). As Merrill writes, “With a microscope or a hand-
lens, one could peer down into an entirely unsuspected realm, a miniature landscape, a 
small but multitudinous universe” (126). Victorian naturalists reacted with wonder and 
astonishment, marveling at the variety and drama of natural life packed into the tiniest of 
spaces. Bustling new panoramas appeared in a water drop, on a piece of moss, in a 
scraping of mildew. Lewes speaks for many when he writes that “the Microscope is not 
the mere extension of a faculty, it is a new sense” (Sea-Side 54). The naturalist’s field of 
vision thus held two views in tension: “the broad view – natural ecology, the landscape as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Peter Stiles’ article entitled “Vivarium” inspired this insight, though he wrote about Adam Bede.  
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a whole, objects within their setting–and the narrow view – anatomical details, 
microscopic focus, the object as isolated” (Merrill 81).111 When microscopic focus also 
opened broad views of infinitesimal objects within microscopic landscapes, the already 
“dual perspective” of the naturalist multiplied further (Merrill 126). 
The idea of the rock pool, aquarium, or even single water drop as microcosmic 
world appears as a familiar conceit among writers popularizing microscopy as a tool for 
the amateur natural historian. As part of an argument for the utility of visual curiosity, the 
conceit served as an example of nature’s multitudinous, mysterious interconnections and 
rich variety, replicated in nested macrocosmic and microcosmic scale. Such writers not 
infrequently describe the life found in these limited watery spheres in terms that make the 
inhabitants seem almost human.  Gosse writes of rock pools, 
What little worlds are these rugged basins! How full of life all unsuspected by the 
rude stone-cutter that daily trudges by them to and from his work in the marble 
quarry of the cliff above!  What arts, and wiles, and stratagems are being practised 
there! What struggles for mastery, for food, for life! what pursuits and flights! 
what pleasant gambols! what conjugal and parental affections! what varied 
enjoyments! what births!  what deaths! are every hour going on in these unruffled 
wells, beneath the brown shadow of the umbrageous oarweed, or over the waving 
slopes of the bright green Ulva, or among the feathery branches of the crimson 
Ceramium! (Evenings 395-6) 
 
This enthusiastic and rather anthropomorphic catalogue of activity reflects Victorian 
fascination with what George Levine has termed “abundance,” the “sense of a newly 
crowded and complicated life” in which nature has filled every niche with countless 
marvelous living beings (Dying 18). The microcosm is merely a more easily studied 
version of the (human) macrocosm in its demonstration of the effects of condition and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111This dialectic also speaks to the ongoing conflict between the methodologies of “field” naturalists, who 
advocated outdoors observation, and “closet” naturalists who primarily worked indoors with stuffed 
specimens and bones. The popular natural history writers I study here tend to be field naturalists who also 
use microscopes indoors to examine specimens they have found and observed outside. 
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environment, and the “intricate and often subtle patterns of inheritance, cousinship, 
mutual dependence” that relate living things one to another (Levine Dying 18). 
This fascination with wonderful life crammed into the tiniest of spaces extends in 
popular writing to the microscopic creatures in a water drop.  In an 1859 article for 
Blackwood’s Magazine, Lewes wrote, 
“A drop of water.” If I remember rightly, some ingenious writer has made a book 
with that title…. The drop of water is a microcosm—the world in miniature.  
Manifold are the creatures swimming, crawling, feeding, and fighting in it.  
(“Only” 595) 
 
Lewes here repeats the trope of multitudinous and varied activity in even the tiniest 
microcosm. Though his prose suggests he has not read the book in question, he may be 
referring to a work entitled Drops of Water; their Marvelous and Beautiful Inhabitants 
Displayed by the Microscope. Published first in 1851, it was written by Agnes Catlow, 
whose works on botany Eliot mentions having read in her journals.112 In the introduction 
to the work, Catlow asks her reader to accompany her on an imaginative journey through 
the tube of the microscope, into the world of the water drop (x-xi). Four of the following 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112Interestingly, Lewes uses the same Rymer Jones quotation in his article that Catlow uses in her book. 
Lewes writes, “’Take any drop of water from the stagnant pools around us,’ says Professor Rymer Jones, 
‘from our rivers, from our lakes, or from the vast ocean itself, and place it under your microscope; you will 
find therein countless living beings moving in all directions with considerable swiftness, apparently gifted 
with sagacity, for they readily elude each other in the active dance they keep up; and since they never come 
into rude contact, obviously exercise volition and sensation in guiding their movements. Increase the power 
of your glasses, and you will soon perceive, inhabiting the same drop, other animals, compared to which 
the former were elephantine in their dimensions, equally vivacious and equally gifted. Exhaust the art of 
the optician, strain your eyes to the utmost till the aching sense refuses to perceive the little quivering 
movement that indicates the presence of life, and you will find that you have not exhausted Nature in the 
descending scale. Perfect as our optical instruments now are, we need not be long in convincing ourselves 
that there are animals around us so small that in all probability human perseverance will fail in enabling us 
accurately to detect their forms, much less fully to understand their organisation’” (595). Catlow’s use of 
the same quotation appears on pages 5-7 of her book. 
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chapters are each devoted to the examination of a different “drop of water,” in which 
microscopic specimens of a different class or family appear.113  
Four illustrated plates appear in Catlow’s text, one each for each “drop of water” 
that she examines. These drops illustrate not only the classes of infusoria on which 
Catlow focuses, but also a typical tension in natural history writing between the 
individual and the community, the particular and the universal. In each, the specimens 
from that chapter appear in a circular arrangement as if the reader gazes at that drop. 
Though they all belong to the same family or class, and clear ties appear in repeated 
structures, representatives of each species often appear so unique that the effect retains 
some sense of miscellany. For example, Drop IV (Figure 12) displays 15 numbered 
species that Catlow says belong to the class Rotatoria (55).114 Cilia appearing on or near 
the mouth apertures of nearly every species suggests their relation, and several groups of 
species share somewhat similar forms–those labeled 9 and 3, for instance, and 13 and 15. 
But the overall impression is of exotic variety. With the exception of the two examples of 
“Mastigocerea carinata” (labeled 9), each infusorium is both an absolute individual 
within the context of the water drop, and also a representative of its kind.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113Catlow remarks early in the text that microscopic creatures would be highly unlikely to segregate 
themselves this way. But she adopts the plan as easier to follow for the inexperienced reader, for as she 
writes at the end of the book, 
When a drop of water, tolerably full of life, is placed under the microscope, all seems confusion to 
the inexperienced eye, the varied forms and rapid movements cause bewilderment… but after 
some use of the glass this feeling subsides, and some one specimen attracts the attention, its shape 
is remembered, reference is made to the illustrations, and there some species similar in form will 
probably be traced; then, by referring to the description, the name of the genus or species may be 
found, with its characteristics and habits…. [T]hus the confusion is soon lessened, and each drop 
at last produces so many old friends, that we have leisure to watch their movements, and be 
amused with their varied habits of life, and extraordinary modes of obtaining food. (182-3) 
Though it may be easier to begin with the study of microscopic organisms segregated by type, Catlow’s 
book suggests, practice will produce confidence amid such variety. Confidence then leads to such 
familiarity that the strange and wonderful inhabitants of a water drop will become “old friends.”   !
114The Rotifer vulgaris appears at 11. 
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Middlemarch the town repeats both these rhetorical strategies, as it is 
simultaneously an enclosed space and also representative of wider humanity. Like the 
marine inhabitants of a rock pool washed daily by the waves, which bring its limited 
sphere into contact with the wider sea, Middlemarch is both a self-contained world, a 
microcosm of human nature, and also a tiny provincial pool connected in myriad ways 
with the wider world. As if echoing Gosse’s description of the rock pool, Elot writes of 
“Old provincial society” that it 
had not only its striking downfalls… but also those less marked vicissitudes 
which are constantly shifting the boundaries of social intercourse, and begetting 
new consciousness of interdependence. Some slipped a little downward, some got 
higher footing: people denied aspirates, gained wealth, and fastidious gentlemen 
stood for boroughs; some were caught in political currents, some in ecclesiastical, 
and perhaps found themselves surprisingly grouped in consequence; while a few 
personages or families that stood with rocky firmness amid all this fluctuation, 
were slowly presenting new aspects in spite of solidity, and altering with the 
double change of self and beholder. Municipal town and rural parish gradually 
made fresh threads of connexion…. Settlers, too, came from distant counties, 
some with an alarming novelty of skill, others with an offensive advantage in 
cunning…. (Middlemarch 88)! 
 
Like the inhabitants of the pools, with their “struggles for mastery,” their “pursuits and 
flights,” their “pleasant gambols” and “affections,” their “arts, and wiles, and stratagems” 
(Gosse Evenings 395-6), the inhabitants of Middlemarch slip and climb, gain and lose, 
compete and fall in love with a fluidity that suggests a watery medium. Social and 
cultural “currents” carry some inhabitants along, while other Middlemarch dwellers stand 
firm, their feet metaphorically planted. Newcomers like Lydgate and banker Nicholas 
Bulstrode add their arts, wiles, and stratagems to the competition for supremacy. Like the 
denizens of a rock pool, Middlemarchers mix together in a microcosm of human society 
that replicates the microcosms of popular natural history texts. 
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Accordingly, many of the novel’s inhabitants are both undeniably remarkable 
individuals, and also somehow representative of a type or kind (Henry 193-206). From its 
opening pages the novel 
encourages readers to compare 
Dorothea Brooke to Saint Theresa. 
“[C]ertainly not the last of her kind,” Saint Theresa is repeated in Miss Brooke, who is 
kept from fine action and wider fame only because she finds “no epic life wherein there 
was a constant unfolding of far-resonate action” (Eliot Middlemarch 3). Similarly, 
Tertius Lydgate compares his ambition to make great medical discoveries despite the 
opposition of smaller-minded people to Vesalius’s similar aspirations. Born with 
Vesalius’ passion and drive, Lydgate nevertheless allows himself to be distracted by 
small cares and meets a different fate. Meanwhile, the vicar, Mr. Farebrother, is a gentle 
but precise, incisive observer and natural historian, like country parson Gilbert White; his 
“original, simple, clear” speech marks him as like both White and also (as Lydgate points 
out) rural-born Reformation preacher Hugh Latimer (Eliot Middlemarch 465). Other 
characters have less-developed but nevertheless recognizable typologies: Sir James 
Chettam is the fine country squire, a “blooming Englishman of the red-whiskered type” 
(Eliot Middlemarch 15); artist Will Ladislaw is sometimes Orpheus and sometimes 
Apollo shaking light from his curly hair (Eliot Middlemarch 475, 209; Beer 164-166); 
Mrs. Vincy is “like a Niobe” who boasts of her children and then is chastened (Eliot 
Middlemarch 151); Edward Casaubon is scholar Isaac Casaubon without the spark of 
genius (Henry 193-196). Like the population of one of Catlow’s water drops, these 
characters are undeniably distinct and memorably individual, yet they also represent 
Figure'12:'Drop&IV.!1851.!Drops&of&Water;&their&Marvellous&and&
Beautiful&Inhabitants&Displayed&by&the&Microscope,!!by!Agnes!Catlow.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
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recurrent types. Eliot seems to suggest that insight into their personalities can derive from 
attention to both their particularity and their participation in a wider typology. 
If water is the medium through which Catlow’s (and Lewes’, and Gosse’s, and so 
many other natural history writers’) creatures interact, then stories are the medium for 
Eliot’s characters in Middlemarch. Stories about others in the form of gossip connect 
various members of the community. Gossip narratives arise in a kind of group inductive 
process, in which various facts and impressions are discussed until consensus is built 
(Shuttleworth 147-8, 152). As Eliot writes of Lydgate, while he is still “virtually 
unknown–known merely as a cluster of signs for his neighbours’ false suppositions” he is 
already being “puffed and belauded, envied, ridiculed, counted upon as a tool and fallen 
in love with” (Middlemarch 132-133). She writes of the irrepressible Mrs Cadwallader, 
“both the farmers and the labourers in the parishes of Freshitt and Tipton would have felt 
a sad lack of conversation but for the stories about what Mrs Cadwallader said and did” 
(Eliot Middlemarch 48). Narratives persist, as demonstrated by the fact that decades later 
Middlemarch still believes Rosamond’s father “Mr Vincy had descended a little” in 
marriage to an “innkeeper’s daughter” while her aunt “had made a wealthy match” with 
Mr. Bulstrode, “who, however, as a man not born in the town… was considered to have 
done well in uniting himself with a real Middlemarch family” (Eliot Middlemarch 89).  
Because these stories form the medium of knowledge through which characters 
move, the quality of decisions often depends upon how accurately these stories capture 
the truth of those involved.115 Eliot often lets readers listen in on the stories characters tell 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115For instance, how accurate are group observations produced via gossip? That individual and community 
opinions are often wrong is one of Shuttleworth’s apt points. That accuracy takes intentional practice in 
perspective sharing and awareness of one’s own subjectivity is, I think, Eliot’s – and it derives in part from 
natural history participatory writing. 
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about themselves and others. Dorothea and Casaubon, Lydgate and Rosamond all make 
poor matches because they project their own wishes onto a prospective mate. So 
Dorothea takes Casaubon’s cultivated scholarly appearance and manner at (literally) face 
value, and discovers in Casaubon what she seeks: shortly after meeting she has already 
“looked deep into the ungauged reservoir of Mr Casaubon’s mind, seeing reflected there 
in vague labyrinthine extension every quality she herself brought” (Eliot Middlemarch 
22). Throughout their brief courtship, “Dorothea’s faith supplied all that Mr Casaubon’s 
words seemed to leave unsaid,” while Casaubon believes he sees in Dorothea “an ardent 
submissive affection” (Eliot Middlemarch 46, 58). The dry scholar attempts to “abandon 
himself to the stream of feeling,” and when he meets predictably shallow results, looks 
for “some deficiency in Dorothea” or “the exaggerations of human tradition” to explain 
it, unaware of his own failings (Eliot Middlemarch 58).116  
Not dissimilarly, before Rosamond Vincy has even met Lydgate, the much-
discussed newcomer to Middlemarch, she has already “woven a little future” for their 
possible romance (Eliot Middlemarch 109). Rosamond does not suspect even that she 
should try to consider Lydgate’s perspective, for in her “romance it was not necessary to 
imagine much about the inward life of a hero” as long as he is “sufficiently handsome,” 
wealthy, and well-connected (Eliot Middlemarch 156). Lydgate, for his side, believes that 
Rosamond’s appearance is all the evidence he needs to know that she has “just the kind 
of intelligence one would desire in a woman – polished, refined, docile, lending itself to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
116That characters mistake “external form” for inner reality in this way is exactly Shuttleworth’s argument 
(146). Though I agree with Shuttleworth here, and want to make clear that her perceptive analysis has 
guided my own, I think she loses important nuance in associating awareness of conditional perspective only 
with experimental science, which she opposes to natural history practices on this point. Instead, I argue, 
Eliot borrows natural history’s emphasis on visual study under varying conditions and perspectives 
precisely as a metaphor for perspective shift.  
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finish in all the delicacies of life” and formed perfectly for wifely helpmate (Eliot 
Middlemarch 153).  “Poor Lydgate! or shall I say, Poor Rosamond!” Eliot exclaims; 
“Each lived in a [mental] world of which the other knew nothing” (Middlemarch 155). 
Miscommunication based on invented stories extends beyond the realm of 
romance. Fred Vincy has “expectations” from old Peter Featherstone’s will – 
expectations in which Featherstone enjoys encouraging and disheartening the young man 
by turns. Yet Fred, who “fancied that he saw to the bottom of his uncle Featherstone’s 
soul, though in reality half what he saw there was no more than the reflex of his own 
inclinations,” remains unable to apply himself as long as he counts on the inheritance 
narrative he and his parents have 
spun from small signs and hope 
(Eliot Middlemarch 111). This 
narrative risks disaster for Fred, 
who as it turns out would have inherited much less than the whole estate under the earlier 
will, and receives nothing by the will that stands. “The difficult task of knowing another 
soul is not for young gentlemen” – 
or perhaps for anyone, Eliot 
suggests – “ whose consciousness 
is chiefly made up of their own wishes” (Middlemarch 111). 
 
Microscopists Must Account for Conditions 
If Middlemarch is a microcosm of human life, Eliot’s adaptation of microscopical 
natural history skills in her “study” of it extends beyond metaphorical passages to inform 
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some of her novel’s basic premises. Like the creatures readers meet in natural history 
texts, her characters are both individuals, and also the product of their environment. To 
understand them is necessarily to consider both aspects, and to practice metaphorical 
perspective shifts much like the literal ones that the study of natural history requires. 
For example, popular works of Victorian natural history commonly included two 
sorts of illustrations, often within the same text: one style in which objects are presented 
isolated against a neutral background, and a second style in which they appear situated 
together within their natural environment, as part of a community. In this way, illustration 
conventions seem to replicate the natural history dialectic between the broad and the 
narrow view of animals under study. Oftentimes the same kind of organism appears in 
two illustrations, once in an isolated form, and once as a living member of a flourishing 
community. Thus several examples of “Echinus Miliaris” appear in Kingsley’s Plate 7 
(Figure 13) in a natural environment, and again in several forms in Plate 8 (Figure 14), 
where the reader is directed to “See Plate 7” for more information. Similarly, an anemone 
labeled “Caryophyllea Smithii” appears in several isolated forms in plate 5 (Figure 15) 
and again in Plate 6 (Figure 16) in a marine environment with other anemone. The reader 
encounters the same organism isolated and displayed in several of its characteristic 
aspects in one plate, and as it presumably might be found in the field in another plate. 
The illustrations suggest that both sorts of view are necessary for understanding. 
Not dissimilarly, Eliot’s novel reproduces what Lydgate calls the “systole and 
diastole” of intellectual “inquiry,” 
“continually expanding and shrinking 
between the whole human horizon and 
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the horizon of an object-glass” (Eliot Middlemarch 602, Shuttleworth 149). We often see 
main characters through the wide lens of local opinion, which can seem monolithic in a 
place where “sane people did what their neighbours did, so that if any lunatics were at 
large, one might know and avoid them”! (Eliot Middlemarch 9, Shuttleworth 152). Thus 
when readers meet Dorothea, we learn that “she was usually spoken of as being 
remarkably clever” though “Celia had more common-sense” (Eliot Middlemarch 7).117 
Meanwhile their uncle, Mr. Brooke, “was held in this part of the county to have 
contracted a too rambling habit of mind” (Eliot Middlemarch 8). Rosamond Vincy is 
introduced as “admitted to be the flower of Mrs Lemon’s school, the chief school in the 
county, where the teaching included all that was demanded in the accomplished female” 
(Eliot Middlemarch 89). About Lydgate the newcomer, “There was a general 
impression… that [he] was not altogether a common country doctor,” so “great things 
[are] expected from him” (Eliot Middlemarch 133).  
Yet readers also know the private thoughts of various individuals at certain times, 
particularly when these diverge 
from public thought. Her constant 
alteration through perspectives, 
from various individuals to the “county” or community “view,” has the effect of alerting 
the reader that it is possible to perceive the same events, or the same character, in widely 
different ways (Shuttleworth 149, 152). For instance, on introducing Lydgate Eliot 
diverges from her narrative to provide a chapter-long review of Lydgate’s past and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117County opinion is disposed to privilege Celia, for “perhaps no persons then living – certainly none in the 
neighbourhood of Tipton – would have had a sympathetic understanding for the dreams of a girl whose 
notions about marriage took their colour entirely from an exalted enthusiasm about the ends of life” and not 
from the trappings of trousseau and household goods (Eliot Middlemarch 26). 
Figure'16:!G.!B.!Sowerby,!Anemone!in!natural!environment,!plate!6.!1859.!Glaucus;&or,&The&Wonders&of&the&Shore,!by!Charles!Kingsley.!
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current psychology. She begins with a restatement of general Middlemarch opinion, and 
then contrasts that with Lydgate’s private aims, which are largely indifferent to 
Middlemarch opinion. At another time, she provides the outlines of local opinion of 
sanctimonious Nicholas Bulstrode – it ranges from prideful satisfaction in his habitual 
deference to rebellious discomfort under his judgment – and then takes the reader inside 
Lydgate’s private thoughts: the doctor “simply formed an unfavorable opinion of the 
banker’s constitution, and concluded that he had an eager inward life with little 
enjoyment of tangible things” (Middlemarch 116-117). Bulstrode himself comes under 
Eliot’s perceptive gaze, which exposes his habit of excusing his own sins where he would 
castigate similar faults in others. Thus when “we” as readers “are concerned with looking 
at Joshua Rigg’s sale of his land from Mr Bulstrode’s point of view” what we learn is 
that, whatever other characters might know or believe, Bulstrode himself interprets it as a 
sign from God in regards to his own business purposes (Middlemarch 489). Similarly, 
readers also often learn what one character privately thinks of another. For example, 
Celia often submits to Dorothea’s opinions, despite her unspoken feeling “that Dorothea 
was inconsistent;” as Eliot notes, “The younger [sister] had always worn a yoke; but is 
there any yoked creature without its private opinions” (Middlemarch 14). 
Often these shifts from one character’s mind to another happen subtly, but Eliot 
several times calls attention to her perspective change. One remarkable moment makes 
the shift a matter for philosophy. “One morning some weeks after her arrival at Lowick, 
Dorothea—“ Eliot begins, before halting suddenly over the dash: “but why always 
Dorothea? Was her point of view the only possible one with regard to this marriage? I 
protest against all our interest, all our effort being given to the young skins that look 
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blooming in spite of trouble,” for the ugly and the old have their own richly developed 
points of view as well (Middlemarch 261). The following paragraphs convey Casaubon’s 
thoughts on his marriage, reminding readers that at least two people have intimate private 
perspectives on the same relationship – a fact that Casaubon himself finds troubling, 
given his concerns over Dorothea’s private opinion of his life’s work at this stage. 
On the widest level, Eliot repeatedly draws proverbial conclusions from her 
narrow subject. Lydgate’s private thoughts lead her to such a pronouncement: “Our 
vanities differ as our noses do: all conceit is not the same conceit, but varies in 
correspondence with the minutiae of mental make in which one of us differs from 
another” (Middlemarch 140). The trouble emerging in Casaubon’s union with Dorothea 
produces a wry comment on cultural prejudice: “Society never made the preposterous 
demand that a man should think as much about his own qualifications for making a 
charming girl happy as he thinks of hers for making himself happy. As if a man could 
choose not only his wife but his wife’s husband!” (Eliot Middlemarch 262). At another 
moment, Eliot remarks “how little we know what would make paradise for our 
neighbours! We judge from our own desires….” (Middlemarch 488). This habit of 
philosophizing in plural, using Middlemarch activity as grounds for broad claims about 
humanity, is as much a part of Eliot’s narrator’s voice as her microscopical metaphors. 
In the context of natural history, good microscopical practice involves a similarly 
oscillating attention to individual particularity and situatedness, and to the effect of 
condition and circumstance. As Gosse writes, “the inexperienced microscopist” 
especially must remember “not to decide too hastily on the character of a surface or a 
structure, from one aspect merely. So many are the chances of illusion, that the student 
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should always seek to view his subject in different aspects, and under varying conditions 
of light, position, &c” (Evenings 340). Quekett offers similar instruction that “every new 
subject should be viewed under all the various conditions” that his guide describes (186). 
Clearly one reason these texts devote so many pages to the ideal environment for 
microscopical study, as well as lighting apparatus and lens power, is that any alteration in 
condition can produce altered vision and interpretation. Yet these writers figure attention 
to condition as positive, useful training for eye and mind. Lewes writes, “The one reason 
why, of all sciences, Biology is pre-eminent as a means of culture is, that owing to the 
great complexity of all the cases it investigates, it familiarizes the mind with the necessity 
of attending to all the conditions, and thus it keeps the mind alert” (Animal 95-96). 
Attention to context in “Biology” alerts the mind to awareness of condition more 
generally – a necessary quality for cultured thoughtfulness within a Victorian empiricism 
positing that experience and environment construct even the human self. 
For these writers, differences in perception due to differing conditions are not 
merely irritations to be controlled, even though they may undergird an unwary observer’s 
interpretive mistakes. Instead, the varied vision that varied conditions produce offers one 
important source of knowledge.118 Repeatedly, introductory microscopy guides instruct 
readers to begin with low lens powers and work gradually towards higher powers. “As a 
general rule,” writes Quekett, “it is best to use the low powers first, as a good light and 
greater clearness of definition, together with a large field of view, will be obtained; the 
higher powers may be employed when the observer has a good general ideal of the 
arrangement of the several parts” (182). The observer might even begin with a “pocket-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 Thus the “many levels of analysis of Middlemarch life” that Shuttleworth notes Eliot presents do not 
derive strictly from “the controlling experimental conception” that depends on conceiving of the narrator as 
a scientist but inhered also in good naturalist practice (161). 
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lens” instead of a microscope to begin work (J. Wood 8). Similarly, the observer should 
ideally look at new specimens under varied lighting conditions, using various implements 
to change the strength and angle of light and taking advantage of different times of day. 
As Jabez Hogg advices, “any new or unknown specimen… should be viewed in turns by 
every description of light direct and oblique, as a transparent object and as an opaque 
object, with strong and with faint light, with large angular pencils [of light] thrown in all 
possible directions” (55). The more that various conditions alter perception, the more the 
observer learns: “Every change will probably develop some new fact in reference to the 
structure of the object” (Hogg 55). 
 The texts imply that varied conditions can catch the inexperienced observer 
unawares, resulting in interpretations that are more subjective than truthful. But at the 
same time, awareness of condition allows the microscopist not just to control for 
condition but to manipulate it and produce more thorough, accurate interpretations. In 
Evenings at the Microscope, Gosse leads his readers through a virtual observation that 
utilizes this control, in which his words simultaneously instruct readers in what to 
imagine and what to do to reproduce the observation. Gosse begins with the narration of 
his specimen preparation, as if the reader watches at his elbow.119 Then he writes, “First, 
let us use a low power – one hundred diameters or so – in order to take a general glance 
at what we have got.  Here is an array of life indeed!” (Evenings 457). A vivid 
description of the community that appears in the live-box, and to the reader’s 
imagination, follows. It includes “clear crystal globules,” “tiny points… like nimble 
fleas,” “long forms… twisting,” “busy little creatures,” and an array of other microscopic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119“I take up with the tip of a fine tube, or pipette, a minute quantity of water” from the bottom of a phial of 
pond water, he writes, and “[t]his drop I discharge upon the glass of the live-box,” which is a glass box that 
holds living specimens on the microscope stage (Evenings 457). 
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entities forming “maelstroms in miniature, and tempests in far less than a teapot” 
(Evenings 458). 
Then Gosse selects one from among the rich “material for our study,” now of the 
individual in isolation, and continues, “Let me put on a higher power, and submit it to 
your observation” (Evenings 458). The next sentence directly instructs his reader what to 
visualize: “You see a flat area of clear jelly, of very irregular form, with sinuosities and 
jutting points, like the outline of some island in a map” (Evenings 458). The description 
continues, providing a much greater degree of detail than in his previous notice of the 
creature. Gosse also begins to take time into account. The specimen is an Amoeba 
diffluens, and as the reader “watches” it changes form – “it is not at two successive 
moments of exactly the same shape” (Gosse Evenings 459). As moments pass Gosse 
narrates this changing shape in some detail. Though others’ instructions suggest a greater 
variety of condition, Gosse’s pages demonstrate the basic utility of manipulating 
microscope and environment to see differently. Attention to condition allows the observer 
to better understand the object of study.120 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120In fact, Lewes adapts this practice from microscopy to the perception of humans in their environment 
that is worth quoting at length: 
At some distance from the Alps we discern their masses of purple grandeur, but that is all we 
discern; on approaching nearer, these purple masses assume shapes more and more definite, 
although their varied architecture is still hidden from us: we see none of their ravines and valleys; 
a little nearer, and we detect these, but discern none of the chalets nestled in the valley, or 
scattered over the mountain-sides; nearer still, we see the habitations, and the cattle, and the men; 
yet nearer, and we discriminate individualities; but we have still to advance, and patiently watch, 
before the tragedies and comedies acted in these scenes can become intelligible to us.  Thus with 
each step we have changed our conceptions of the Alps.  Thus with each step do we change our 
conceptions of Nature.  We all begin, where most of us end, with seeing things removed from 
us—kept distant by ignorance and the still more obscuring screen of familiarity.  We then learn to 
observe something besides these broad general outlines which constitute the scenery of our 
existence, and learn to admire the magnificence of Nature.  The observation of one detail is a step 
to the recognition of many.  In this stage we resemble the traveller who has discovered the Alps to 
have valleys and habitations.  If the Microscope be now placed in our hands, it brings us into the 
very homes and haunts of Life; and finally, the high creative combining faculty, moving amid 
these novel observations, reveals something of the great drama which is incessantly enacted in 
every drop of water, on every inch of earth.  Then, and only then, do we realise the mighty 
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For Eliot to narrate the life in the Middlemarch water drop, then, requires her 
attention – and ours – to condition as it accounts for character. Mr. Farebrother speaks 
like a Victorian empiricist when he reminds Dorothea that “character is not cut in marble 
– it is not something solid and unalterable. It is something living and changing” and can 
change with the condition (Eliot Middlemarch 692). If types – of Saint Theresas, 
Vesaliuses, Casaubons, Whites of Selborne – appear repeatedly in human history, much 
depends upon their circumstances, as Eliot also makes clear from the opening words of 
her novel. Saint Theresa “found her epos in the reform of a religious order” but without a 
“coherent social faith and order” offering material and métier, her later sisters find “ no 
epic life” (Eliot Middlemarch 3). So Dorothea finds herself in a community largely 
unresponsive to the deeper desires of her nature. One consistent theme of her struggle is 
her search for proper outlets in an environment often uncongenial, whether because it 
needs no improvement (e.g. Lowick), because proprieties and family members stand in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
complexity, the infinite splendour of Nature; then, and only then, do we feel how full of Life, 
varied, intricate, marvellous, world within world, yet nowhere without space to move, is this 
single planet, on the crust of which we stand, and look out into shoreless space, peopled by 
myriads of other planets, larger, if not more wonderful, than ours. (Sea-Side 54-55) 
Lewes presents the visual approach to the Alps as a gradual process of discernment, which begins with the 
perception of mere “masses” and ends in patient watching of “the tragedies and comedies” of human life on 
the mountains. At each degree of approach, something new and useful to interpretation of the whole 
appears, but it is not until individuals are fully visible, and the observer can watch them over time within 
the context of their community and environment, that the life of these inhabitants is fully “intelligible.” 
Like Gosse’s readers taking time to watch an amoeba, Lewes incorporates time to watch interaction 
between human inhabitants, their fellows, and the natural environment. Lewes then turns this into a 
statement about human powers of observation: we begin in incomprehension, the twin obstructions of 
ignorance and over-familiarity preventing us from seeing clearly even what is closest except in “general 
outline.” To learn to see one detail in “Nature” is to make a beginning from which skill in observation 
gradually improves; the microscope then opens the “homes and haunts of Life” and displays the inhabitants 
whose activity together forms “the great drama which is incessantly enacted” even in “every drop of 
water.” To observe this drama, unfolding over time in the tiniest of spaces, is then to feel the full 
significance of not only this microcosm but also the “world within world” that ultimately forms the whole 
populous planet whirling through “shoreless space” “peopled” perhaps with even more life. It is to learn to 
attend to the individual and the community, the personal and the environmental. It is to begin to suspect the 
splendid mystery of contexts within contexts that expand indefinitely, and yet affect the life of the most 
infinitesimal creatures in mutually causative fashion. Though Lewes uses the image of an observer 
watching humans within their community and physical environment to explicate the study of a 
microscopist who examines “the great drama” of a water drop, his metaphor reversed could serve as a 
model for Eliot’s Middlemarch. 
! 186!
her way (e.g. Sir James, “county” opinions about women’s work), or because intended 
recipients are unreceptive (e.g. Casaubon). She finally immerses herself in Ladislaw’s 
public work instead of her own, and her “full nature… spent itself in channels which had 
no great name on the earth” (Eliot Middlemarch 785).  
Similarly, while he has just fortune and freedom enough for independence and 
self-motivated work, Lydgate dreams of making his name and great discoveries in 
medicine. Even while “the man was still in the making,” the mixed character traits, the 
“virtues and faults capable of shrinking or expanding” that lead to his eventual failure to 
follow through on his dreams are present: he is prideful, he is sensitive, he has “spots of 
commonness” that prevent him from turning his scientific precision into a Lewesian 
alertness about social relations (Eliot Middlemarch 140-1). While he has money enough 
for independence, Lydgate’s pride merely makes him seem aloof to his neighbors; his 
sensitivity and intellectual discernment enables his practice insofar as he is interested 
even in patients who cannot pay; even his emotional impulsiveness and marriage with 
Rosamond might not have destroyed his hopes had he maintained her in furniture and 
dress. Careless of money, his lack of it begins to make Lydgate aware that his success 
may depend as much on condition as on desire: a “petty degrading care” like want of 
money “casts the blight of irony over all higher effort” (Eliot Middlemarch 551). Pride 
keeps him from accepting help until it is too late; sensitivity keeps him despairingly 
careful of “Rosy.” Finally mastered by debt and wife, Lydgate turns to a more financially 
successful career that feels like failure. Would-be Vesalius, entangled in small cares, 
becomes a conventional  “watering-place” doctor to the well-to-do.  
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Condition shapes the lives of supporting figures too, so that Farebrother must 
maintain himself “not altogether in the right vocation” (Eliot Middlemarch 162) and Fred 
Vincy narrowly escapes a misfitted life as clergyman partly through a happenstance 
encounter with Caleb Garth (Eliot Middlemarch 561). “It always remains true that if we 
had been greater, circumstance would have been less strong against us,” Eliot writes, and 
yet individual characters and the fates they meet are never separable from their 
community and condition (Middlemarch 551). Character and biography are shaped in the 
continual interaction of type and environment, personal qualities and local conditions. 
 Condition as it affects perceptual possibilities also accounts for how well 
characters understand each other. I have followed Shuttleworth’s argument that 
Rosamond Vincy, Lydgate, Casaubon, Fred, and Dorothea misunderstand themselves and 
each other when their viewpoint remains restricted to personal desires and/or is unduly 
influenced by unsubtle community gossip (168-9). Dorothea’s evolution beyond these 
depends in part on her determination to seek “the fullest truth, the least partial good” 
(Eliot Middlemarch 190). This evolution, which finally produces Dorothea’s most 
selfless act of the novel, shows Eliot again using physical vision metaphorically to 
represent perspective shift. Eliot has characterized the “country gentry,” to whom 
Dorothea belongs, metaphorically as “dotted apart on their stations up the mountain” 
from which “they looked down with imperfect discrimination on the belts of thicker life 
below” (Middlemarch 306). Dorothea has never been “at ease in the perspective and 
chillness of that height” (Middlemarch 306). When she finally rises from the “narrow cell 
of her calamity” on the morning after her worst crisis, her gaze through an upper window 
of her lonely house literalizes this earlier comparison with a crucial difference (Eliot 
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Middlemarch 740). Where metaphorical distance once stood for “imperfect” sight, now 
literal distance facilitates Dorothea’s wider vision of herself within a living community: 
She opened her curtains, and looked out towards the bit of road that lay in view, 
with fields beyond…. On the road there was a man with a bundle on his back and 
a woman carrying her baby; in the field she could see figures moving – perhaps 
the shepherd with his dog. Far off in the bending sky was the pearly light; and she 
felt the largeness of the world and the manifold wakings of men to labour and 
endurance. She was part of that involuntary, palpitating life, and could neither 
look out on it from her luxurious shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her eyes in 
selfish complaining. (Eliot Middlemarch 741) 
 
Though Eliot has shown us Dorothea’s gaze through this window many times by these 
closing chapters, this is the first view that incorporates human life and its effects in the 
forms of a family, human occupations, fields, a road.121 It is as though she now sees the 
view through the proper lens. As a result, Dorothea now feels instead of merely desires a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121By the night of her final crisis, Dorothea has spent much time at windows. On her first visit to what will 
become her own boudoir at Lowick Grange, Dorothea “turn[s] to the window to admire the view,” in which 
appears “the avenue of limes” that will eventually become her solace in loneliness (Eliot Middlemarch 70). 
When she returns sadder and wiser from her honeymoon in Rome, the furniture of Dorothea’s room seems 
smaller, colder, and fainter, and the view through her window is similarly snowy and cold: “The distant flat 
shrank in uniform whiteness and low-hanging uniformity of cloud” (Eliot Middlemarch 256). As “[t]he 
duties of her married life, contemplated so great beforehand, seemed to be shrinking with the furniture and 
the white vapour-walled landscape,” so through the window Dorothea sees a “still, white enclosure which 
made her visible world” (Eliot Middlemarch 257). The view through the window is more than an objective 
correlative reflecting Dorothea’s feelings: it seems also to make up part of the environment that actively 
shapes her activity in a living “nightmare in which every object was withering and shrinking away from 
her” (Eliot Middlemarch 258).  
Later, the room and its view take on a more comforting atmosphere, as if they are the physical 
home of her “inward life;” “She had been so used to struggle for and to find resolve in looking along the 
avenue towards the arch of western light that the vision itself had gained a communicating power” (Eliot 
Middlemarch 349). Again the view through the window does not merely reflect, but actively influences 
Dorothea’s inward life, which in turn shapes her outward behavior. At the height of her marital misery, 
however, Dorothea is too preoccupied to look. After the crisis of Casaubon’s health, in which he rejects 
Dorothea’s attempt to offer solace, Eliot writes, 
 She went up to her boudoir. The open bow-window let in the serene glory of the  
afternoon lying on the avenue, where the lime-trees cast long shadows. But Dorothea knew 
nothing of the scene. She threw herself on a chair, not heeding that she was in the dazzling sun-
rays: if there were discomfort in that, how could she tell that it was not part of her inward misery? 
(Middlemarch 399) 
Thwarted in her attempt to show outward care, Dorothea turns inward so profoundly that her awareness is 
contracted into inner misery. The communicating power of the view, and even the light and air through the 
open window, are ignored and absorbed into this nearly pure self-consciousness. Thus when Dorothea rises 
from the “narrow cell of her calamity” on the morning after the night of her crisis, her gaze through the 
window echoes multiple other moments with a difference (Eliot Middlemarch 740).!
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connection with “the manifold wakings of men to labour and endurance.” Though she has 
not lacked for idealistic altruism, her opportunities have been severely constrained until 
this moment in which action seems to require supreme sacrifice. Dorothea now must turn 
her vision of community into action, dependent on this awakening awareness of herself 
situated within a field of social connections, perhaps comprehended from an elevated 
social status but viscerally understood as strongly local ties (Shuttleworth 171). Like a 
naturalist viewing new horizons, her narrow self-focus expands into awareness of her 
own situated condition, which crucially enables selfless action. 
Though Dorothea’s response may be rare, Eliot does not finally despair over the 
possibility of careful perspective sharing. As with thorough microscopical observation, it 
is not innate but acquired, often through hard experience, for “We are all of us born in 
moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves” and must learn 
that others too have “an equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows must 
always fall with a certain difference” (Eliot Middlemarch 198). “Suppose we turn from 
outside estimates of a man,” she writes, “to wonder, with keener interest, what is the 
report of his own consciousness about his doings or capacity” (Middlemarch 78). Like 
the microscopist who directly instructs readers in habits of observation and then leads by 
example, as a novelist Eliot articulates her intentions and illustrates them. As the 
microscopists’ descriptions teach the reader both to visualize in response to the text, and 
to reproduce the process in personal experimentation, so Eliot’s narration helps her reader 
better to understand her characters as individuals, and also seems to invite reproduction in 
that reader’s daily activity. Her stories seem to want to teach readers certain observational 
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practices by asking them to see how much more accurate interpretive stories about others 
can be when they incorporate varied perspectives and attention to condition. 
Conclusion: Visual Curiosity, Visual Wonder 
Victorian natural history writers establish a “community of wonder” among their 
readers: to learn to see precisely is to learn to see reverently, as naturalist writers’ 
emotional tone makes clear. Kingsley advocates as much when he asserts that naturalist 
study improves children by teaching them “to find wonder in every insect, sublimity in 
every hedgerow, the records of past worlds in every pebble, and boundless fertility upon 
the barren shore” (54). Lewes writes that persistent observation brings a “deep, abiding, 
almost awful sense of the mystery and marvel of Nature,” “[t]he crowning glory” of 
which “is the knowledge which ever opens into newer and newer vistas, quickening our 
sense of the vastness and complexity of Life” (Lewes Sea-Side 53).122  
A crucial component of this wonder derives from a growing sense of nature’s 
interconnection, inextricable from practice in sharing perspectives. “Happy, truly, is the 
naturalist,” writes Charles Kingsley; “[for] everywhere he sees significances, harmonies, 
laws, chains of cause and effect endlessly interlinked, which draw him out of the narrow 
sphere of self-interest and self-pleasing, into a pure and wholesome region of solemn joy 
and wonder” (14). Natural history’s emphasis on shifting from the broad to the narrow 
view and back, on accounting for condition and circumstance, on precise observation and 
the attempt to multiply perspectives, helps the naturalist to perceive him- or herself within 
a wider sphere. As Lewes puts it, “We cannot isolate ourselves if we would. The thoughts 
of others, the needs of others, –  these two make up our life; without these we should !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122Later he asserts that “Only ignorance keeps us from perpetual wonderment; as we lift each corner of the 
veil, more and more marvellous are the vistas which reveal themselves” (Sea-Side 236). 
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quickly perish” (Animal 180). By teaching naturalists to regard their own interests within 
a field of competing interests, in which all living beings are connected, natural history 
improves the very ability to see interconnections on which it depends. 
In Eliot’s hands, this interconnection becomes a tangled plot of hidden 
connections, in which old secrets return to connect otherwise disparate fates, and 
surprising effects link characters across social chasms. As she writes, “…anyone 
watching keenly the stealthy convergence of human lots, sees a slow preparation of 
effects from one life on another, which tells like a calculated irony on the indifference or 
the frozen stare with which we look at our unintroduced neighbour” (Middlemarch 88). 
Indifference is nearly always rewarded with pain. On the other hand, social inextricability 
means that one good turn can have an “incalculably diffusive” effect, “for the growing 
good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts” of those who do learn to see 
themselves networked within a wide field (Eliot Middlemarch 785). Eliot’s novel seeks 
to build those connections one at a time, as she teaches readers to see and practice 
perspective shifts in a natural history of human life.
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CHAPTER 5: THE COLLECTION AS  
VISUAL TECHNOLOGY IN RUDYARD KIPLING’S KIM 
 
 
 
In Rudyard Kipling’s captivating vision of India, Kim, the eponymous protagonist 
is the son of a poor Irishwoman and a former color-sergeant of an Irish regiment. Born in 
India and orphaned soon after, when the novel opens Kim lives in the loose care of an 
opium-addicted half-caste woman and flits about Lahore on errands of local intrigue. His 
only link with his British heritage is an amulet containing his birth certificate and his 
father’s Freemason papers; he refuses even to wear European clothes much of the time, 
but prefers to slip through the streets in “Hindu or Mohammedan garb” (Kipling 51). 
Known as “Little Friend of all the World” for his varied connections in the city, Kim is 
intensely curious and puckishly daring – a boy’s ideal hero. Curiosity motivates Kim to 
introduce himself to the lama, a strange figure who appears outside the Lahore Museum 
one day and represents “such a man as Kim, who thought he knew all castes, had never 
seen” (Kipling 52). Curiosity sends Kim along as chela, or disciple, on the lama’s 
pilgrimage in search of a holy river. While on the road, Kim’s heritage and talent draw 
the attention of British officials. Kim is sent to British school – though he escapes during 
holidays to travel with the lama–and becomes an agent of British intelligence in “the 
Great Game” of espionage in India, combining work with play in an adventurous fashion. 
Throughout the novel, Kim’s continued travel with the lama, as disciple and on 
the Empire’s secret commission, offers Kipling the chance to present wide views of 
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India. Much of the novel’s interest lies in exciting the reader’s own Kim-like curiosity 
about this landscape populated with strange figures and stranger events, a place and 
population simultaneously part of Great Britain and yet unmistakably foreign. Along with 
Kim, Kipling clearly delights in his vision of India, and expects his reader to share 
interest. Such a vision, born of Kipling’s own boyhood love for the region, is hard to 
resist. Yet Kipling sees India through eyes so thoroughly imperialist that Kim is as much 
propaganda for the British Empire as it is adventure story, as Edward Said, Sara Suleri, 
and others have noted.123 In fact, scholars suggest even the fantasy of encompassing all 
India in one novel may belong only to the English outsider-possessor, who can imagine it 
in panorama through ignorance of local differences (Cronin 5). How did an author so 
infatuated with India create such an apparently sympathetic vision and yet get it wrong? 
One key to the riddle lies in the Great Game as structuring concept. As a term, 
“the Great Game” refers to the tense struggle for control over the dangerous, uncharted 
territory between British India and Tzarist Russia in the nineteenth century. It took the 
form of varied diplomatic and intelligence-gathering missions, as English military 
officials, amateur researchers, and scientists of various stripes collected information 
about the people, culture, and geography of the region and attempted to influence local 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123Said points out that Kipling presents a “timeless” India, “a place almost as much poetic as it is actual” 
not because India was like this but because Kipling “deliberately saw India that way” (134). Suleri notes 
the sense of novelty the novel reflects is inseparable from the “will to possess” (118-119). Both quote 
Edmund Wilson’s earlier comment that while “the reader tends to expect” that Kim will “realize that he is 
delivering into bondage to the British invaders those whom he has always considered his own people,” 
Kipling avoids this potential conflict entirely (123-4). Said adds that this potential conflict goes 
unmentioned “not because Kipling could not face it, but because for Kipling there was no conflict;” in 
Kipling’s view “it was India’s best destiny to be ruled by England” (Said 146). “In reading Kim today, “ 
writes Said, “we can watch a great artist in a sense blinded by his own insights about India, confusing the 
realities that he saw with such color and ingenuity, with the notion that they were permanent and essential” 
(162). 
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rulers to maintain British allegiance. As a metaphor for espionage, the Great Game 
suggests a serious, secretive, wittily fatalistic approach to exploration.   
In Kipling’s treatment, the term becomes almost literal: the world that Kimball 
O’Hara inhabits is a fantasy game space, where the deadly work of knowledge gathering 
occurs in the context of a boy’s adventure. Curiosity drives both work and play, just as it 
must have for British explorers who slogged through difficulty on the strength of a desire 
to know. Curiosity compels reader interest in the novel’s strange and possibly magical 
events, exotic landscapes, and remarkable people. The Great Game provides rules and 
adversaries, and the reader vicariously adventures with Kim, rejoices in secret expert 
knowledge, and seems to scan all India with intense curiosity that the novel itself evokes.   
Within this game space, the information that Kim learns to catalogue in service to 
the Empire is most often visual: he must learn to recognize and remember people by their 
visual appearance, and to “carry away a picture” of the countryside in his mind (Kipling 
211). His training points to British reliance on visual information about their territories, 
including maps, geographic records, catalogues of people according to visual type, 
drawings of flora and fauna, and descriptions of landscape. The novel reproduces this 
reliance on visual information for the reader; Kipling “shows” India through descriptions 
of visually arresting scenes, catalogues of visually interesting objects, and depictions of 
people via “characteristic” visual appearances. By the end of the novel, this accumulation 
of visual experience facilitates the lama’s holistic vision of all India – and the reader’s. 
Rich in memorable visual imagery, the novel provides a collection of vicarious visual 
experiences that seem to add up to comprehensive knowledge. 
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This chapter will consider the dissertation’s concern with how fiction involves 
readers in other lives, performing cultural work along the way, through analysis of the 
puzzle Kim poses: the novel enthralls and misleads the reader because it connects its 
apparently comprehensive vision of foreign places and people with insight into identity. I 
argue first that the British used the collection (whether of maps, drawings, photographs, 
descriptions, or records of ethnic and cultural “types”) as a kind of cognitive artifact – 
one that enhances thinking via visualizations. Collections of knowledge gathered and 
arranged according to various typologies, in the form of albums, atlases, maps, or 
museums, allowed Britons to organize visual data, study it for patterns, and communicate 
knowledge. Collections as visual technologies thus facilitated not only the British 
government’s accumulating knowledge about its growing empire – which in turn 
informed further imperialist decisions – but also nurtured nationalism in British subjects 
at home and abroad, in current and future administrators, in researchers of various kinds, 
and in citizens who merely read books, bought maps, gazed at albums, and visited 
museums. Britons who participated in this trend participated in imperialism. Curiosity 
stoked interest, which in turn helped to build the imagined community of empire.124   
My chapter will then argue that Kim, with its register shifts into passages 
reminiscent of public record, its rich descriptions of landscapes, its detailed catalogues of 
people according to their visual types, its lists of exotic objects, and its characters’ final, 
apparently all-encompassing visions of India, functions as the novel version of this kind 
of collection. If books containing maps and photographs were one major form that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124Although Benedict Anderson’s seminal work is concerned with emerging nationalism in developing 
nations (often themselves former colonies) rather than with nations establishing overseas possessions, his 
term usefully suggests the possibilities for felt unity among Britons at home and abroad, reading similar 
material and learning to think of themselves as members (and governors) of a far-flung empire. 
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collections took in the century, then Kim is the novel version of such richly visual 
groupings gathered for inspection, study, and the satisfaction of curiosity. Kipling’s own 
history, including his journalism experience and his connection to museum scholarship 
through his father, the curator of the very Lahore Museum where Kim begins, draws this 
thread through Kipling’s biography as well as his writing. Kipling engages his reader in 
much the same position as someone studying a map or an album for recreational interest: 
the satisfaction of curiosity offers both playful pleasure and also work, the accumulation 
of apparently useful knowledge. Yet Kipling’s vision is also undeniably fantasy; the play 
in which the reader engages does the work of empire as much as sympathy. The Great 
Game informs the novel’s content and its structure and form. 
This context of fantasy and game clarifies the central problem of interpreting the 
novel that I have posed – the problem of how such an apparently sympathetic vision 
could be so inaccurate. Kim as fantastic vision highlights fiction’s unexpected dangers. 
We like to share stories, and some scholars argue that reading may offer not only pleasure 
but also pleasurable work in the form of practice in empathy. But it also appears that 
readers’ empathy does not automatically improve morality or sensitivity, and may induce 
nothing more than self-congratulatory complacency or self-satisfied voyeurism. From the 
standpoint of Kipling’s inextricable loves and biases, fiction comes to seem its own 
dangerous great game: one that offers pleasure in the work of mindreading and 
knowledge-gathering, but that also hazards risks of mistake. 
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Cognitive Artifacts and the Great Game 
 
 Nineteenth century Europe was an age of cognitive artifacts aiding information 
visualization, as well as an age of colonialism.125 In their immense project tracking the 
“Milestones” of visualization, Michael Friendly and Daniel J. Denis locate the inception 
of “modern data graphics” in the first half of the nineteenth century, and call the second 
half its first “Golden Age.”126 British efforts to consolidate and maintain control over 
Indian territories occurred amid this atmosphere of innovation, and depended on 
information gathering. The “Great Game” as Kipling uses the term refers simply to a 
more intense nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century version of the research the British 
had carried on in India from as early as the first decade of the eighteenth century.127   
 Whether or not the British actually had an intelligence community of the sort that 
appears in Kim, they were heavily invested in gathering and representing information, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125To review briefly, a cognitive artifact is a human-created device that enhances cognitive performance by 
representing information. External visualization–representing information so that it can be interpreted 
visually–is one of the most powerful perceptual avenues for external cognition. Such visual representations 
might include maps, graphs, and, I argue, physical collections of visually communicative objects. Visual 
representations reduce demands on memory and thereby free effort for creative thought. They aid discovery 
by codifying information for new manipulations and grouping it to reveal patterns (Card et al 7, 15). What 
good visual representations share is facilitation of information collection and storage, pattern recognition, 
and/or communication. In short, as Card and collaborators put it, they “use perception to amplify 
cognition” (10). For more on the power of external cognition, see Scaife and Rogers’ definitive early 
article, “External Cognition: How Do Graphical Representations Work?”  
 
126It was in Europe in the nineteenth century, for instance, that mapping techniques began to be used to 
display not just geography but also information about history, culture, economics, medicine, and 
demographics. Meanwhile, statisticians invented bar and pie charts, line graphs, and time-series plots 
(Friendly and Denis). 
 
127Invention of the term is usually ascribed to Arthur Conolly, a cavalry officer who performed several 
dangerous missions of the officially unofficial sort, and apparently “coined this memorable phrase in a 
letter to a friend” (Hopkirk 123). Kipling gets credit for introducing the phrase to the wider British public 
with Kim, published serially in 1900-1901, though Russophobia in direct connection with empire had for 
the entire previous century been more a matter of intense public feeling than official British foreign policy 
(Hopkirk 1-8). Scholars now argue over the degree to which the British government had a truly organized 
secret service in India of the sort Kipling imagines in Kim. Regardless of its official existence, in the British 
popular imagination the idea of “the Great Game” had powerful appeal !
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often of a visual sort.128 As anthropologist and scholar of colonialism Bernard S. Cohn 
has noted, “The British appear in the nineteenth century to have felt most comfortable 
surveying India from above and at a distance–from a horse, an elephant, a boat, a 
carriage, or a train” (10). To this list I add the potential for intellectual survey afforded by 
the maps, drawings, photographs, albums, and catalogues of specimens–or in other 
words, the collections of (visual) information–that British colonialists gathered during 
their Indian explorations. The imperial conquest of India ran on the collection of visual 
knowledge by many different kinds of researchers, from ethnographers, biologists, 
geographers, cartographers and military surveyors to artists and civilian travelers, 
collecting a seeming infinitude of details gradually coalescing into massive, messy data 
sets that facilitated commercial decisions, military action, and political control. Popular 
publications spread the results of such study beyond government officials to the British 
public. Beyond practical concerns of daily governance, therefore, such knowledge 
gathering also facilitated what Phillip Wegner has called the “imaginative ordering” of 
India, which in turn allowed its conceptual integration into the British Empire (143).   
 This imaginative ordering depended in a significant way on visual collections, 
which I suggest served as cognitive artifacts for visualization. India seemed ideally 
knowable via collections because for many Britons, India itself represented an enormous 
jumble of people and objects and views in need of rational (British) order. As Cohn 
points out, “[f]or many Europeans India was a vast museum, its countryside filled with 
ruins, its people representing past ages–biblical, classical, and feudal; it was a source of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128Often, it seems, the government benefitted from the exploratory efforts of various officials and private 
citizens operating in strictly non-official capacities with more-or-less secret additional purposes whose 
outcomes were sometimes excised from subsequent public record and popular publications. See Robert 
Johnson, Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 1757-1947, or Peter Hopkirk, The 
Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. 
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collectibles and curiosities to fill European museums, botanical gardens, zoos, and 
country houses” (9). Cohn calls this attitude towards the investigation of India’s treasures 
“the museological modality” (9). Similarly, Christopher Pinney terms the British 
approach to gathering information about India a “museological mode” which “stressed 
the discrete and describable nature of India as an aggregate of things which could be 
understood through strategies of ‘typicality’… ‘miniaturization’… and, above all, 
‘display’ with its continual assumption of knowledge to be gained through visibility” 
(255). Whether they studied Indian views, items, or people, British researchers tended to 
assimilate the objects of their research into categories, which could then be sorted and 
arranged within collections affording visual survey. 
The products of such cataloguing efforts, whether albums of photographs or 
museum collections on display, would be significant not only insofar as they incited new 
scholarly and popular knowledge via patterns and visual display. The act of study itself –
whether in creation or of the final product – would itself be important for its cognitive 
influence, because it involves the creator and the user in categorization. Britons creating 
or learning the categories that organized their collections would learn to perceive their 
Indian colony and its inhabitants through those defining types. 129  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129Categorization essentially means the categorizer learns to differentiate the kinds or types that constitute 
the categories. Learning to categorize depends on selecting the “invariants” that define a category, or in 
other words, the features that all members of a category must invariably share in order to be members of 
that category. The person who learns and applies categorization uses his or her senses (in this case, vision) 
to perceive and privilege the relevant feature. Such learning can happen through instruction from another 
person as well as through personal experience (Harnad 30, 37-9). An album (for example) organized by 
“type” of view or figure would provide both instruction and practice in learning categories for Indian 
landscapes or people. Cognitive psychologists have argued over whether categories are innate or learned.  
But except in the narrow case of Chomsky’s proposed inherent capacity for learning grammar, “All 
evidence suggests that most of our categories are learned” (Harnad 23). 
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Learning categories in this way could then influence how those who learned them 
saw and conceived not just of India’s objects and images, but also of India the British 
colony, and its inhabitants. As cognitive scientist Stevan Harnad writes, once categories 
are learned, in subsequent perception 
Some features are selectively enhanced, while others are suppressed, thereby 
bringing out the commonalities underlying categories or kinds.  This works like a 
kind of input filter, siphoning out the categories on the basis of their invariant 
features, and ignoring or reducing the salience of noninvariant features. (34) 
In the case of British catalogues, British aesthetic and scientific conventions influence 
which features were deemed significant, as the many studies exposing sublime or 
picturesque treatments of Indian landscapes, or empiricist attitudes towards historical and 
ethnographic work can attest.130 Collections therefore facilitated external cognition in two 
ways: as organized groupings affording visual survey, and as the material for practice in 
categorization. Like Kim’s visions of Indian landscapes populated with various character 
types, both ways offered the fantasy of comprehensive knowledge. Like the Great Game 
as it forms the novel’s space of work and play united in an exotic adventure and packaged 
for safe enjoyment, these collections harness curiosity for useful pleasure in public, 
scholar, and government official. Their creation and use could alter how nineteenth-
century Britons perceived and conceived 
of their Indian colony. 
The Visual Collection: Types  
 To early ethnographic and anthropologically minded researchers, India seemed a 
“living museum of mankind” where physical, visible characteristics “embodied” intrinsic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130See Almeida and Gilpin, Indian Renaissance: British Romantic Art and the Prospect of India, David 
Arnold, The Tropics and the Traveling Gaze: India, Landscape, and Science 1800-1856, Pinney’s essay in 
The Raj: India and the British 1600-1947, or Nicholas B. Dirks, “Guiltless Spoliations: Picturesque Beauty, 
Colonial Knowledge, and Colin Mackenzie’s Survey of India”–for just a small selection. 
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racial identity (Pinney 253). European anthropologists seem to have taken the caste 
system, if anything, even more seriously than natives as an inflexible biological absolute. 
Castes seemed strictly endogamous groups in which visible difference indexed racial and 
cultural difference and genealogical inheritance. Indian people could therefore be sorted 
into “types” according to visual physiological markers–and in practice, often by dress and 
the curious implements associated with their traditional occupations as well. Pinney 
quotes William Flower, British comparative anatomist, thus: “Physical characters are the 
best, in fact the only true tests of race, that is of real affinity; language, customs etc, may 
help or give indications, but they are often misleading” (253). Once properly sorted, these 
“types” should reveal the progression of human history in the form of racial genealogy.  
 This typological framework produced many collections of visual images of caste 
“types” intended for study and for popular interest, sometimes simultaneously. Mildred 
Archer has demonstrated the huge late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century popularity 
of albums containing drawings of Indian natives and the tools of their occupation among 
the British, who bought them as souvenirs of India (Cohn 100). These Indian subjects (of 
the empire and of the drawings) are usually largely “decontextualiz[ed]. They are drawn 
without any background, and with an individual and perhaps his wife depicted with the 
tools of his or her trade or the products of goods produced for consumption and use by 
Europeans and Indians” (Cohn 100). These 
figures are therefore not individuals so much as 
representatives of their visual type or kind. 
British paintings of government ceremonies and 
official history had also long suggested the 
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arrangement of  “the bodies of Indians,” characteristic of their caste or type, for 
“inspection” by British representatives of Empire (Pinney 254). (See Figures 18 and 19.)  
The enormous Victorian People of India project, the first of its kind to make 
intensive use of photographs, marks a major milestone in the visual representation of 
“types” for ethnographic study and public curiosity. Photographic portraits of “types,” 
with titles like “A Hindu Gentleman” or “A Parsee” or “Nautch [Dancing] Girl,” were as 
popular as their precursors in drawing form, and Victorians snapped up the earliest 
ethnographic work to use photographs, 
The Oriental Race and Tribes: 
Residents and Visitors of Bombay, in 
1863 (Worswick 4-5). Then, personal and governmental interests united in a project 
sponsored by the Viceroy, Lord Canning, who requested photographs of Indian life and 
people to complete an album that he and his wife wished to take home with them to 
England, to “recall to their memories the peculiarities of Indian life” (Watson and Kaye 
n.p.). The response to this request was so much greater than expected that copies of the 
photographs sent to the India Office in London became the basis for an eight-volume 
series entitled The People of India: A Series of Photographic Illustrations, with 
Descriptive Letterpress, of the Races and 
Tribes of Hindustan (Desmond 36-7).  
Published between 1868 and 1875, this 
immense work was the first major 
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ethnographical project to rely so heavily on photography, considered an ideal medium for 
ethnography because it “so well preserved and conveyed” “the appearance” (Falconer 
274). 
The People of India includes versions of each of the two varieties of caste “type” 
images that Pinney identifies (256). It presents both portraits of individuals from the 
shoulders up, isolated from the background and without accompanying objects, and also 
staged images of individuals or groups, often with tools, products, or otherwise 
characteristic objects, in an apparently natural environment. Typically, the portrait or 
portraits follow an introductory text naming the “type” and describing the people in terms 
of their geographical location, supposed genealogy, culture, habits, and appearance. 
Sometimes the same “type” is presented in both portrait styles, as with the “The Mulliks” 
(Watson and Kaye). The Mulliks are “a distinct race” that reside “chiefly” in Behar and 
“cultivate land,” according to the introductory information before their photographs 
(Watson and Kaye). Following these short paragraphs appears the portrait of an older 
man wearing a turban and beard, his shoulders draped in cloth; it is labeled with his 
racial, religious, and geographic identity, respectively (“MULLICK. / SOONEE 
MAHOMEDAN / BEHAR”) but not his name (Watson and Kaye). On the next printed 
page is a vignette photograph with a similar title (now plural) showing two people outside 
of what appears to be a hut in an agricultural area. Their clothing, the implements visible 
around them, and their lifestyle and occupation as it appears in the photograph are on 
display, indicators of their identity as much as the racial and religious markers of their 
caption. Other “types” are represented similarly, but usually by either portraits of 
individuals or of staged groups, and always with generic captions such as “Moamurias, or 
! 204!
Muttucks: Hill Tribe” and “Bhotanese; Chiefly of Tibetan Origin” (Watson and Kaye). 
The photographs elide identity with appearance and with category or “type.”! 
Typified demographic information also aided the work of British government 
more directly. When the Government of India began to conduct regular censuses of the 
population in the second half of the nineteenth century, the categories borrowed terms 
from ethnography, which had based its terms partly on visible markers. Cohn notes, 
By 1881 [the government] had worked out a set of practices that enabled them not 
just to list the names of what they hoped would be every person in India but also 
to collect basic information about age, occupation, caste, religion, literacy, place 
of birth, and current residence. Upwards of 500,000 people, most of whom were  
volunteers, were engaged in carrying out the census…. The census represents a  
model of the Victorian encyclopedic quest for total knowledge. 
It is my hypothesis that what was entailed in the construction of the census  
operations was the creation of social categories by which India was ordered 
for administrative purposes. (8) 
The published reports of the great Censuses of India, collected every decade between 
1871 and 1901, did not include graphics or diagrams, but they did participate in the 
nineteenth-century British rage for statistics 
with raw data organized in tables (Bowles).  
This produced the effect of an apparently 
comprehensive view of Indian culture and 
society, organized according to geography, 
population, and markers like religion, caste, occupation, and gender, associated with 
visual characteristics. This collection of numerical data thus depended on social 
categories partially recapitulating the many popular visual depictions of Indian “types.”   
 Though not directly visual, reams of statistics such as those collected by the 
censuses could eventually communicate visually. Herbert Hope Risley, the foremost 
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British anthropologist at the turn of the twentieth century and the Census Commissioner 
for India, purposefully welded anthropological and governmental concerns even more 
tightly. Risley inherited and propagated the belief that appearance constitutes identity, 
arguing for instance that nasal shape indexed racial progress: the “finest noses” belonged 
to the most superior 
castes (Risley qtd in 
Pinney 259). Risley organized the earlier multitude of “types” into seven main categories, 
and then used census data to produce a color-coded map of India’s population that locates 
these categories geographically (fig 22). Since caste was associated not just with 
appearance and occupation but also with the degree of resistance to British rule, the map 
implies that visual information is key not just to biological identity but also to 
governance.! 
 In this way, categories and portrait subjects reinforced specimen-like 
organization of natives of India by typological markers, defined visually. The resulting 
collections, whether these took the form of columns of numbers representing types, or in 
the form of albums of sketched (and later photographic) portraits, offered the sense of 
encompassing all of India’s subjects inside the 
boundaries of a book’s covers.! 
As a collection of characters, Kipling’s 
novel recapitulates the contents of typical nineteenth-century British albums representing 
Indian “types.” Kipling’s narrator often identifies people whom Kim and the lama meet 
on their travels not by their names, but by their appearance and visual attributes, which 
reveal their identities in the form of caste, occupation, and race. On the train, for instance, 
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the identity of a “fat Hindu money-lender” is evident in his weight, his “oily smirk,” and 
the “account-book in a cloth under his arm” (Kipling 75), while “the wife of a well-to-do 
cultivator” wears “clinking” bracelets, stereotypically “scowl[s]” at a flirtatious younger 
woman, and has come equipped with food she can share (Kipling 75-6, 82). On the Grand 
Trunk Road, where Kim and the lama pass “all the world going and coming,” the same 
identification patterns hold (Kipling 105). For example, the low-caste “Sansis” are 
obvious because they wear their hair long, carry “baskets of lizards and other unclean 
foods,” and walk “at a quick, furtive job-trot” (Kipling 109). A soldier “Akali” appears in 
a turban and “the blue-checked clothes of his faith,” keeping a stalking pace characteristic 
of his race (Kipling 109). When Kim helps a fellow spy alter his disguise from 
“Mahratta” to “Saddhu,” he colors the man’s skin, adds a “caste-mark” to his forehead, 
changes his garments, gives him opium to make his eyes red, and, to evade suspicion in a 
crucial moment, publicly teases him for “hav[ing] lost the ringed fire-tongs which are the 
Saddhu’s distinguishing mark” (Kipling 250-
3, 255). Kipling even represents several native 
characters who play significant roles in Kim’s 
travels by their caste, gender, or occupational identities instead of their names, such as 
“the old soldier” outside Umballa, who shows them the way to the Grand Trunk Road, 
and “the woman from Kulu” with whom the lama repeatedly visits, and who nurses both 
travelers back to health at the novels’ end (Kipling 92, 321).  
These attributes are both concrete and visual, so they should be memorably 
encoded by both the verbal and nonverbal systems. Although speech also carries clues to 
identity, visual attributes offer clearly superior identification: a young soldier on the train 
Figure'24:!R.!E.!Wallace,!albumen!print!of!Mallah,!a!“type”!from!Mirzapur.!!c.!1895.!Royal!Anthropological!Institute,!London.!
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who speaks of himself as a Sikh is exposed as “Dogra” instead by a fellow passenger, a 
Sikh himself who knows the visual signs (Kipling 77). Smirks and smiles, clothes and 
caste-marks, identify groups and individuals within the shifting crowds through which 
Kim moves to him and to Kipling’s readers. The very strangeness of many of these 
striking visual characteristics to a curious turn-of-the-century British reader might 
increase their impact. In this respect, the travelers (and hence, the readers) encounter the 
populace of India like visual specimens representing “types” in a photographic collection. 
Kim’s spy training involves honing his ability to read others’ character by their 
appearance–in other words, to read types. Having frequently begged, he is naturally 
skilled “as every beggar must be [in] watching countenances” (Kipling 84). His skill 
translates into an almost preternatural ability to mimic: for instance, having seen Colonel 
Creighton once, he mimes the man’s characteristic walk, physical attitudes, and tics so 
well that an old soldier who knew Creighton years before recognizes who Kim represents 
even though Kim himself does not know Creighton’s name (Kipling 96). Kim can shift 
appearances so well that the lama at first believes he has met an Irish boy and a “Hindu 
urchin in a dirty turban” on the same day, when both are in fact Kim wearing different 
clothing (Kipling 63-4). Kim fools even 
Mahbub Ali, who knows him well, into 
believing the boy is a “Little Hindu” (Kipling 
67). As his first nickname “Little Friend of all the World” suggests, Kim is uniquely able 
to move between the novel’s various social demarcations because he “borrow[s] right- 
and left-handedly from all the customs”–and the costumes–“of the country he knew and 
loved” (Kipling 121). 
Figure'25:!Khan&Mahomed,&embroiderer&(prize&
Medallist&1862).!Albumen!print!by!Houghton!and!Tanner.!
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Kim’s training for the Great Game at Lurgan Sahib’s house in Simla hones his 
skill in visual observation and categorization. Kim and a Hindu child play games of 
observation and recall, beginning with studying gems and other objects and tallying them 
from memory. Then they play a similar game with “photographs of natives,” presumably 
like those in The People of India, and even “Mr Lurgan’s many and various curious 
visitors,” of whom Kim and the Hindu boy “were expected to give a detailed account of 
all that they had seen and heard–their view of each man’s character, as shown in his face, 
talk, and manner, and their notions of his real errand” (Kipling 206-7). Two of the three 
important classes of clues–“face, talk, and manner”–are visual. This information, Kipling 
suggests, will demonstrate true intentions even through disguise. 
Kim must also use his growing skill in reading types to improve his ability to 
embody them. He plays a “game” of “dressing-up,” in which Lurgan Sahib paints Kim’s 
face, fits him with various costumes, and teaches him “how such and such a caste talked, 
or walked, or coughed, or spat, or sneezed” (Kipling 207). Kim’s practice in visual 
memory and his early inclination for imitation predispose him to talent for this “game”: 
The Hindu child played this [dressing-up] game clumsily.  That little mind, keen 
 as an icicle where tally of jewels was concerned, could not temper itself to enter 
 another’s soul; but a demon in Kim woke up and sang with joy as he put on the 
 changing dresses, and changed speech and gesture therewith. (Kipling 207) 
It is true that part of Kim’s skill in imitation and disguise depends on his ability to 
channel others’ speech as well as their appearances and attitudes. For instance, in another 
episode he belies his English schoolboy appearance, without changing his clothing, by 
shifting language and speech convincingly enough to “undeceiv[e]” a native (Kipling 
148). Nevertheless his school uniform marks him well enough that Kim cannot escape the 
physical confines of his school without changing his clothing (Kipling 154). His almost-
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magical ability to shift identity, defined in this novel by caste, occupation, and race, 
depends ultimately on adopting visual appearances and characteristic gestures. When 
Kim “enters another’s soul,” he inhabits the visible attributes of another “type” with a 
playful enthusiasm that suits him for the serious work of the Great Game. Kim’s training, 
in which the reader participates vicariously, relies on identification of visual types. 
The Visual Collection: Albums of Views 
As a subset of their general cataloguing efforts (and often as an aid to mapping 
work), the British collected and catalogued images as well. William Hodges was the first 
professional British landscape artist to arrive in India, in 1780. A steady stream of 
landscape artists followed him over the next century, including Thomas and William 
Daniell, Henry Salt, James Baillie Fraser, and George Chinnery. The British public was 
hungry for images of India, and 
artists recorded views of landscapes, 
monuments, and archaeological sites 
that were meant to convey both interest and knowledge (Tillotson 141-145). British 
surveying efforts were finding important historical and cultural sites that seemed in need 
of aid to British eyes, even when they were still in use. Archaeologists and other 
researchers soon followed the surveyors, and landscape art became important as a means 
for historical record: the British 
would save the sites for science 
and preserve the sights on paper for posterity (Dirks 223).  
This historical interest combined with general curiosity to create a surprising 
British demand for financially accessible images of India. Typically, artists would make 
Figure'26:!Thomas!and!William!Daniell,!Buddell,&Opposite&
Bilkate&in&the&Mountains&of&Sirinagur.!1804.!Yale!Center!for!British!Art,!New!Haven,!CT.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
Figure'27:!James!Baillie!Fraser,!Old&Court&House&Street.!1819.!India!Office!Collections,!British!Library,!London.!
Image&removed&for&copyright&reasons&
! 210!
sketches while they traveled through India over a period of years, return to England and 
work their drawings up into engravings, and then publish albums or series of prints. As 
Cohn notes, “There was a large market in Great Britain for illustrated books, portfolios, 
prints, and drawings of oriental scenes” (9). In addition to the published works of 
professional artists, amateur sketchers (and later, photographers) crammed their 
sketchbooks with drawings of Indian views. The government even encouraged those 
Britons who were abroad for other purposes to fill spare hours with sketching (or later, 
photographing) and thus continue the work of recording India’s landscapes (Tillotson 
149-150, Falconer 267). In short, then, the experience of looking through a collection of 
views was a regular one in England throughout the nineteenth century. 
Though quite a few illustrated books, albums, and prints were published, perhaps 
the most famous work belongs to Thomas Daniell and his nephew William. Between 
their arrival in India and return to England almost a decade later, in 1794, Daniell and his 
nephew traveled widely across the subcontinent–more widely, in fact, than had been 
possible for any previous traveling English artist, due to recent British military successes. 
Following in the footsteps of Governor-General Cornwallis, who was subduing Indian 
lands sometimes just a step ahead of them, the Daniells recorded views across all three 
Presidencies for the eventual consumption of the British public (Almeida and Gilpin 
184). After returning to England, the 
two labored over a massive 
publication they titled Oriental 
Figure'28:!Henry!Salt,!A&View&at&Lucknow.!1809.!India!Office!Collections,!British!Library,!London.!
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Scenery.  The work consisted finally of 144 prints published in six volumes over twelve 
years, and included aquatints based on the Daniells’ Indian sketches and writings, which 
seem to have been aimed at the educated classes in England and India. 
A magnificent panorama included within the sixth volume of Oriental Scenery 
(1803) provides a typical example of the Daniells’ work. The volume was dedicated to 
the archaeological excavations at Ellora, an important Hindu temple site. The panorama 
consisted of three prints that folded out of the book into a single scene stretching 21.5 by 
77 inches when fully extended (Rossi). In its topographical accuracy and visual interest, 
the panorama manifests the competing claims that marked most such British landscape 
art from India in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Tillotson 146). !
Figure'29:!Thomas!Daniell,!The&Mountain&of&Ellora.!1803.!The!Yale!Center!for!British!Art,!New!Haven,!CT.!
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The panorama demonstrates Thomas Daniell’s eye for topographical detail, which 
he had honed engraving images of estates for the landed elite at home in England. Both 
Daniells employed observational tools that ensured precision, using a camera obscura to 
create their composition and a perambulator, usually the instrument of the surveyor or 
cartographer, to measure distances and frame their scenes accordingly. Frustrated by 
sketches from previous artists like Hodges, which the Daniells ended up correcting for 
greater accuracy, the uncle-nephew team created a body of knowledge that was almost as 
much cartographic as artistic by the standards of the day.131 This panorama’s long !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131In fact, their sketches became famous for accurate authority long before the final engravings were 
published to popular artistic acclaim.  James Rennell, surveyor-general for the East India Company, even 
used their sketches to emend his Map of Hindoostan, and credited Thomas Daniell for the improved 
information in the third edition.  The final engravings were also praised by London reviewers for their 
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perspective and high vantage point, combined with the degree of detail, suggests the 
possibility of seeing everything–a power that can also imply knowing everything. 
But, like other landscape images of the period, the panorama also reveals the 
pressure of the picturesque aesthetic, a necessarily interpretive influence which G. H. R. 
Tillotson calls “so fundamental a part of the English landscape tradition that to most 
artists it was not a consciously adopted instrument but an inescapable artistic vision” 
(151). The picturesque functioned according to a set of conventions clearly apparent in 
the composition of the Ellora triptych. For example, in order to be picturesque, a scene 
should be visually interesting; often this meant including “mountains or hills as 
backdrops, lakes or rivers closer in, and objects such as… ruined buildings” and “gnarled 
trees” (Dirks 217). Mottled light and shadow should catch and amuse the eye, as it does 
here. To further “enlive[n]” the scene, “groups of human figures and animals” might be 
scattered about, to all the better effect if they were a bit tattered and unkempt (Dirks 217). 
The figures in the panorama, which provide a sense of scale with their tiny size, also offer 
interest with their Indian dress. The panorama, with its apparently comprehensive view of 
Ellora, also reflects the ordering vision of the British picturesque aesthetic. As one in an 
album in a series, it represents a single 
point in a data field, a slice of visual 
record in testament to the British vision of 
India through eyes conditioned by habit.! 
Photographs mostly superseded landscape paintings and drawings by the final 
quarter of the nineteenth century. The new medium was much more efficient, and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“fidelity of… representations” and “astonishing accuracy” (qtd. in Almeida and Gilpin 191), the volumes 
becoming known for “provid[ing their] viewers with confidence-inspiring, accurate, masterful, scientific 
art” (Almeida and Gilpin 191). 
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East India Company replaced its draftsmen with photographers in 1855. Local British-run 
governments did the same not long after, desiring archives of military adventures as well 
as information about landscapes and records of archaeological work (Worswick 2-4). 
Photography’s success can also be measured in terms of firms and societies established. 
Photographic societies sprang up in Bombay, Bengal, and Madras in the 1850s. 
Photographic firms had blossomed in larger Indian cities by 1870, catering to the desire 
of officials and individuals abroad to document Indian people and landscapes. By the late 
1860s Samuel Bourne’s firm, one of the most famous of its period, offered a 77-page 
catalogue of photographs for purchase “whose subject matter encompasses the whole 
British vision of India” in a “comprehensive range of views” (Falconer 266). Amid this 
encouraging atmosphere, photographic journals and collections flourished, including the 
Bombay-based Indian Amateur’s Photographic Album (1856), the London-based One 
Hundred Stereoscopic Illustrations of Architecture and Natural History in Western India 
(1864), a series of James Fergusson’s illustrated architectural volumes (issued 1850s-
1870s), and a host of others. London journals frequently brought the efforts of English 
photographers in India to the public eye; the Photographic News commended these 
photographers in 1859 for preserving images of Indian monuments for study, saving them 
from “the tooth of time and the razure of oblivion” (Desmond 3). As with their drawing 
sketchbook precursors, amateur photographers also kept collections of their own work, so 
that flipping through a series of Indian views remained a regular Victorian experience. 
The importance of accuracy and the influence of the picturesque remained 
competing pressures on photographs, just as they had on drawings of Indian landscapes. 
The British Raj sponsored official photographic efforts and encouraged the work of 
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amateurs precisely because such records seemed important–and reliable–documentation 
(Falconer 271). But the picturesque also retained its hold on perception, inescapably 
shaping the aesthetics of photography in India even after wider trends in English art at 
home had moved on (Falconer 264-5). Thus photographs like Edmund David Lyon’s 
print of the arcade in the Palace at Madura (1868) or Samuel Bourne’s print of Chini and 
mountains (1866) combine typically picturesque, framed compositions with rugged 
forms, contrasts in light and dark, and (in Lyon’s typical photograph) the appeal of the 
visually interesting ruin. Others of Samuel Bourne’s work add the interest of small 
human figures to the composition. (See Figures 31 and 32). 
Kipling’s novel reproduces the effect of a collection of picturesque views: it 
presents wide-angle views of landscapes, which in their repetition begin to seem like 
images stacked in an album. Kim’s natural curiosity means that from the novel’s opening 
page he takes pleasure both in the interest of 
what he sees, and also in the information it 
provides. Though the lama reproves both 
himself and Kim for becoming overly excited by the visual interest of the Grand Trunk 
Road, the “wonderful spectacle” of it as “a river of life as nowhere else exists in the 
world” (Kipling 105), Kim’s interested eye remains the lens through which the reader 
comprehends their travel experience. Kipling describes their first experience with the 
Grand Trunk Road thus: 
 The lama, as usual, was deep in meditation, but Kim’s bright eyes were open  
 wide.  This broad, smiling river of life, he considered, was a vast improvement on 
 the cramped and crowded Lahore streets.  There were new people and new sights 
 at every stride – castes he knew and castes that were altogether out of his  
 experience.  (109) 
Figure'31:!Edmund!David!Lyon,!Albumen!print!of!arcade!in!the!Palace!at!Madura.!c.!1868.!India!Office!Library!and!Records,!London.!
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And again later: 
 The lama never raised his eyes…. But Kim was in the seventh 
 heaven of joy.  The Grand Trunk at this point was built on an embankment to  
 guard against winter floods from the foothills, so that one walked, as it were, a  
 little above the country, along a stately corridor, seeing all India spread out to left 
 and right.  It was beautiful to behold the many-yoked grain and cotton wagons  
 crawling over the country roads: one could hear their axles, complaining a mile  
 away, coming nearer, till with shouts and yells and bad words they climbed up the 
 steep incline and plunged on to the hard main road, carter reviling carter.  It was 
 equally beautiful to watch the people, little clumps of red and blue and pink and  
 white and saffron, turning aside to go to their own villages, dispersing and  
 growing small by twos and threes across the level plain.  Kim felt these things, 
 though he could not give tongue to his feelings…. (110-11). 
 As with the landscape images above, this passage suggests a panoramic view of the 
countryside, with “all India” spread before Kim (and the reader). The personified wagons 
“crawl” in the distance and the people are “little clumps” of color moving through the 
landscape like spots of interest in a picturesque painting. Though sound, and at other 
points touch and smell, are important for the full sensory experience, picturesque vision 
functions as the primary sense undergirding Kim’s perception in Kipling’s treatment. The 
vision becomes “feelings” for Kim, and perhaps for readers familiar with seeing similar 
landscape images at second-hand in photographs and drawings.  
Similar descriptions of picturesque views often recur. For instance, Kim and the 
lama have wide views from the train, as “Golden, rose, saffron, and pink, the morning 
mists smoked away across the flat green levels. All the rich Punjab lay out in the 
splendour of the keen sun” (Kipling 
79). On foot on “the rutted and 
worn country road that wound across the flat between the great dark-green mango-
groves” with “the line of the snow-capped Himalayas faint to the eastward,” Kim and the 
lama see “all India… at work in the fields,” the tiny figures of people elided into the 
Figure'32:!Samuel!Bourne,!Chini&and&its&Mountains.!1866.!!The!British!Library,!London.!
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mention of their land (Kipling 99). Kipling describes the road itself with picturesque 
interest in “the green-arched, shade-flecked length of it, the white breadth speckled with 
slow-pacing folk” (Kipling 105). This picturesque vision is thus also the reader’s, as if 
India in this novel becomes a series of visual panoramas speckled with light and spotted 
with tiny figures.   
Kim’s training, as with types, reproduces this visual epistemology in collecting 
landscapes. His education at St. Xavier’s includes map-making, but this takes a turn 
towards landscapes as Kipling’s characters explain it. Spymaster Colonel Creighton tells 
Kim he “must learn how to make pictures of roads and mountains and rivers – to carry 
these pictures in [his] eye till a suitable time comes to set them upon paper” for 
government use (Kipling 166). Later Kipling’s text describes this important aspect of 
espionage work as the conversion of views into mental landscapes: Kim’s job will be to, 
“by merely marching over a country with a compass and a level and a straight eye, carry 
away a picture of that country which might be sold for large sums” (Kipling 212). It is as 
if Kim must do something like the reverse of what the reader does when he or she dual 
codes Kipling’s visual descriptions: where the reader’s verbal coding of the text produce 
nonverbal (visual) associations, Kim should compose his visual perception into a 
“picture” in his mind and then into written descriptions and pictures on paper. 
These “pictures” provide knowledge, or at least the sense of it. Like pages in an 
album, their isolated (though apparently locally comprehensive) views can add up to 
more than the sum of their parts. Kim’s friend and advisor Mahbub Ali explains that each 
small player in the game has only local knowledge at any given time: “The Game is so 
large that one sees but a little at a time” (Kipling 217). Yet the reader, like the spymasters 
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or the owner of an album of views, can turn these pieces into wider knowledge. Several 
times Kipling provides the reader with a wide view of the game itself in which pieces add 
up to panorama. For instance, Kim remains ignorant of the outcome of his aid to an agent 
on the train, but in one quick paragraph Kipling offers a series of “views,” ranging across 
the map from Simla to Delhi to Roum, of people reacting to the news this agent carried 
(Kipling 258). Another similar group of “views” reveals to the reader several months’ 
worth of espionage activity in a series of present-tense vignettes (Kipling 316-318). And 
finally, the reader has a kind of album in the form of the novel itself, which purports to 
represent Kim’s sequential, consecutive experience but can always be re-experienced by 
any reader who returns to earlier moments and previous descriptions in the text. 
The Visual Collection: Museums 
British explorers in India also collected and catalogued things: antiquities, 
artifacts, art objects, and plant and animal specimens. The public museum, a collection of 
curious and perhaps educational objects for public view, “came of age” in Europe in the 
nineteenth century (MacGregor 237). In England, an obsession with rare specimens and 
interesting objects was at least as old as empiricism, which as Richard Altick points out is 
not content with legendary authority but requires “materials” for study (10). But it was 
not until the second half of the nineteenth century that the museum as twenty-first century 
visitors would recognize it came into being: sponsored by local groups or the 
government, open for easy public access, intended for educational purposes, and 
organized and labeled for informative display. In the interim, the private “curiosity 
cabinet” and the (sometimes traveling) public “show,” both collections of the exotic, the 
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rare, and the strange, served the needs of those who sought visual stimulation and the 
satisfaction of curiosity via objects.  
By the middle of the eighteenth century, England had caught up with Europe in 
terms of an enthusiasm for personal collections of rare and interesting objects, as the 
borders of England’s territory advanced and the imaginative horizons of its citizens 
figuratively widened. The advance of industry meant material items were becoming more 
accessible to the general public, while travelers through Britain’s growing empire also 
continued to supply people at home with odd objects from around the globe. Dealers in 
“curiosities” served collectors who wanted to stock their cabinets.132 By 1802, a typical 
“dealer in all manner of curiosities” trafficked in “Egyptian mummies, Indian implements 
of war, arrows dipped in the poison of the upas tree, bows, antique shields, helmets, 
&c…. the skin of the cameleopard exhibited in the Roman amphitheatre, the head of the 
spear used by king Arthur, and the breech of the first cannon used at the siege of 
Constantinople” (qtd in Altick 24). In these lists, objects of curious (and dubious) 
provenance crowd together with oddly manufactured items and exotic things from 
abroad. Their value lies in their visual interest and their oddity. Similarly, the public 
exhibition of such jumbled rarities belonging to collectors like the Tradescants or Don 
Saltero was intended more to astonish and amuse (and sometimes, fleece) the public 
rather than to educate (Altick 7-8). Still, the very fact of their existence widened the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132The list of items Horace Walpole bought at an estate sale of such a dealer in 1755 is characteristic. He 
names his purchases to a friend in a letter: “Brobdingnag combs, old broken pots, pans, and pipkins, a 
lanthorn of scraped oyster-shells, scimitars, Turkish pipes, Chinese baskets” (qtd in Altick 24). His bill also 
includes ‘two large clumbs [clam shells] with mahogany stands,’ ‘an India bow, eight arrows, a dagger, 
etc.,’ ‘a Chinese lanthorn and an India basket,’ ‘a basso relievo in ivory and a large comb,’ and ‘a large and 
curious crucifix’” (qtd in Altick 24). 
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mental horizons of collectors and viewers, who had physical, visible evidence of places 
as far distant in geography and imagination as Egypt and Constantinople. 
Such a collection appears in Kim, in the form of Lurgan Sahib’s “curiosity shop” 
in Simla, where the gem-dealer and spymaster has collected a strange assortment of 
religious and cultural objects. Kipling explicitly connects the place to the more organized 
public museum in Lahore, but this curiosity shop would also have been familiar to 
original readers as an example of the older jumbled collections of bizarre curios: 
The Lahore Museum was larger, but here were more wonders – ghost-daggers and 
prayer-wheels from Tibet; turquoise and raw amber necklaces; green jade  
bangles; curiously packed incense-sticks in jars crusted over with raw garnets,  
the devil-masks [from Tibet] and a wall full of peacock-blue draperies; gilt figures 
of Buddha, and little portable lacquer altars; Russian samovars with turquoises on 
the lid; egg-shell china sets in quaint octagonal cane boxes; yellow ivory  
crucifixes – from Japan of all places in the world, so Lurgan Sahib said; carpets in 
dusty bales, smelling atrociously, pushed back behind torn and rotten screens of  
geometrical work; Persian water-jugs for the hands after meals; dull copper  
incense-burners neither Chinese nor Persian, with friezes of fantastic devils 
running round them; tarnished silver belts that knotted like raw hide; hairpins of 
jade, ivory, and plasma; arms of all sorts and kinds, and a thousand other 
oddments were cased, or piled, or merely thrown into the room, leaving a clear  
space only round the rickety deal table, where Lurgan Sahib worked. (200) 
The list is impressive in terms of sheer number of odd objects.  As in England’s 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century curiosity shops or exhibitions of rarities, strange items 
from distant places crowd together in fascinating disorder. Sacred religious objects and 
items of daily use in other lands are made strange by their transport into a foreign life. 
Kipling’s descriptions are concretely visual: readers can imagine riotous color in 
gemstones and “green jade,” “peacock-blue draperies,” lacquered wood, “egg-shell 
china,” “yellow ivory,” “copper” and “tarnished silver.” Visually interesting textures 
abound in gilt and lacquer and cane and cloth, screens and friezes and knots. Dual Coding 
Theory suggests that this jumble should be especially vivid and memorable, bringing to 
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bear readers’ associations with the places named as well as the sorts of objects and the 
kind of collection Kipling describes. Together the objects represent pan-Asian detritus 
stretching as far away as Russia and Japan; they suggest a world collected into a room.  
By the second half of the nineteenth century in England, publically accessible 
collections sought to provide “rational amusement,” educating the public via 
entertainment (Altick 3). What remained the same was the mixing of social classes that 
tended to occur at public exhibitions; as Altick writes, “Curiosity was a great leveler” (3). 
The nineteenth century saw the establishment of hundreds of British museums, and some 
of England’s most famous, including the National Gallery of Art (1824), the National 
Portrait Gallery (1856), and the Victoria and Albert Museum (1852). Where earlier 
exhibitions offered an eclectic jumble, these institutions often specialized, so that 
museums now focused on antiquities, science, design, art, natural history, geology, and 
the like. For instance, the nation boasted about 250 museums dedicated to natural history 
by the end of the century (MacGregor 258). Joseph Banks’ collection in Soho Square was 
the forerunner to this later nineteenth-century museum, which was organized, catalogued, 
labeled, and intended specifically to provide useful information about (sometimes distant) 
places and peoples, as well as to entertain and astonish.133 
Once situated within the confines of the museum, such objects received narrative 
contexts explaining their functions and situating them within the history of foreign places !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133Collections from India appeared in these museums, and made a significant contribution to the temporary 
Great Exhibition as well. The Indian Museum and Exhibition in London claimed museum status, but was 
really more an eclectic grouping of objects from India intended to sell tickets. But the East India Company 
itself ran a better-organized museum that covered cultural and religious objects, agricultural implements, 
weaponry, and natural history; by 1850 it boasted more than 40,000 visitors a year. This collection would 
eventually become a treasured component of the Victoria and Albert’s holdings (Altick 457, 427, 299-300). 
Additionally, individual collectors working in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were responsible for 
gathering much of what would constitute the holdings of later British institutional museums set up in 
Britain and in India (Cohn 9-10, 97). !
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as the British constructed it (K. Arnold 5-6, Cohn 80).  Classified, organized, studied, and 
explained, these objects still constitute the visual record of empire.  The museum 
collection context provides an “apparatus with which to isolate and investigate bits of the 
material world” and then return those bits to their categories to complete the view (K. 
Arnold 5-6, 29).134 Like the book of photographs writ large, the museum categorizes 
information for survey – for the satisfaction of curiosity under the cover of education.  
This form of museum appears in Kim as well. The “Wonder House,” the “native” 
name for the Lahore Museum (Kipling 49) where we first meet both Kim and the lama, 
holds collections of “Indian arts and manufactures,” as was typical of imperial museums 
archiving unusual colonial products (Kipling 52, K. Arnold 109-110, 165). The Curator, a 
character probably based on Kipling’s own father, is “a white-bearded Englishman” who 
says he is “here… to gather knowledge” and to distribute it, for “anybody who sought 
wisdom could ask the Curator to explain” (Kipling 55, 52). Kipling’s use of “wisdom” 
apparently covers both scholarly knowledge of Indian culture, and the more spiritual 
insight the word implies. The visitors to the museum include the Indians themselves, who 
come to learn about their own culture from the British intruders: Kipling describes “the 
peasants from the country” who visit “to view the things that men made in their own 
province and elsewhere” (52). The most important visitor the reader sees is of course the 
lama, whose visit’s purpose in spiritual devotion is the obverse of the Curator’s scholarly 
interest in the museum’s images of the Buddha. Thus the Wonder House facilitates at !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134Indeed, here these objects offered (and offer) not just visual knowledge, but a kind of psychological 
frisson dependent (as are all objects in any museum) on the injunction to “look but don’t touch.” As Ken 
Arnold notes, “Being able to get hold of things in museums would in fact be a banal letdown.  For touching 
the essence of an idea, a memory, a moment or a feeling would almost inevitably make it disappear…. 
Channelled through imaginative exhibitions, played off against the context of the museum, animated by 
reflexive texts that enable visitors to insert themselves and what they know, it is the tightly-sprung energy 
of objects close enough to touch, but crucially just out-of-reach, that fuels the poignancy of the tales told 
about and through museum objects” (100-101). 
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least three sorts of wonder, that response uniting aesthetic pleasure with intent curiosity: 
the interest of the Indian “peasant” villagers, the scholarly curiosity of the Curator, who 
discovers with great excitement that the lama can create “conventional brush-pen 
Buddhist pictures,” and the spiritual marveling of the lama, who reacts with emotion and 
many questions to the museum’s Buddhist art (Kipling 60).135   
If the reader is at all sympathetic to these reactions, then Kipling’s descriptions of 
the Wonder House’s contents can facilitate a kind of wonder in the reader as well. The 
museum is indeed full of cultural and religious objects, which the Curator studies 
lovingly and to which the lama reacts “with the reverence of a devotee and the 
appreciative instinct of a craftsman” (Kipling 56): 
In the entrance-hall stood the larger figures of the Greco-Buddhist sculptures  
done, savants know how long since, by forgotten workmen whose hands were  
feeling, and not unskilfully, for the mysteriously transmitted Grecian touch. 
There were hundreds of pieces, friezes of figures in relief, fragments of statues  
and slabs crowded with figures that had encrusted the brick walls of the Buddhist 
stupas and viharas of the North Country and now, dug up and labelled, made the 
pride of the Museum. (Kipling 54) 
When the lama tells the Curator about his lamassery, a “four months’ march away,” the 
Curator brings out “a huge book of photos” in which he shows the astonished lama an 
image of “that very place, perched on its crag” (Kipling 55). The lama goes over the 
stone sculptures in the museum, following the story they tell of the Buddha’s life; and 
“Where the sequence failed… the Curator supplied it from his mound of books–French 
and German, with photographs and reproductions” (Kipling 56). The two men look at a 
map of Asia – “a mighty map, spotted and traced with yellow” – on which the Curator 
points out the places important to the Buddha’s life. As the Curator speaks, “The brown !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135Indeed, the lama and the Curator each find a version of himself in the other: the Curator recognizes “that 
his guest was no mere bead-telling mendicant, but a scholar of parts” and the lama refers to their interaction 
as between “priest and priest” (Kipling 56, 60). 
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finger followed the Curator’s pencil from point to point” (Kipling 56-57). The Curator, 
with his mastery of European languages and Urdu, also translates fragments from his 
archive of books for the lama, who calls him a “Fountain of Wisdom” (Kipling 56-7). 
The Curator as guide through collected European knowledge of the lama’s own religion, 
and the collection itself to which he literally and figuratively points, seems intended to 
symbolize British (as foremost European country) epistemological hegemony.136  
 Kipling’s text also at times reproduces the language of recorded or institutional 
text. After covering Kim’s genealogy and explaining the boy’s relationship with the half-
caste woman who cares for him, Kipling shifts into language reminiscent of legend: “So 
it came about after [Kim’s] father’s death,” Kipling writes, “that the woman sewed [his 
father’s papers] into a leather amulet-case which she strung around Kim’s neck” as a 
token of prophecy (50). Later, he seems to confirm the truth of the lama’s wide travels 
with a parenthetical aside: “(The Curator [of the Wonder House] has still in his 
possession a most marvellous account of his wanderings and meditations)” (213).  
But the most explicit and important of such moments occurs when Kipling 
reviews Kim’s progress at school, and again uses language that suggests legend or 
institutional text. “It is written in the books of St Xavier’s in Partibus,” Kipling begins, 
before recapitulating Kim’s study and performance, further detailing his proficiencies 
thus: “It is further recorded in the same books that he showed a great aptitude for 
mathematical studies as well as map-making” (212). As if readers pore over the records 
at Kipling’s shoulder, he adds that “Pencil notes on the edge of an old muster-roll record 
that [Kim] was punished several times for ‘conversing with improper persons’, and it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136Critics have seen the Curator’s gift of his spectacles to the lama as a kind of metaphor for the way the 
Curator becomes the lens through which the holy man sees his own religion during his visit to the Wonder 
House. See for instance M. Daphne Kutzer, “Kipling’s Rules of the Game.” 
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seems that he was once sentenced to heavy pains for ‘absenting himself for a day in the 
company of a street beggar’” (212). This records Kim’s continued intercourse with 
Mahbub Ali and the lama. Finally, the record ends when Kim is fifteen: “His name does 
not appear in the year’s batch of those who entered for the subordinate Survey of India, 
but against it stand the words ‘removed on appointment’” (Kipling 212). Like a 
researcher who discovers records that corroborate other information, the reader knows 
these words appear to be the institutional proof that Kim attended school and left on 
secret purposes, documented only telegraphically in official papers. 
Kipling thus provides the reader with richly concrete descriptions of two major 
collections of visually interesting objects, recapitulating in words the museum 
experience. His text further offers glimpses of seemingly official records that authenticate 
the events it relates, even as they confirm the secret status of the Great Game itself. This 
language of record itself causes wonder, apparently sanctified by age and former 
importance, and may increase readers’ curiosity about and belief in the story. Kim 
reproduces the sensation of knowledge through the collection of objects. 
The Visual Collection: Maps 
Finally, of course, the British produced countless maps of their territory for public 
consumption and practical use. Early maps tended to focus on safe routes of passage, and 
reflected the fact that mapmakers “follow[ed] the course of rivers, roads, or mountain 
ranges, and us[ed] bearings to remarkable rock formations, peaks, or permanent 
structures as the bases for their maps” (Barrow 64). These maps included illustrations in 
cartouches and sometimes left out unstudied areas; especially in comparison to later maps 
these early efforts seem “rambling” and picturesque, with a “journey-like quality that 
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leads a viewer from a starting point to a destination” (Barrow 64). By contrast, beginning 
in the early nineteenth century, cartographers began to situate geography within latitude 
and longitude lines. Surveyors’ use of trigonometry offered a more consistent, accurate 
method for locating points in space. Where early maps were often artistically inaccurate, 
nineteenth-century maps were increasingly “systematic” and objective (Barrow 64-5). 
The immense Survey of India, a mapping effort that the East India Company began in 
1765 and that continued into the twentieth century, “eventually covered India with an 
imaginary grid on which the government could locate any site” in the continent (Cohn 7). 
Even the most apparently objective map offers a particular mode of perception, 
reflecting and influencing how the mind sees a landscape. Increasingly rationalized, 
scientific British maps reflected the British preference for order and objectivity, and also 
the British desire for physical oversight to aid government (Barrow 7). They suggest that 
visual knowledge facilitates rule. But they also implicitly argue that the British were 
naturally suited to rule through their rational superiority, which could impose visual and 
governmental order (Edney 36). The Survey of India sought to show the Indian 
subcontinent, with all its local differences, as one perceptual–and conceptual–entity, 
united under British rule (Edney 3-16). 
Of course, any map was the collection and distillation of multitudinous intense 
local efforts. Surveyors were often accompanied or followed by researchers into local 
zoology, anthropology, geology, botany, history, culture, and demographics (Cohn 7). 
Surveyors filled journals with sketches and drawings and notes to aid their later 
cartographic maps, and sometimes also kept personal books of images or notes while 
engaged on their official business (Barrow 71, 78, Falconer 270-273). Any Survey of 
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India map, therefore–whether of the earlier journey-like or the later rationalized variety–
represents the widest view of a collection of individual views. 
The novel’s descriptions of the lama’s travels offer the reader a totalizing yet 
particularized perspective on India not unlike the Survey of India’s great maps. The lama 
mistrusts information obtained through his senses, and seeks the holy river of the Buddha 
precisely because he seeks to be free of Illusion, which he associates with mere 
appearances. Yet, practically speaking, his quest requires him to walk and look. And 
when he believes he has found the river and immersed himself in it, he explains his 
metaphysical, mystical vision largely with concretely visual references: 
Yea, my Soul went free, and, wheeling like an eagle, saw indeed that there was no 
 Teshoo Lama nor any other soul.  As a drop draws to water, so my Soul drew near  
to the Great Soul which is beyond all things. At that point, exalted in 
contemplation, I saw all Hind, from Ceylon in the sea to the Hills, and my own 
Painted Rocks at Such-zen; I saw every camp and village, to the least, where we 
have ever rested.  I saw them at one time and in one place; for they were within 
the Soul.  By this I knew the Soul had passed beyond the illusion of Time and 
Space and of Things.  By this I knew that I was free.  I saw thee lying in thy cot, 
 and I saw thee falling downhill under the idolater – at one time, in one place, in  
 my Soul, which, as I say, had touched the Great Soul.  Also I saw the stupid body  
 of Teshoo Lama lying down, and the hakim from Dacca kneeled beside, shouting  
 in its ear.  Then my Soul was all alone, and I saw nothing, for I was all things,  
 having reached the Great Soul…. Then a voice cried: ‘What shall come to the boy  
 if thou art dead?’ and I was shaken back and forth in myself with pity for thee;  
 and I said: ‘I will return to my chela, lest he miss the Way.’ …. Then a voice  
 cried: ‘The River!  Take heed to the River!’ and I looked down upon all the  
 world, which was as I had seen it before – one in time, one in place – and I saw 
 plainly the River of the Arrow at my feet…. I saw the River below me – the River 
 of the Arrow – and, descending, the waters of it closed over me; and behold I was 
 again in the body of Teshoo Lama, but free from sin, and the hakim from Dacca 
 bore up my head in the waters of the River.  It is here!  It is behind the mango- 
 tope here – even here!  (Kipling 337-8) 
The lama references specific events from his travels with Kim, alerting the reader to the 
fact that if the vision he now narrates functions as a holistic vision of all of India 
simultaneously, this vision is possible because the lama has in fact seen so much of India. 
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In addition to his travels with Kim on the Grand Trunk Road and into the Hill Country, 
the lama has crossed India extensively on his own. As if his rest stations are nodes on a 
network, the lama returns regularly to stay in a temple at Benares, or with the woman 
from Kulu, arriving sometimes “from the South… whence the wonderful fire-boats go to 
Ceylon,” sometimes “from the wet green West and the thousand cotton-factory chimneys 
that ring Bombay,” and “once from the North” where he revisited the Wonder House at 
Lahore (Kipling 213-14). Having seen these places in person, the lama can reconstitute 
them in a single holistic vision, like a cartographer using notes and sketches taken on the 
spot to create a single comprehensive map. 
As Said notes, then, the lama’s “encyclopedic vision of freedom” is surprisingly 
like the practical empiricism of “Colonel Creighton’s Indian Survey, in which every 
camp and village is duly noted” (142-3). Kipling’s previous narration of the lama’s 
travels suggests his walks encompass much of India indeed. His metaphysical vision 
offers a holistic version of the British attempt to build an all-encompassing picture of 
India from a multitude of fragments; the lama himself has sewn together his variegated 
visual exposures to experience them as one integrated whole. The reader who, prepared 
by Kipling’s description of the lama’s experience, visualizes the lama’s vision takes the 
perspective of one who surveys from above, like Colonel Creighton poring over a map. 
This vision of the lama, however, is not the rational and objective vision of a 
nineteenth-century British surveyor, and Kipling seems to leave the choice to interpret it 
from a mystical or rational standpoint up to the reader. The text provides an alternative 
version of the story the lama relates about his experience that offers a pragmatic 
explanation. This version comes in the words of Hurree Babu, a Bengali ethnographer 
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and figure of fun in Kipling’s treatment, who has adopted some English research habits 
but retained some Indian habits of mind. The reader gets the Babu’s story first, when 
Hurree describes to Kim how he saved the lama from drowning. Kim has heard from his 
caretaker, the woman of Kulu, that while he was ill and in bed the Babu “had the sense to 
fish the Holy One [the lama] out of the brook” (Kipling 327). Kim asks the Babu for his 
own explanation, and Hurree replies: 
“Oah yess.  I am his good friend, I tell you.  He was behaving very strange… I 
followed him on his meditations, and to discuss ethnological points also…. By 
Jove, O’Hara, do you know, he is afflicted with infirmity of fits.  Yess, I tell you. 
Cataleptic, too, if not also epileptic.  I found him in such a state under a tree in 
articulo mortem, and he jumped up and walked into a brook and he was nearly 
drowned but for me.  I pulled him out.” 
“Because I was not there!” said Kim.  “He might have died.” 
“Yes, he might have died, but he is dry now, and asserts he has undergone 
transfiguration.”  The Babu tapped his forehead knowingly.  “I took notes of his 
statements for Royal Society – in posse.”  (Kipling 328-9) 
Here then is the practical explanation, in Hurree’s professional opinion combining 
his Western learning with his native accent. The lama has had a fit–perhaps one that 
medicine can diagnose. While under its influence, he wandered into an actual river. The 
Babu saved him from drowning while in the throws of this temporary brain dysfunction, 
and has now recorded it as an example of native culture for the Royal Society. The 
episode is catalogued within the empire’s epistemology. The reader is also thus enabled 
later to interpret the lama’s own words, quoted in the previous section, by imagining 
details the Babu’s story suggests: whatever caused the fit, the holy river is an actual river 
into which the lama stumbled while under its influence. The lama’s version indicates that 
he is aware, whether mystically or through physical sensation, that the Babu both spoke 
to him while he was physically incapacitated and also pulled him from the water. 
Because Kipling does not overtly contrast the Babu’s story with the lama’s, however, the 
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reader must do that work. We are left to imagine whether the lama has also heard a 
mystical “voice” admonishing him to remember Kim and to “Take heed to the River!” or 
has simply given the Babu’s practically motivated warnings metaphysical import. The 
lama’s holistic vision of India and his subsequent discovery of the sought-after river may 
be the work of mysticism, or just the pragmatic result of a dream that stitched together 
discrete previous visual experiences with a stumble into physical water. That the reader 
can choose highlights the work curiosity performs in the context of this novel. 
The Great Game as Fantasy Space in Fiction 
If Kipling positions his reader in much the same position as someone studying an 
album or visiting a museum, nevertheless the information his novel provides is often 
fantasy masquerading as fact. The Great Game provides not just the novel’s context, but 
also a space for this fantasy – a space where ludic rules hold sway. As in Johan 
Huizinga’s description of game space, the Great Game represents a “stepping out of ‘real’ 
life” into a secluded sphere where an “absolute and peculiar order reigns” (Huizinga 8-
10). Kipling’s game likewise “operates self-consciously outside the established law in its 
own realm of reality” (Hooper 107). Kim and his fellow agents flirt dangerously with 
boundaries of English control when they gather information on the activities of Russians 
or rebellious Indians. Otherwise they inhabit the same spaces as other Indian and Anglo-
Indian subjects, but pursue their own secret purposes outside the laws of governing 
institutions, as becomes clear when Kim evades the British police to aid a mission from a 
higher imperial authority, or, when his training is complete, leaves the British school 
without a record except for the words “removed on appointment” (Kipling 212). 
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Just as the novel both presents collections and reproduces them in the reader’s 
experience, so it presents the Great Game and represents one. The Great Game as a 
metaphor structuring Kim’s espionage activity highlights the nature of the pursuit of 
knowledge that characterizes both the Great Game, and more importantly, also the idea of 
the collection as manifested in the novel. Knowledge collections in Kim facilitate wonder, 
that blend of pleasure and curiosity motivating study that I have been ascribing to real 
world British collections.   
Philip Fisher usefully describes this sort of experience as “a combination of 
passion and energy, intellectual alertness and pleasure in the unknown that [leads] on to 
science;” he finds a synonym for such curiosity in “wonder” (39). A feeling at the 
“border between sensation and thought, between aesthetics and science” (6), for Fisher, 
the word “wonder” itself “preserves the connection between intellectual curiosity (‘I 
wonder if…’) and the pleasure of amazement” reflected in exclamation “(‘What a 
wonder!’)” (Fisher 11). It occurs with the notice of something unexpected, unusual, or 
surprising – a break in the pattern – which prompts not fear but interest. Both the initial 
interest and the subsequent investigation are pleasurable, and repeated successful 
experience with investigation and explanation builds a foundation of confidence that 
allows interest to replace fear in increasingly unusual situations (Fisher 48-9).137   
Fisher’s description of this process of investigation and reintegration echoes Ken 
Arnold’s comment on the work scholars perform with collections. “Wonder, curiosity, 
and successful explanation,” writes Fisher, “notice the world and then renormalize that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137Wonder results from the instantaneous visual apprehension of something out of the ordinary; the pleasure 
of this sensation uniting aesthetic appreciation with curiosity propels investigation (Fisher 17-18).  Vision 
is key, as Fisher asserts: “Wonder is the outcome of the fact that we see the world.  Only the visual is 
instantaneous, the entire object and all its details present at once” (17). !
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world, by fitting the exceptional back into the fabric of the ordinary” once the exceptional 
has been studied (48). Similarly, someone using a collection examines the unusual and 
the surprising in order not just to better understand these items but also to fit them within 
the patterns of the whole under survey. Curiosity sparks interest, and pleasure then both 
accompanies and motivates the work of investigation. The process involves learning and 
the result is knowledge.138 
The collection as I have defined it offers just this sort of pleasurable work 
experience, which provokes attention to pattern and detail; the fantasy of knowledge the 
collection facilitates depends in part on a wonder-ful reaction in its viewer. 139 Kim, as an 
adventure full of wonders, elicits curiosity in the reader–a curiosity that is both fueled by 
and fuels the visual epistemology of the novel as it recapitulates the idea of the collection.  
Like the collection, where serious pursuit of knowledge and playful interest in the 
unusual collide, Kim points out that curiosity can be simultaneously ludic and serious, 
wonderful and dangerous. The confines of the novel guarantee the reader safety while its 
rich and curious catalogues offer vicarious adventure. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138Cognitive psychology studies what Fisher calls wonder or curiosity as exploratory or novelty seeking 
behavior. According to this level of explanation, humans like all other animals investigate the novel and the 
unfamiliar, perhaps because more information means better preparedness for the unexpected (Pisula 59-60). 
The experience of novelty offers pleasure in and of itself, in addition to the rewards of new information. As 
one psychologist puts it, “The tendency to detect, recognize, and seek novelty must be regarded as a 
fundamental motivational process regulating the behavior of animals and men” (Pisula 101).  In Fisher’s 
terms, both the initial wondering curiosity and the subsequent information that investigation affords are 
pleasurable. Curiosity can seem to be a sort of biological default, with a novel stimulus always provoking 
interest. In humans, “exploratory behavior” includes sophisticated intellection as well as observation, 
manipulation and physical movement; we recognize a gap in our knowledge and feel compelled to fill it. 
As with lower animals, humans who feel confident in their ability to learn from exploration will seek to 
satisfy curiosity that novelty arouses; humans who feel “the demands of the situation are excessive” or 
dangerous will retreat instead (Pisula 72, 131). Translated into humanities terms, this begins to look like 
Fisher’s formulation: something new and surprising elicits curiosity and investigation when context and 
previous experience suggest safe exploration.  Both curiosity and investigation are rewarding. !
139Though I am calling pleasurable experiences “play” here, it should be noted that play and exploration as 
they are understood psychologically are similar but not necessarily the same behaviors.  They may both be 
rewarding, and sometimes for similar reasons, but should not be conflated (Pisula 57-65). 
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I have argued that collections functioned as ordered spaces of catalogued 
knowledge represented (often visually) within the confines of their boundaries. These 
boundaries, as if reflecting the organizational as well as the research powers of their 
creators, offered the sense of knowledge expanding far beyond their confines. Britain’s 
collections of India gave users (the illusion of) the power to understand India holistically 
via limited yet comprehensive data. In their very scientific, empirical prowess, therefore, 
they offer a fantasy whose gears are turned by curiosity. 
Conclusion: Fiction as the Game 
Fiction itself might be compared to a game in which an “absolute and peculiar 
order reigns,” and readers set aside their awareness of reality and their defenses against 
trickery to participate. There is some evidence that fiction does generally offer a safe 
space for curiosity to lead readers into the pleasurable work of perspective-sharing. In 
Suzanne Keen’s work with undergraduates, students were much more likely to feel 
empathy for the protagonist of a novel than for the writer of a purportedly non-fictional 
letter asking for help. Keen speculates that a fictional context may open the floodgates of 
emotion in uniquely unguarded ways: readers who know that what they read is fiction 
abandon the skepticism that protects them from emotional manipulation, and experiment 
more freely with sharing another’s perspective (Keen 29-35). Similarly, the fictional 
nature of Kipling’s novel might also predispose readers to share the perspectives of his 
protagonists more freely than they might with real life versions. The context of fiction 
allows the safe satisfaction of readerly curiosity about others. 
The content of this novel, exotic to Western eyes especially of its day, may offer a 
uniquely interesting satisfaction of curiosity within the context of fiction. Kipling permits 
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the possibility of magical causation for strange events like the lama’s vision, even as he 
suggests practical explanations. For instance, when Kim and the lama encounter a snake 
near the bank of a little stream, Kim hastily warns the lama and looks for a way to kill it, 
for “No native training can quench the white man’s horror of the Serpent” (Kipling 91).  
But the lama stops him, reminds him that the snake is a soul “upon the Wheel as we are,” 
crosses “within a foot of the cobra’s poised head,” and commands Kim to follow, saying 
“Come. He does no hurt” (Kipling 91-92). Kim follows, and “the snake, indeed, made no 
sign” (Kipling 92). Does the lama’s religious awareness guarantee they are safe, or is this 
lucky naïveté? Kipling does not comment.  
Lurgan Sahib’s attempt at mind control over Kim, when he compels him to see a 
broken vessel as whole merely via verbal commands, remains arguably the most 
inexplicable “magic” of all. Kim seems largely under Lurgan’s spell, and begins to see 
the vessel shimmer back into completion as the older man commands – but then he thinks 
suddenly of “the multiplication table in English” and this clarifies his vision: 
 The jar had been smashed – yess [sic], smashed – not the native word, he would  
 not think of that – but smashed – into fifty pieces, and twice three was six, and  
 thrice three was nine, and four times three was twelve.  He clung desperately to  
 the repetition. The shadow-outline of the jar cleared like a mist after rubbing  
 eyes (Kipling 202) 
 With his recourse to his British self – to English language and rational systems – Kim 
reasserts his own power of sight and rational intellect. But at the same time, the novel’s 
refusal of any practical explanation for Lurgan’s near-success reminds the reader that 
Kipling asserts few clear boundaries separating rational from mystical explanations. 
The boundaries of a novel may allow Western readers unique permission to 
entertain its exotic contents in this respect, too. Since the “scientific revolution” in the 
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West, magical thinking and behavior have been relegated to the domain of children and 
the pre-scientific, as the survivors of past ages (Subbotsky 12-14). But studies show that 
while children in developed countries do gradually substitute scientific explanations for 
mind-over-matter magical ones to explain mysterious events, their belief in magic is 
repressed rather than expunged. Indeed, while Piaget and other child developmental 
psychologists have seen magical thinking as “an immature stage in the development of 
intelligence,” more recent studies suggest that magical thinking serves a useful cognitive 
purpose even in adults, aiding creativity and problem-solving (Subbotsky 34, 42).   
This may help to explain why art with magical causation maintains such appeal 
across the age spectrum. While adults with scientific education are much more wedded to 
verbal disbelief in magic, preferring physical explanations for counterintuitive events, 
they nevertheless behave as if magical thinking persists on an unconscious level. This is 
true to an equal extent of adults from rural areas in undeveloped countries, and of adults 
from developed countries with a standard scientific education. Furthermore, adults given 
the chance to explore the possibility of magical causation in a low-cost situation, wherein 
the researcher reassures them that he understood they disavow magic in favor of science, 
overwhelmingly demonstrate curiosity about magic (Subbotsky 59, 63-76). 
 Kipling’s novel thus offers a safe space for the satisfaction of curiosity in more 
ways than one. Kim’s rich catalogues, romance of the exotic, and possibility of magic 
combine to produce the sense of “a ‘great and wonderful land’” that also has “the special 
quality of a den, a secret place in which a child’s fantasy life can flourish safely, 
protected from the destructive realism of adult eyes” (Cronin 7). Kim himself is one 
model for the reader within the fantasy, for his serious play reproduces what fiction 
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readers do: inhabit other perspectives, interpret characters from limited descriptions, and 
turn curiosity into information. The novel both elicits and also seems to satisfy this 
curiosity with its catalogues, replicating the experience of a visual collection. Its pages 
offer the landscapes of a nineteenth-century photographic album, the visual detail of 
character “type” studies, the catalogues of a Victorian museum, and the encompassing 
vision of a Survey of India map. Part of the fantasy it offers is the same dream of 
comprehensive knowledge built from concrete particulars that such collections propose. 
From within the safe boundaries of a book’s covers, readers can feel they know India. 
 But if fiction is a great game, it has its own dangers – as Kim illustrates equally 
well. Story draws us in and lowers our defenses; captivated by narrative, “we drop our 
intellectual guard. We are moved emotionally, and this seems to leave us defenseless” 
(Gottschall 152). The more deeply readers are absorbed, the more a story can influence 
beliefs, shaping minds in ways that last (Green and Brock 701-703, 707). Yet this 
potential can be used for good or ill: fiction may make readers better empathizers, but 
that is not the same as making them better people. 
 If learning categorization means learning to privilege the features essential for 
dividing one group from another, then Kipling’s fantasy also practices readers in the 
British Empire’s categories. It reproduces picturesque rules for perceiving landscape, 
ordering and valuing it according to British aesthetics. It unites “British India” into one 
entity that ignores serious local differences of culture, history, and religion in favor of the 
interest of local color. It suggests that outsiders can know a place, through its objects, 
better than the people who live there and use them. It implies that the rational British are 
the natural rulers of India, capable of making visual order where disorder prevailed. It 
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flirts with occult magic just enough to satisfy curiosity without requiring its Western 
readers to abandon a superior self-image. It suggests that useful judgments about not just 
thoughts, but even character and worth, can be made from appearance. And of course, it 
positions the Indian “Oriental” – disingenuous, disorderly, in disarray – as the “other” of 
the rational British. Kipling’s failures, right in the middle of his love, point to the dangers 
inherent in the perspective-sharing work of fiction’s play. Kim suggests that fiction itself 
might be compared to a thrilling game of pretend – one that offers story’s incredible 
power to sway, transport, and transform, and also its potential for human mistake. 
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CODA: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation argues that visual information offers one important avenue for 
the perspective-sharing work that fiction performs, and that greater numbers of Victorian 
novelists than have been previously acknowledged sought precisely to leverage newly 
common visual experiences into sympathy. The larger implication of such a claim, as I 
have suggested, is that these novels (perhaps all widely-shared fiction) also act as 
cognitive artifacts – as stories that articulate and assimilate changes in British culture. In 
part through their embodiment of wider cultural movements (industrialization, 
urbanization, political and economic upheaval, the growth of empire) within specific 
characters and circumstances, they help to make some sense of what might otherwise be 
even messier and less digestible to the average reader. As George Eliot’s own words 
quoted in Chapter Four suggest, this was an era in which at least some novelists believed 
their fiction could do things: convey knowledge, spread belief, effect reformation. Eliot 
shares William Wordsworth’s belief that lasting revolutions depend on literature’s effect 
on minds and hearts. While much scholarship to this point suggests that what Victorian 
fiction does when it engages the visual is disrupt sympathy, I have attempted to show that 
this may be too simplistic a reading of Victorian visual sophistication. Indeed, where 
Victorian fiction does use the visual to alienate audiences in those works I have studied, 
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this caused surprise enough to suggest the violation of expectation, rather than merely the 
confirmation of familiar habits of mind.140 
 The project suggests that, if novels are cognitive artifacts for sharing perspectives 
in order to change minds, their potential may be used for ends good or ill. As my chapters 
imply, stories can further readers’ participation within an imagined community of empire, 
or challenge readers to see and sympathize with the human face of difficulty during 
economic turmoil. Stories seem to help humans make order, but the sort of order they 
make depends on cooperation between writer and reader – cooperation that is also always 
contingent on both wider cultural trends, and also personal perception and inclination. 
 As it stands, this project is much wider than it is deep. My work has sometimes 
felt like aggregation as much as like analysis. At times I have summarized in a few 
reductive sentences fields that scholars spend careers studying, and, I fear, glossed 
arguments with nuance not fully captured in my prose. My reach has exceeded my grasp. 
I am uncomfortable with the dissertation’s lack of depth in favor of breadth. To ready it 
for a book will require significant digging underwater, beneath the places where it 
currently skates shallow surfaces.  
Perhaps the most important personal realization that writing this dissertation 
produced is my sense of story’s ability to shape minds in ways that last. Its claim to 
interest is its analysis of the historical uses of story. 
One final note: Along the way I also discovered that Victorian natural history 
writing and illustration had an influence on Victorian culture far, far exceeding its 
appearance in modern critical study. I can so far unearth only a handful of scholarly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140Fear may underlie such violations – the half-suspected fear, for instance, that indeed physiognomy did 
not provide infallible information about others’ characters – but this does not necessarily negate the idea 
that more Victorians found new visual sensations more congenial than much modern critical work suggests.  
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monographs treating the genre of naturalist writing, despite the historical fact that this 
material probably appeared in virtually every middle-class Victorian home. I suspect that 
the hugely popular stories Victorian writers narrated about the natural world – its hidden 
wonders, its aesthetic interest, its importance for study, its significance for humans – are 
stories we still need. Rachel Carson’s 1962 book Silent Spring unleashed contemporary 
American environmentalism with its narrative of bird death due to pesticide use, and yet 
other counter-narratives to scientific evidence have proven strong enough that fifty years 
later a significant percentage of Americans find climate change unconcerning. Some 
researchers speculate that if current trends continue, in the next hundred years we will 
eliminate nearly half the plant and animal species alive now (Williams 44).  
Nineteenth-century England’s industrialization and simultaneous naturalism is 
thus a story we are still writing. By the same token, it is from influential Romantic 
thinkers like William Wordsworth and Humphry Davy that we have inherited persistent, 
if contested, ideas that science ought to serve the public, that an education in science is 
crucial equipment for good citizenship, that advances in literature and in science ought to 
be accessible, that individual imagination is hallowed, and that art can elevate and even 
heal. I have also suggested that Romantic ideas about how humans come to know the 
inner lives of other humans persist and return. I think there is important work to be done 
on story as it can help convince the public to conserve the natural world, our shared 
home. Essentially I!hope!that!Dorothy Wordsworth’s naturalist-like stories can be our 
stories in this sense, too, as they belonged also to the Victorians.!
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